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I.   INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 This Article addresses a set of important and unsettled legal ques-
tions on which there has been scant theoretical scholarship.1 A few 
examples suggest the nature, importance, and difficulty of the  
questions: 
 Tenant suffers substantial lost income as a result of a careless 
error by Contractor in renovating a commercial building. A term in 
                                                                                                                  
 * Professor, Berkeley Law School. I thank participants at the Second North 
American Workshop on Private Law Theory, the Obligations VI Conference, the 10th 
International Conference on Contracts, and workshops at the Bar-Ilan Faculty of Law, 
Berkeley Law School, and the Hebrew University Faculty of Law for comments on drafts. I 
owe a special debt to Shawn Bayern and Amnon Lehavi for their extensive comments on 
drafts and to Adam Nguyen for invaluable editorial assistance. 
 1. The most relevant theoretical literature concerns the choice between contract law 
and tort law as a legal regime to determine when a party to a contract is liable to a 
nonparty for harm caused by negligence that occurs in performing the contract. See John 
G. Fleming, Tort in a Contractual Matrix, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 661 (1995); Israel Gilead, 
Non-Consensual Liability of a Contracting Party: Contract, Negligence, Both, or In-
Between?, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 511 (2002); Simon Whittaker, Privity of Contract 
and the Tort of Negligence: Future Directions, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1996).  
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Tenant’s contract with Owner, who hired Contractor, absolves 
Owner from liability for the loss. Does the term also absolve Con-
tractor from liability to Tenant? What if the exculpatory term is in 
the contract between Owner and Contractor?2 
 Buyer overpays for goods as a result of Appraiser’s careless er-
ror. Seller hired Appraiser. A term in the contract between Buyer 
and Seller makes the appraisal “final and binding.” Does this term 
bar a claim by Buyer against Appraiser?3 
 Creditor detrimentally relies on Accountant’s report in extend-
ing credit to Company. Company hired Accountant. A term in Ac-
countant’s contract with Company limits the scope of Accountant’s 
duty to investigate accuracy of Company’s financial information. 
Does this term also define the scope of Accountant’s duty  
to Creditor?4 
 A building has a defective foundation as a result of Builder’s 
mistake. Years later, after Owner sells the building to Purchaser, 
the defect becomes manifest. The contract between Owner and 
Builder absolves Builder from liability for the defect. Does this 
term bar a claim by Purchaser against Builder?5 
                                                                                                                  
 2. J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory implicitly answers both questions no. 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 
1979). Berschauer/Phillips Construction Co. v. Seattle School District answers both 
questions yes. 881 P.2d 986 (Wash. 1994). Neither case suggests any weight is given to the 
presence or absence of an exculpatory term in either contract. Lutz Engineering Co. v. 
Industrial Louvers, answers the second question yes, giving some weight to the exculpatory 
terms. 585 A.2d 631 (R.I. 1991). This case is addressed in Section VII.B.2, infra. 
 3. Dressel Assocs., Inc. v. John A. Welsch Real Estate Appraisers, Inc. explicitly 
answers the question yes. 632 A.2d 906, 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Glanzer v. Shepard 
gives the same answer implicitly. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922). Victor P. Goldberg argues that 
the correct answer in the case was no. Victor P. Goldberg, A Reexamination of Glanzer v. 
Shepard: Surveyors on the Tort-Contract Boundary, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 475 
(2002). See infra Part III, for an explanation about why the Appraiser is not a third-party 
beneficiary of the term. See infra Section VII.B.2, for a discussion of the handling of the 
case in negligence law. 
 4. Most cases answer yes, if the limitation is communicated to the creditor. See 
Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying Illinois law); First Nat’l 
Bank of Newton Cty. v. Sparkmon, 442 S.E.2d 804 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Dakota Bank v. 
Eiesland, 645 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); First Nat’l Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 
386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989). In New York, if the court followed the lead of Ossining Union 
Free School District v. Anderson, then the question would be answered no. 539 N.E.2d 91 
(N.Y. 1989). Section V.A, infra, explains why the term is not enforceable against the 
plaintiff under the privity rules in contract law. Section VII.C, infra, explains the relevance 
of the term to the duty issue in the law of negligent misrepresentation. 
 5. Newman v. Tualatin Development Co. answers no. 597 P.2d 800, 803 (Or. 1979). 
Aronsohn v. Mandara answers yes, if there is an exculpatory term. 484 A.2d 675, 680-81 
(N.J. 1984). Apparently this is without regard to whether the buyer knows or has reason to 
know of the term. See id. Crowder v. Vandendeale precludes the claim whether or not there 
is an exculpatory term. 564 S.W.2d 879, 881-82 (Mo. 1978). Robert L. Cherry collects 
additional cases, which come out different ways. Robert L. Cherry, Jr., Builder Liability for 
Used Home Defects, 18 REAL EST. L.J. 115 (1989). Part VI considers the possibility of 
enforcing the term using the law of equitable servitudes. Section VII.B.2, infra, explains 
the relevance of the term to the duty issue in the law of economic negligence. 
2015]  PRIVITY’S SHADOW 3 
 
 Alarm Service has a term in its agreement with Building Own-
er absolving Alarm Service from liability for consequential damag-
es. The alarm fails in a fire. As a result of the failure of the alarm, 
Tenant is injured. Does the term limit the liability of Alarm Ser-
vice to Tenant?6  
 In the simplest case, three parties are connected through two con-
current contracts. One contract connects a harm-doer and a third 
party. The harm-doer, in performing this contract, carelessly harms a 
victim. The victim is in harm’s way because of the second contract, 
which connects him with the same third party. One of the two con-
tracts contains a term that clearly shows the parties to that con-
tract—the third party and either the harm-doer or the victim—
intended to exculpate the harm-doer from liability to the victim for 
the harm in question. This simple case presents what I will call the 
Basic Issue: does the exculpatory term bear on the harm-doer’s liabil-
ity to the victim even though it is not in a contract between the two  
of them?  
 More complicated cases can involve four or more parties, with the 
harm-doer and the victim connected through a chain of three or more 
contracts. Rather than being concurrent, the making and perfor-
mance of the contracts may be separated by many years. A non-
contractual link, such as a gift, may form part of the chain of rela-
tionships or transactions that connects the harm-doer and victim. 
Further complicating matters, the relevant term may be ambiguous, 
or the absence of liability may be implicit in a contract, transaction, 
or relationship in the chain. 
 The Basic Issue and these more complicated iterations could not 
arise under the old form of the privity doctrine, which largely 
shielded an actor from liability to a nonparty for careless perfor-
mance of a contract. The absence of a third-party beneficiary claim 
meant that only the other party could recover on a contract claim, 
while the privity doctrine shielded that same party from any duty in 
                                                                                                                  
 6. Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp. answers no, 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1373 (N.Y. 1992), 
(this logically follows from holding the exculpatory term does not bar a contribution claim 
by co-defendants because of the absence of privity). Fretwell v. Protection Alarm Co. 
answers yes. 764 P.2d 149, 151 (Okla. 1988). Marjorie A. Shields collects additional cases, 
which come out both ways. Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Exculpatory and Limitation of Liability Clauses in Burglary, Fire, and Other 
Home and Business Monitoring Service Contracts, 36 A.L.R. 6th 305 (2008). This type of 
case is addressed in Section VII.A.2, infra. It proposes a no-duty rule that would cover 
many such claims. 
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tort to a nonparty. The privity doctrine thus made a contract a “per-
fect circle” of obligation in which obligation could exist only between 
the parties to the contract.7  
 The old form of the privity doctrine was demolished by the middle 
of the twentieth century, but because negligence liability was still 
tightly constrained to misfeasance causing fairly direct physical 
harm,8 its demolition did not immediately give rise to the issues at 
hand.9
 
The narrow ambit of negligence liability limited the frequency 
of cases in which parties might have valid reasons to contract out of 
the background liability rules. And when such cases did arise, courts 
could use the restrictive rules in negligence law to deny liability if its 
absence seemed warranted. Consequently, there was never a need to 
explain the absence of liability by reference to an exculpatory term 
that was not in a contract between the harm-doer and the victim. 
 However, as the ambit of negligence liability has expanded during 
the second half of the twentieth century on several dimensions—to 
reach nonfeasance, remote physical harm, and pure economic harm—
a new dynamic has made the questions more pressing. As the poten-
tial ambit of negligence liability expands on these dimensions, it be-
comes increasingly questionable whether imposing liability for care-
lessly caused harm is in the interest of the parties, or the interest of 
society.10 It also becomes increasingly questionable whether liability 
is justifiable as a matter of fairness.  
 These increasing questions justify greater deference to private ar-
rangements that provide less protection than the background liability 
rules. Deference may be warranted even though private ordering is 
imperfect, as it manifestly is when participants in a multi-person pro-
ject order their affairs through separate contracts. Conversely, and 
importantly, creating mechanisms to enable people to opt-out of the 
background liability rules makes it possible to have broader back-
ground liability rules.11 
                                                                                                                  
 7. Percy H. Winfield, The Restatement of the Law of Torts—Negligence, 13 N.Y.U. 
L.Q. REV. 1, 15 (1935) (“Contract was the perfect circle that must be marred by no 
indentation or protuberance.”). 
 8. During this period, negligence liability was generally confined to instances of 
misfeasance causing fairly direct physical harm.  
 9. John Goldberg and his co-authors harken back to this era when they define “easy 
duty cases” as “ones in which the plaintiff’s allegation is that the defendant carelessly 
pursued an affirmative course of conduct that directly caused the plaintiff physical harm.” 
JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 51 (2d ed. 2008). 
 10. See infra Section IV.C, which lays out how and why negligence law’s expansion 
has led to these doubts. 
 11. See infra Section VII.C, for an example. In many states, firms that supply widely 
disseminated financial information, such as auditors and credit rating agencies, have no 
duty of care to users of the information. These firms have no legal incentive to warn people 
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 This Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets forth the principles 
that courts should use to resolve these issues. The two relevant gen-
eral principles are straightforward: courts should consider the 
strength of the reasons for negligence liability and the quality of the 
victim’s assent to the exculpatory term. These familiar principles are 
taken from negligence law and contract law, and they implicate fa-
miliar factors in each body of law. Part III concerns cases in which 
the exculpatory term is in the victim’s contract, and the legal issue is 
whether the harm-doer is a third-party beneficiary of the term. The 
results in these cases generally are consistent with the principles in 
Part II. In these cases, tort principles that bear on the strength of the 
reasons for negligence liability inform contractual analysis in deter-
mining whether the harm-doer is a third-party beneficiary of the ex-
culpatory term. 
 Most of the problems in existing law arise in cases in which the 
exculpatory term is in the harm-doer’s contract with a third party. 
Part IV explains the problems with current law. Part V explains the 
privity rules in modern contract law and their rationale, which is re-
ducing nonparty information costs. The privity rules in contract law 
preclude using contract law to implement the principles in Part II 
when the victim is not a party to the contract with the exculpatory 
term. However, as Part V explains, exculpatory terms generally do 
not implicate the concern for information costs. Thus, we should be 
open to using bodies of law other than contract to give effect to an 
exculpatory term against a nonparty victim, when this is justified 
under the principles in Part II. 
 Parts VI and VII explain how courts should go about solving these 
problems using property and tort law. Part VI explains how property 
law and the law of equity can be used to implement the principles in 
Part II when the harm is caused by a defect in property and the ex-
culpatory term covering the defect can be enforced as an equitable 
servitude that runs with the property. Part VII explains how tort law 
can be used to implement the principles in Part II. Courts have had 
the greatest difficulty with cases in which the defendant negligently 
inflicts a pure economic loss on the plaintiff. I show how contract 
principles can and should inform tort’s no-duty analysis in these 
hardest of cases. Courts have had an easier time with cases in which 
                                                                                                                  
not to rely on the information they supply and a strong economic incentive to invite 
reliance because it makes the service supplied more valuable. Immunity from liability 
might be conditioned on information being delivered in a way that warns recipients that 
the information supplier is not willing to stand by its carefulness in checking the accuracy 
of the information. This is possible only if there is a legal basis for giving effect to an 
exculpatory term. 
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the quality of the victim’s assent to the exculpatory term is irrelevant 
to duty analysis. Familiar principles of tort law suffice to explain the 
absence of a duty in these easier cases. 
II.   GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
 In deciding whether an exculpatory term precludes a negligence 
claim, a court generally should consider the strength of the reasons 
for imposing negligence liability for the act and harm in question, 
absent the exculpatory term, and the quality of the victim’s assent to 
the exculpatory term. This Part explains these two general principles 
and identifies relevant factors under each. Just to be clear, I am not 
arguing that courts should actually resolve most cases by a direct 
balancing of the two principles and relevant factors. Typically the 
principles and factors will operate at a meta-level to explain a rule in 
contract or tort law that resolves a case.12 
A.   Strength of the Reasons for Negligence Liability 
 Familiar factors in negligence law determine the strength of the 
reasons for negligence liability. The principal reasons for imposing 
negligence liability are compensation and deterrence.13 Negligence 
law rests on the premise that compensation and deterrence are war-
ranted when the elements of a negligence claim are established. 
These elements are: (1) the harm-doer acted unreasonably; (2) his 
unreasonable action was a factual cause of harm to the victim; (3) the 
risk of such harm is among the risks that made the harm-doer’s ac-
tion unreasonable; (4) the harm can appropriately be quantified as 
damages; and (5) neither the victim nor another wrongdoer more  
appropriately bears responsibility for the harm.14 Obviously, the abil-
ity of a plaintiff to establish these elements is an important factor 
bearing on the strength of the reasons for negligence liability. If  
a claim involves bodily harm or physical harm to property, and if a 
reasonable juror could find the plaintiff established the first three  
                                                                                                                  
 12. Nor am I arguing that either principle can be reduced to a linear spectrum. There 
are legal discontinuities (e.g., the different significance accorded actual intent, manifest 
intent, and predicted intent in contract law and the different protection afforded against 
bodily harm and pure economic loss in tort law) that may map on to normative 
discontinuities. 
 13. See MARK A. GEISTFELD, ESSENTIALS OF TORT LAW 42-44 (2008).  
 14. This list omits the element of duty, because these factors are being used in duty 
analysis. 
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elements—an unreasonable act, factual cause, and legal cause or 
scope of duty, respectively—then a plaintiff generally is entitled to 
have a negligence claim go to the jury.15 
 However, even when a claimant may satisfy all of these elements, 
a negligence claim is sometimes disallowed under a no-duty rule be-
cause of two general countervailing factors. One general countervail-
ing factor is the availability of other mechanisms to achieve the goals 
of compensation and deterrence, or to otherwise avoid similar harm 
in the future. In short, a court asks how vulnerable people in the vic-
tim’s position would be to the risk of such harm without negligence 
liability.16 The other general countervailing factor is the cost and risk 
of error in using negligence liability as a mechanism for compensa-
tion and deterrence.17 These two factors work together. The first fac-
tor bears on the need for negligence liability to achieve compensation 
and deterrence, while the second bears on negligence liability’s effi-
cacy to achieve those goals.18 For example, the no-duty rules that ap-
ply to claims involving pure economic loss are generally explained 
either by the availability of other mechanisms to achieve compensa-
tion and deterrence, or by the inefficacy of negligence liability to 
achieve these goals, or by the combination of the two factors. 
 The proximity between the arguably wrongful act and the result-
ing harm is often stated as a primary factor.19 An act and resulting 
harm are considered proximate when the act and the harm are close 
in time and space and when the harm did not involve other unusual 
human conduct, particularly other wrongful human conduct that oc-
curs subsequent to the act (such an act is often referred to as a su-
perseding cause). While important, the factor of proximity is best un-
                                                                                                                  
 15. See infra Section IV.C, for authority on this point. In some states this statement 
needs to be qualified to account for rules on superseding cause and implied assumption of 
risk. Rules on superseding cause generally absolve an actor from liability when the 
immediate cause of the harm is another person’s unusual criminal or intentional wrongful 
conduct. Rules on implied assumption of risk generally absolve an actor from liability when 
the plaintiff makes a knowing, voluntary, and reasonable choice to confront the risk 
created by the actor’s negligence.  
 16. See Jane Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused 
“Middle Theory”, 50 UCLA L. REV. 531, 554-58 (2002); Jane Stapleton, The Golden Thread 
at the Heart of Tort Law: Protection of the Vulnerable, 24 AUSTL. B. REV. 135, 143-46 
(2003); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Ambit of Negligence Liability for Pure Economic Loss, 
48 ARIZ. L. REV. 749, 763-71 (2006). 
 17. Gergen, supra note 16, at 768-71.  
 18. See id. 
 19. Proximity is one of six factors in the Biakanja balancing test. See Biakanja v. 
Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (in bank). It is one of two factors in the two-part test for 
determining duty in Anns v. Merton. Anns v. Merton LBC [1978] AC 728 (HL) (appeal 
taken from Eng.). It is one of three factors in Canadian National Railway Co. Can. Nat’l 
Ry. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co., [1993] 1 F.C. 67, 72 (Can.). 
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derstood as being of secondary importance and relevant only insofar 
as the proximity of the act and the harm bears on the strength of the 
reasons for liability under some other factor.20 The temporal and 
physical proximity of an act and the resulting harm, and the in-
volvement of other unusual human conduct in the harm, can bear on 
all of the primary factors: the unreasonableness of the harm-doer’s 
act, whether the harm is among the risks that made the act unrea-
sonable, whether primary responsibility for the harm is appropriately 
allocated to the victim or to another wrongdoer, the victim’s vulnera-
bility to the harm, the risk of error in determining causation, and 
whether the harm-doer’s act is considered a moral wrong against the 
victim.21 Other factors of secondary relevance include the indetermi-
nacy of the liability the claimant seeks to impose on the harm-doer 
and the proportionality of the liability to the harm-doer’s degree  
of fault.22  
 Yet other factors that may also bear on the strength of the reasons 
for imposing liability are of contested relevance. An important con-
tested factor is whether the harm-doer’s act is considered a moral 
wrong against the victim.23 Another important contested factor is the 
character of the victim’s harm. Many people believe bodily harm to be 
more deserving of legal protection than pure economic loss.24 As a de-
scriptive matter, when harm is unintentional, tort law generally af-
fords people significantly greater protection from bodily harm and 
physical harm to property than from pure economic loss. 
                                                                                                                  
 20. Clarity on this point is important because while proximity generally increases the 
strength of the reasons for negligence liability, proximity also generally increases the 
possibility of a plaintiff’s knowledge and assent to an exculpatory term. 
 21. Many of these factors are present when a victim of an intentional criminal act 
sues a remote actor for having carelessly set the stage for the crime. For a discussion and 
criticism of the handling of the general problem by the Third Restatement, see John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The Restatement 
(Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1211 
(2009). 
 22. The concerns for imposing indeterminate and disproportionate liability are often 
cited as reasons for not imposing liability for far-flung economic losses. Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931), is a leading case expressing the concerns in a claim 
involving pure economic loss. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 
1928), expresses the same concerns to justify absolving a water company from liability to 
private individuals for failure to supply water to hydrants. 
 23. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 917, 928-32 (2010). For authority on the point that this is a contested consideration, 
see Michael L. Rustad, Twenty-First-Century Tort Theories: The Internalist/Externalist 
Debate, 88 IND. L.J. 419, 421-23 (2013). 
 24. See Mesiar v. Heckman, 964 P.2d 445, 451 (Alaska 1998) (stating that negligence 
resulting in solely pecuniary harm is not morally blameworthy). 
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B.   Quality of the Victim’s Assent to an Exculpatory Term 
 Familiar factors in contract law generally determine the quality of 
the victim’s assent to an exculpatory term. Assent to an exculpatory 
term is of the highest quality when the term is a “dickered term” in 
the victim’s contract (i.e., the term is understood to have been subject 
to negotiation or factored into price), the victim understands the risk 
she bears under the term, and the harm-doer proceeds with the 
transaction in reliance on the victim bearing the risk.25 Assent may 
still be of fairly high quality when these factors are absent. In partic-
ular, there can be a fairly high quality of assent to an implied term 
(or to a boilerplate term in a form contract) when the term covers a 
low probability risk that is not salient or worth the parties’ focusing 
on when the contract is made; the term is customary in a trade; the 
victim and harm-doer are regular participants in the trade; and the 
allocation of the risk in question to the victim is sensible in light of 
the overall transaction.26  
 Other factors of contested relevance in contract law may also bear 
on the quality of a victim’s assent to an exculpatory term. Disagree-
ments over how the law should treat boilerplate in consumer form 
contracts implicate the most important contested terrain in contract 
law for the immediate purposes.27 U.S. law generally gives presump-
tive effect to boilerplate in consumer form contracts even though we 
know consumers almost never read boilerplate.28 A criticism of this 
                                                                                                                  
 25. Karl Llewellyn juxtaposes “dickered term[s]” and boilerplate to make the point 
that assent is genuine only with respect to the former. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON 
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362 (1960). Most analysis of boilerplate focuses on the 
absence of genuine assent by a form-taker. But sometimes a form presenter uses a 
premade form that includes boilerplate terms the form presenter did not intend to be part 
of the agreement. This becomes an issue when a form presenter tries to exploit a term 
when a dispute arises. Under modern rules of contract interpretation, a court may decline 
to give effect to the term by finding neither party intended it to apply. See, e.g., Morin Bldg. 
Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that it was 
appropriate for a lower court to decline to give effect to artistic-effect and quality-fitness 
clauses in a form contract when it was likely neither party intended the terms to cover the 
aluminum factory wall). 
 26. See infra Section VII.B.1, for development of this point. 
 27. When a transaction is routinized, low probability risks are usually covered by 
boilerplate in a pre-made form. Often an exculpatory term is boilerplate. 
 28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating 
general rule that a party who signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing “adopts the 
writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing”); see 
also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CONSUMER CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. Preliminary Draft 
No. 1, at 12, 2014) (on file with author) (“[C]redible empirical evidence, as well as common 
sense and experience, suggests that consumers rarely read standard contracts no matter 
how these terms are disclosed. . . . Informed assent, which is a basic requirement in 
classical contract law, is, by and large, absent in the typical consumer contract, at least 
with respect to the standard contract terms.”). 
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policy asserts that contractual assent ideally involves a party’s sub-
jective, considered, and uncoerced consent to a transaction and all its 
material terms.29 Clearly, such “true assent” is an ideal. Practical 
considerations require that contract law determine assent objectively 
(often using rules that provide an advantage to people who know how 
to use approved forms to secure their preferred terms). Practical con-
siderations also require that contract law imply some material terms 
and that contract law tolerate much coercive use of economic power. 
Despite these real-world constraints, true assent is an important and 
persistent ideal in contract law. It has deep roots in both a libertari-
an and a liberal ethos. A policy giving presumptive effect to boiler-
plate in consumer form contracts is difficult to square with this ideal. 
This is particularly true when the consumer might have objected to 
the term had the term been brought to the consumer’s attention 
when the contract was made, for the policy denies the consumer a 
meaningful opportunity to object. 
 The argument for giving presumptive effect to boilerplate in con-
sumer form contracts dismisses the idealized notion of assent as not 
worth pursuing even as an aspirational goal.30 Instead, this argu-
ment views the relevant question as whether enforcing boilerplate is 
in the interest of consumers as a group and society at large. The ar-
gument treats as unimportant the quality of consumer assent in any 
specific case. What matters is the aggregated assent of consumers as 
a class, as this aggregated assent is mediated through competition in 
the market. Further, aggregated assent matters because it is a signal 
that a term is in the interests of consumers generally and in the in-
terest of society. The fact that some consumers may object to the 
term if it were brought to their attention is beside the point because 
the relevant question is assumed to be whether on-balance the term 
is in the interest of consumers as a group.31  
 This argument’s underlying ethos is utilitarian, not liberal or lib-
ertarian.32 The disagreements over the policy giving presumptive ef-
fect to boilerplate in consumer form contracts are not entirely norma-
tive (about relevant values). Indeed the primary disagreements may 
be empirical (about the facts). People disagree about the likelihood 
that markets actually deter firms from exploiting boilerplate to profit 
                                                                                                                  
 29. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW (2013). 
 30. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. 
REV. 883, 884 (2014). 
 31. If assent is a factor in the analysis in the cases discussed infra Section VII.A.2, 
then it is in this way. 
 32. The argument shares with libertarianism a distrust of public ordering and a 
preference for private ordering. 
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at the expense of consumers.33 And people disagree about the capaci-
ty of courts to identify and improve upon socially undesirable terms.34 
These empirical disagreements reflect pervasive disagreements about 
the capacity of people to protect themselves from the carelessness 
and cupidity of others and the capacity of courts to improve  
the world. 
 But there is also much common ground on boilerplate. Critics of 
the policy of giving presumptive effect to boilerplate in consumer 
form contracts concede form contracts can be a useful mechanism for 
self-governance, particularly when forms are used in a trade. Karl 
Llewellyn explains when and why courts should defer to boilerplate. 
At their best, Llewellyn observes, pre-made forms are “a triumph of 
private attention to what is essentially private self-government in 
the lesser transactions of life or in those areas too specialized for the 
blunt, slow tools of the legislature.”35 Llewellyn continues: 
[Where] two-fisted bargainers on either side of the table have 
worked out in the form of a balanced code to govern the particular 
line or trade or industry, there is every reason for a court to as-
sume both fairness and wisdom in the terms, and to seek in the 
first instance to learn, understand, and fit both its own thinking 
                                                                                                                  
 33. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler summarizes the prior literature, debating the role of 
competition in shaping boilerplate. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the 
Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2008). The paper reports the results of an empirical study of 
boilerplate in End User Licensing Agreements (EULAs) in the software industry. Id. at 
467-75. A principal finding is that “most EULA terms do not appear to depend on 
competitive conditions in a measurably important way.” Id. at 451. In other words, there 
was no evidence that sellers with market power exploited this power to obtain more 
advantageous EULA terms. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? 
Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 244 
(2013) (examining changes in EULA terms over time (2003 to 2010) and finding “that most 
of the terms that changed have become more pro-seller relative to the original contract”).  
 34. Skepticism about the ability of courts to improve upon the market in regulating 
boilerplate terms underpins the argument made by Douglas Baird that courts should 
generally enforce boilerplate while developing rules targeting specific terms that clearly 
have an anti-competitive effect or otherwise violate well-established public policy. 
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS 134-40 (2013). Robert Scott makes the 
general point that a strategy that directs courts to develop default rules “to direct the ex 
post efficient result . . . may thus be assuming a level of competency that courts cannot 
reasonably achieve,” Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 847, 858-59 (2000); see also Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under 
Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749 (2000) (arguing that courts 
lack the genius and guidance necessary to properly decide disputes that arise between 
contracting parties). John Murray observes critically that “[f]ormalists insist that 
Llewellyn’s ‘functional’ contract law failed because it is based on an assumption of 
competent courts and incompetent parties while the actual empirical condition that is 
alleged to prevail reveals competent parties and incompetent courts.” John E. Murray, Jr., 
Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 899 (2002). 
 35. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362 
(1960). 
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McDonnell Douglas, seeking to recover lost profits and claiming some 
of the problems with the aircraft were attributable to defects in the 
parts. Aeronaves could not recover its lost profits from McDonnell 
Douglas because its contract with McDonnell Douglas had an exclu-
sive repair-and-replace remedy. The case holds the exclusive repair-
and-replace remedy in the Aeronaves-McDonnell Douglas contract 
also shielded the parts suppliers from liability. This was correct. 
There was a high quality of assent: Aeronaves was a sophisticated 
party, and the exclusive repair-and-replace remedy was a material 
term in a negotiated contract. Had the tort claim been allowed, it 
would have negated the limitation of remedy in the Aeronaves-
McDonnell Douglas contract for McDonnell Douglas would have ul-
timately borne the cost of damages paid by the suppliers to Aer-
onaves under indemnity terms in the contracts between McDonnell 
Douglas and the parts suppliers. Further, the reasons for liability 
were weak: Aeronaves was not left entirely vulnerable, for McDonnell 
Douglas did substantial free work under the warranty to repair the 
defects; the loss was purely economic; and the tort claims against the 
parts suppliers raised difficult issues of fault and causation. 
 In cases in the lower-left quadrant, the reasons for liability are 
weak, and the victim’s assent to the exculpatory arrangement is low 
quality. The tragic case Hampton v. Federal Express Corp. illus-
trates.38 A thirteen-year-old cancer patient died while waiting for a 
bone marrow transplant. It turned out the boy’s blood type matched 
the blood type of a potential donor, but the match was not discovered 
in time because Federal Express failed to deliver samples of the boy’s 
blood. The contract between Fed Ex and the shipper, the hospital 
where the boy was being treated, limited the carrier’s liability to 
$100. The court held Fed Ex’s liability was capped at $100. This was 
correct, but largely because the reasons for liability were very weak. 
The risk Fed Ex was being asked to assume was grossly dispropor-
tionate to the price it was paid. The hospital was in a better position 
to avoid the loss. Someone at the hospital should have followed up to 
ensure the package was delivered. And it was highly speculative 
whether the transplant would have succeeded, and the boy would 
have lived even if the match had been identified. 
 In cases in the lower-right quadrant, the reasons for liability are 
strong, and the victim’s assent to the exculpatory arrangement is low 
quality. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. illustrates.39 Hen-
ningsen was seriously injured when the steering mechanism of a re-
cently purchased Chrysler automobile failed. The small print of 
                                                                                                                  
 38. 917 F.2d 1119, 1121 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Missouri law). 
 39. 161 A.2d 69, 79-80 (N.J. 1960). 
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Chrysler’s standard form agreement, which the dealer had the Hen-
ningsens sign, provided a limited warranty (90 days or 4000 miles) 
and limited Chrysler’s obligation to “making good” defective parts.40 
The court correctly held the contract did not shield Chrysler from lia-
bility for Henningsen’s injuries. The court reached this result by a 
contractual route, holding a purchaser from a dealer has a claim for 
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability against a manu-
facturer41 and invalidating the disclaimer and limitation of liability 
clauses for unconscionability.42  
 In cases in the upper-right quadrant, the reasons for liability—
ignoring for a moment the exculpatory term itself—seem strong, but 
the victim’s assent to the exculpatory term is high quality. J.C. Pen-
ney Co. v. Dillard’s Inc. illustrates.43 The parties were two tenants in 
a mall, which had an operating agreement under which the tenants 
agreed to carry casualty insurance and “to release each other from 
liability from any loss or damage to property covered by the party’s 
insurance policy.”44 The court held the exculpatory term barred a 
claim by one tenant against another for property damage resulting 
from the defendant’s negligence.45 The result is correct. This ar-
rangement is fairly common in commercial leases: it makes the mall 
an island of no-fault liability in a sea of negligence liability, with re-
spect to property damage disputes between tenants. Casualty insur-
ance fulfills the compensation function of the tort system.46 As a mat-
ter of legal principle, once compensation for a loss is secured, the law 
is indifferent about who bears the burden of funding compensation.47 
Other mechanisms, such as reputation and self-interest, may partly 
fulfill the deterrence function. And despite any shortfall in deter-
rence, commercial tenants may nevertheless prefer to opt out of the 
                                                                                                                  
 40. Id. at 74. 
 41. Id. at 76-84. 
 42. Id. at 85-95. 
 43. 75 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). 
 44. Id. at 797. 
 45. Id. at 798. 
 46. For a comparison of no-fault and liability insurance for auto accidents, see Gary T. 
Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: Advantages and Problems, 73 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 611 (2000). After a careful review of the available evidence, Schwartz concludes: 
“Pure no-fault, then, should be dramatically less expensive than either tort or hybrid no-
fault, partly because of reduced compensation for pain and suffering, but largely because of 
reduced litigation costs and reduced incentives for padded medical expenses.” Id. at 636. 
 47. Thus, there is a general rule validating indemnity agreements. This rule is not 
restricted to insurance and does not preclude an actor from indemnifying himself against 
his own negligence. Jones v. Strom Constr. Co., 527 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Wash. 1974)  
(en banc). 
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negligence system. They may determine that negligence law’s in-
creased deterrence is outweighed by its expected cost and risk  
of error.48  
 Cases in the upper-right quadrant may be interesting as a matter 
of policy because of the inconsistency of the private arrangement and 
background rules of negligence law. When people routinely contract 
out of the background rules of negligence law, it may be time to re-
think the rules. However, as J.C. Penney illustrates, current doctrine 
can handle these cases without difficulty whenever the term is in a 
contract to which the victim is a party. As Part III explains, the mod-
ern law of third-party beneficiary is available to enforce an exculpa-
tory term in the victim’s contract to benefit a harm-doer who is not a 
party to the contract. These rules mostly give effect to manifested 
intent, but the rules are supple enough to allow a court to consider 
factors that bear on the strength of the reasons for liability, particu-
larly when the term is ambiguous. In these cases tort principles in-
form contractual analysis. 
 Nor are cases in the extreme lower-right corner of the diagram, 
such as Henningsen, difficult to handle doctrinally. In these cases, 
courts can use the unconscionability doctrine and the public policy 
doctrine to invalidate exculpatory terms because there are strong 
reasons for liability and the quality of assent is weak. Often this will 
follow from a contextualized assessment of relevant factors. Clear 
rules also prohibit certain types of exculpatory terms. For example, 
manufacturers and distributors of new products generally cannot dis-
claim liability for defects that cause bodily harm.49 These rules are 
complemented by amorphous standards that allow courts to make 
one-off determinations under criteria that roughly and generally get 
at the strength of the reasons for imposing liability and the quality of 
a victim’s assent to a term.50 The amorphousness of the standards is 
                                                                                                                  
 48. For an argument that using negligence liability to compensate and deter is 
generally inefficient, see Paul H. Rubin, Courts and the Tort-Contract Boundary in Product 
Liability, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 119 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999). 
 49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
Under the U.C.C., “Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case 
of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.” U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW  
INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014).  
 50. Many jurisdictions use the six factor test in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of 
California to determine whether an exculpatory term violates public policy. 383 P.2d 441, 
444-46 (Cal. 1963) (in bank). The factor whether the “purchaser is placed under the control 
of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents” goes directly to 
vulnerability. Id. at 446 (footnote omitted). Going to the quality of assent is the factor of a 
harm-doer’s “decisive advantage of bargaining strength” and the factor whether “[i]n 
exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized 
adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay 
additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
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both a vice and a virtue.51 There is general consensus that the virtues 
outweigh the vices so long as the operation of these doctrines is con-
fined to cases in the lower-right corner.52 The judge makes necessary 
factual and normative determinations under these doctrines, not the 
jury, which reduces the worry about the amorphousness of  
the standards. 
 This leaves a large field of cases on which current legal doctrine 
offers less sure footing, if courts are to implement the principles iden-
tified in this Part in a coherent, consistent, and predictable way. 
Hampton v. Federal Express is emblematic of a recurring type of case 
that presents doctrinal difficulties, even though the outcome in many 
of these cases is easy to justify under general principles of tort law. In 
these cases, there are weak reasons for liability based on factors rele-
vant under tort law, and the conclusion that liability is neither in the 
interest of people like the plaintiff generally, nor in the interest of 
society, is reinforced by the presence of exculpatory terms in standard 
form contracts, typically in the form of a liability cap. Hampton reap-
pears in Section IV.C as an example to illustrate how modern rules of 
                                                                                                                  
Mark Geistfeld restates the relevant questions under these two factors—“Was the plaintiff 
a ‘weak bargainer,’ and did he or she ‘really acquiesce voluntarily in the contractual 
shifting of the risk?’ ”—using terms that even more clearly bear on the quality of assent. 
GEISTFELD, supra note 13, at 303. Three of the Tunkl factors do not correspond with the 
two general principles in any obvious way. These factors are whether a harm-doer is in “a 
business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation”; whether a harm-doer 
“is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a 
matter of practical necessity”; and whether a harm-doer “holds himself out as willing to 
perform this service for any member of the public.” Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (footnote 
omitted). These factors may get at whether negligence liability is routinely imposed for the 
conduct and harm in question, which one would hope relates to the efficacy of negligence 
liability. Geistfeld questions the relevance of the importance or necessity of the harm-doer’s 
activity. See GEISTFELD, supra note 13, at 304-05. The actual claim in Tunkl was for 
medical malpractice. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 442. The defendant, a charitable research hospital, 
required patients to sign a release as a condition for admission. See id.  
 51. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND 
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 129-43, 160-71 (1997), for a 
balanced and nuanced assessment of the vices and virtues of the unconscionability 
doctrine. Even critics of the doctrine concede the validity of its application in cases like 
Henningsen and the value of the doctrine’s flexibility. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, 
Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1975). The two 
principles roughly correspond with the substantive and procedural strands of the doctrine 
of unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability gets at the quality of assent. 
Substantive unconscionability gets at the fairness or reasonableness of a term. Because 
tort principles supply a basis for determining the reasonableness of an exculpatory term, 
this strand of unconscionability doctrine is less susceptible to the objection that it lacks 
guiding principles. 
 52. Victor Goldberg reports an oddity in this regard. VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING 
CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 245-78 (2006). Courts have held an 
exculpatory term absolving a ship classification society from liability for consequential 
damages violated public policy, but then denied consequential damages based on contract 
law principles. Id. at 261-64.  
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negligence law invite weak claims in cases involving physical harm. 
Section VII.A.2 will explain why the result in Hampton nevertheless 
follows from general principles of tort law once these principles are 
properly understood. It proposes a no-duty rule that gives effect to 
ubiquitous liability caps in certain types of form contracts. 
III.   THE PRINCIPLES AT WORK: THIRD-PARTY  
BENEFICIARY LAW  
 The principles identified in Part II can be seen at work in cases 
where the victim’s contract contains an exculpatory term, and it is 
ambiguous whether a nonparty harm-doer is an intended third-party 
beneficiary of the term. It is well established under third-party bene-
ficiary law that protection from a legal claim is one of the rights that 
can be granted to a third party by contract. The enforcement of a 
“Himalaya clause” in the maritime carriage trade is an example. 
When a carrier and a shipper want to extend a limitation of liability 
to other carriers who will handle the shipper’s goods (“through carri-
ers”), they express that intent with a Himalaya clause in the bill of 
lading.53 A through carrier is treated as a third-party beneficiary of 
the clause.54 The law on releases supplies another example. When a 
company negotiates a release, it typically wants the release to cover 
the company’s officers, employees, and related parties, such as a par-
ent company or a subsidiary. Third parties who are covered by the 
release can be identified individually by name, as a class, or by using 
global language. An identified third party is treated as a third-party 
beneficiary of the release.55  
 When an exculpatory term unambiguously covers a claim against 
a third party, U.S. courts are likely to enforce the term automatical-
ly, giving no consideration to the parties’ actual intent, or to the rea-
sonableness of applying the term. This is not consistent with the 
principles identified in Part II. Most U.S. courts use the “intent to 
benefit” test to determine third-party beneficiary status.56 Courts will 
                                                                                                                  
 53. Thomas R. Denniston et al., Liabilities of Multimodal Operators and Parties Other 
Than Carriers and Shippers, 64 TUL. L. REV. 517, 521 (1989). The leading U.S. cases 
involve terms that do not have this effect because they are ambiguous. See, e.g., Robert C. 
Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 302 (1959); Brown & Root, Inc. v. M/V 
Peisander, 648 F.2d 415, 417 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing the English cases). For cases 
enforcing the clause to benefit a third party, see La Salle Mach. Tool, Inc. v. Maher 
Terminals, Inc., 611 F.2d 56, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1979), and De Laval Turbine, Inc. v. W. India 
Indus., 502 F.2d 259, 264-70 (3d Cir. 1974). 
 54. See, e.g., La Salle Mach. Tool, Inc., 611 F.2d at 59-60; De Laval Turbine, Inc., 502 
F.2d at 264-70. 
 55. See, e.g., Mayfield v. NASCAR, Inc., 674 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2012) (enforcing global 
exculpatory clause in NASCAR drug testing agreement). 
 56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1)(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
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usually treat an expression of intent to create a legal right in a third 
party as decisive under this test.57 A good example of this is the way 
courts treat releases of legal claims against a class (as opposed to 
specific, named persons). Courts frequently ignore the fact that a 
party who procures a release does so only to minimize the risk of 
missing a claim that might ultimately redound to its own detriment, 
such as a claim against an employee. Instead of recognizing that 
point, U.S. courts generally enforce class releases literally, with no 
inquiry into whether applying the release to a claim against a third 
party actually benefits the party who paid for the release.58 The vic-
tim consequently basically bears the risk that a class release will 
cover an unintended harm-doer or an unintended harm, unless the 
victim can persuade a court he is entitled to relief on the legal ground 
of mistake. This is a consequence of the literalist approach U.S. 
courts take in contract interpretation.59 
                                                                                                                  
 57. For a critique of the intent to benefit test, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party 
Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1378-81 (1992). Eisenberg focuses on the problem of 
determining when a third party has the right to legal redress for non-fulfillment of a 
performance obligation. See id. 
 58. Brinton v. Bankers Pension Servs., Inc., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
Brinton was a party to a class action against a securities broker-dealer (Thon) and a 
dealership (Titan) involving failed investments in five limited partnerships (the Hill 
Williams entities). The class action litigation ended in a settlement in which Brinton 
released the defendants and their “principals” from:  
[A]ll claims, demands, causes of action, suits or debts of any kind or  
nature . . . that [Plaintiffs] . . . now have or may ever have against [the named 
Defendants] by reason of any matter or thing arising from, related to, or 
affiliated with any cause, act, transaction, omission or event whatsoever that 
occurred prior to the date of this Agreement, . . . involving the Hill Williams 
Entities. . . . 
Id. at 474. This release was held to bar a claim by Brinton against Bankers Pension 
Services (“BPS”) also involving a loss on an investment in the Hill Williams entities 
because BPS was within the defined class as a “principal” of a named defendant, as Thon 
had served as a broker dealer for BPS. BPS had no other connection to the defendants in 
the class action and there was no claim that the defendants had an economic interest in 
releasing BPS. The court refused to consider evidence offered by Brinton that he had not 
understood the release to cover dealerships other than the defendant to the class action. 
Global releases are handled differently. The problem typically arises when “[a]n injured 
party settles with an alleged tortfeasor’s insurer, signing a general release agreement that 
appears to excuse everyone in the world from liability. Then the injured party proceeds 
against a different alleged tortfeasor, who raises the general release as a defense.” 
Neverkovec v. Fredericks, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856, 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Neverkovec 
supplies guidelines to resolve such claims. A person seeking benefit of a general release has 
the burden of affirmatively showing the parties intended to release him. Id. Intent is 
determined objectively by examining the terms of the contract and the circumstances 
surrounding the release. The ultimate question is “how a reasonable person in the 
releasing party’s shoes would have believed the other party understood the scope of the 
release.” Id. at 867. Key to this determination is whether the other party had any apparent 
motive to cover the alleged tortfeasor with the release.  
 59. As explained below, third-party beneficiary law has a party-centric focus. The 
interests of the nonparty harm-doer are irrelevant to interpreting the exculpatory term— 
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 On the other hand, when a contract is ambiguous, U.S. courts will 
consider contextual factors in resolving the ambiguity, including the 
reasonableness of an interpretation. The outcomes in cases that re-
quire a court to interpret an ambiguous exculpatory term generally 
conform to the principles identified in Part II, except in one respect, 
which will be explained shortly.60 Thus, the strength of the reasons 
for imposing negligence liability explain and support a rule of mari-
time law requiring that the intent to protect a nonparty carrier from 
a negligence claim be clearly expressed.61 The rule grounds on a 
strong public policy against a carrier absolving itself from negligence 
liability. This policy is readily explained by a combination of vulnera-
bility to carelessness without liability, and the absence of factors that 
justify not imposing negligence liability (i.e., the concerns for inde-
terminate liability or the difficulty of ascertaining breach and causa-
tion). Also, it generally is not in the interest of either the initiating 
carrier or the shipper to absolve a through carrier when this is not 
agreed to in advance. 
 The results in two Ninth Circuit cases also generally conform to 
the principles identified in Part II. The cases are noteworthy because 
they involve the same exculpatory term but reach opposite results, 
for reasons that conform to the principles identified in Part II. Both 
cases involve a claim by a commercial airline against an aircraft 
manufacturer and a part supplier for defective work. In both cases, 
the contract between the aircraft manufacturer and the airline had 
an exclusive repair-and-replace remedy. Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. holds the exclusive repair-and-replace term 
precludes a claim against a parts supplier, when the manufacturer 
does substantial free work under the warranty to repair the defects.62 
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.63 holds the 
term does not preclude a claim against a parts supplier, when the 
                                                                                                                  
only the interests and purposes of the parties matter. If courts would keep this in mind, 
then courts would not interpret an exculpatory term literally when a literal interpretation 
leaves a party to the contract vulnerable to harm and when it does not advance the 
interests of the other party to the contract to absolve the nonparty harm-doer from 
liability. 
 60. It is uncontroversial that when parties engaged in a common enterprise are 
connected through a chain or web of contracts, the contracts “must be read and considered 
together” when interpreting an ambiguous term involving a third-party beneficiary claim. 
Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Plank, 178 S.E. 58, 60 (Va. 1935). For further authority, 
see Fabrizio Cafaggi, Contractual Networks and Contract Theory: A Research Agenda for 
European Contract Law, in CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS, INTER-FIRM COOPERATION AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 66, 75 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2011). 
 61. Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (Am.), Inc. v. S.S. Cal. Mercury, 750 F. Supp. 141, 144-45 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 62. 677 F.2d 771, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 63. 819 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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manufacturer is not contractually obligated to repair the work in 
question.64 Both results conform to the principles identified in Part 
II.65 In Aeronaves de Mexico, the repair-and-replace remedy gave the 
plaintiff some protection from the loss without the claim against the 
parts supplier; in Continental Airlines, the plaintiff’s only possible 
recourse was against the parts supplier. In addition, in Aeronaves de 
Mexico, the manufacturer would have had to indemnify the parts 
supplier for any damages they paid to the plaintiff, and so allowing 
the claim would have defeated the purpose of the exclusive repair 
and replace remedy.66  
 When interpreting an ambiguous exculpatory term, courts deviate 
from the Part II principles in one respect. Principles of negligence 
law generally require a court to balance the interests of risk creators 
(i.e., people like the harm-doer) and risk bearers (i.e., people like the 
victim). Something like interest balancing is going on in Aeronaves de 
Mexico and Continental Airlines. However, there is an important dif-
ference between interest balancing in negligence law and interest 
balancing in third-party beneficiary law. In third-party beneficiary 
law, the only relevant interests are those of the parties to the con-
tract. In cases like Aeronaves de Mexico and Continental Airlines, 
these are the interests of the airline and the aircraft manufacturer. 
The parts supplier’s interests are irrelevant to interpreting the ex-
culpatory term, except insofar as they implicate the interests of a 
party to the contract (i.e., the airline or the airline manufacturer). 
Third party-beneficiary law has this party-centric focus because peo-
ple make contracts to achieve their own purposes. Consistent with 
this, third party status should be conferred if and only if it advances 
the purposes of the parties to the contract. 
 The party-centric focus of third-party beneficiary law reduces the 
risk that an ambiguous term will be construed in a way that leaves a 
                                                                                                                  
 64. Id. at 1528-29. This is because the repair work was outside the scope of the 
manufacturer’s repair-and-replace remedy. Id.  
 65. It may seem odd that the airline that bargained for greater contractual protection 
ends up having lesser rights once the third-party beneficiary claim is considered. The 
result follows from tort principles because the contractual protection makes the airline less 
vulnerable to the carelessness of the parts supplier. The result follows from contract 
principles because the contractual protection increases the likelihood the parties would 
have agreed that the airline would not have an additional third-party beneficiary claim 
against the parts supplier, if the parties had thought about the issue when the contract 
was made. Section VII.B.1, infra, explains this in more detail in the context of tort claims 
for pure economic loss. 
 66. Aeronaves de Mex., 677 F.2d at 773. In Continental Airlines, the court suggested 
ways to handle the claims against the part suppliers to ensure that the manufacturer did 
not end up paying consequential damages, which the manufacturer was absolved from 
having to pay by the contract with the airline. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 819 F.2d at 1529. 
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victim vulnerable to harm by a nonparty.67 Dressel Associates, Inc. v. 
John A. Welsch Real Estate Appraisers, Inc. illustrates.68 An apprais-
er argued that a term in a real estate contract, which made the ap-
praisal “final and binding,” shielded the appraiser from negligence 
liability for a loss resulting from an inaccurate appraisal. The court 
held the purpose of the term was to fix the vendor and purchaser’s 
obligations to each other, and not to protect the appraiser. This is 
plausible, for shielding the appraiser from negligence liability to the 
purchaser would impose a significant risk on the purchaser without 
providing a corresponding benefit to the seller.69 You will see later 
that, in some states, a negligence claim probably is not available 
against the appraiser in a case like Dressel Associates.70 There is no 
inconsistency here: negligence law’s interest balancing accounts for 
the interests not just of people like the harm-doer, but also of society 
generally. A court might conclude from this fuller accounting of in-
terests that no claim should be available under negligence law, even 
though third-party beneficiary law’s narrower, party-centric focus 
suggests otherwise. 
IV.   THE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT LEGAL DOCTRINE 
 Most of the problems with current legal doctrine involve cases in 
which an exculpatory term is in the harm-doer’s contract with a third 
party. Section IV.A explains that courts often determine the effect of 
an exculpatory term by applying one of two rules, which make the 
term’s effect depend on the classification of the plaintiff’s claim as 
either a tort claim or a contract claim on a third-party beneficiary 
theory. Section IV.B explains that the rules share the same basic 
                                                                                                                  
 67. Because of the party-centric focus of third-party beneficiary law, reliance by a 
nonparty harm-doer on being shielded by the exculpatory term should be a reason to confer 
third-party beneficiary status on the harm-doer only if at least one of the parties to the 
contract invited the harm-doer’s reliance to induce the harm-doer to deal with them, or to 
secure some other benefit from the harm-doer. An explicit indication by one of the parties 
that they want the harm-doer to be able to rely on the term should satisfy this 
requirement. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1384 n.99. 
 68. Dressel Assocs., Inc. v. John A. Welsch Real Est. Appraisers, Inc., 632 A.2d 906, 
908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Conway v. Icahn & Co. is further authority for the point. 16 F.3d 
504, 509 (2d Cir. 1994). An investor sued his stockbroker for liquidating an account 
without permission to satisfy a margin call, claiming this was a breach of fiduciary duty 
and negligence. There was an agreement between the investor and the clearing broker 
permitting what the investor’s stockbroker had done. But the stockbroker was not a party 
to the agreement, and there was no express language indicating he was an intended 
beneficiary. The court refused to treat him as a beneficiary by implication. Id. 
 69. There is no suggestion the absence of liability was factored into the price the 
appraiser charged the seller. 
 70. See infra Section VII.B.1, for a discussion of these rules and an explanation of the 
reasons that may justify the rule.  
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premise as the old privity doctrine, which is that contract is either 
conclusive or irrelevant to the issue of the availability of a tort claim. 
Section IV.C explains how changes in negligence law make the prem-
ise untenable. To deal with these problems sensibly, the analysis 
must incorporate tort and contract considerations.  
A.   Two Rules 
 Courts often apply one of two rules to determine an exculpatory 
term’s effect when it is in the harm-doer’s contract with a third party. 
The rules make the effect of the term turn on whether the victim’s 
claim against the harm-doer is classified as a third-party beneficiary 
contract claim or as a tort claim. Classifying the victim’s claim as a 
third-party beneficiary contract claim brings into play the rule a 
third-party beneficiary cannot have greater rights than a contract cre-
ates.71 The rule makes the exculpatory term effective without regard 
to the victim’s interests and assent. Classifying the victim’s claim as 
a tort claim brings into play the rule a contract cannot destroy rights 
of a nonparty.72 The rule makes the contract between the harm-doer 
and the third party irrelevant to the harm-doer’s duty to the victim. 
                                                                                                                  
 71. The rule has been invoked to hold that a harm-doer cannot be liable to a third-
party beneficiary for failing to take a precaution outside the scope of the harm-doer’s 
performance commitment in the contract. Doe v. Grosvenor Props. (Haw.) Ltd., 829 P.2d 
512, 518-19 (Haw. 1992) (dismissing an elevator passenger’s assault claim against a 
maintenance company for negligently failing to connect the stop button and alarm because 
the contract had absolved the company from its obligation to modify the design to comply 
with safety regulations). 
The rule has been invoked to hold a third-party beneficiary to a valid term limiting 
liability. Fretwell v. Prot. Alarm Co., 764 P.2d 149, 151 (Okla. 1988) (holding that 
homeowners—as third party beneficiaries of a contract between their insurance company 
and alarm company—were subject to the limitation of liability clause in the contract); see 
also Lane-Detman, L.L.C. v. Miller & Martin, 82 S.W.3d 284, 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) 
(enforcing an exculpatory term against a third-party beneficiary). 
The rule has been invoked to hold a victim to a valid choice-of-forum term. A.P. Moller-
Maersk A/S v. Comercializadora de Calidad S.A., 429 F. App’x 25, 29 (2d Cir. 2011); Am. 
Patriot Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Mut. Risk Mgmt., Ltd., 364 F.3d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Consol. Bathurst, Ltd. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Gustaf Erikson, 645 F. Supp. 884, 887 (S.D. 
Fla. 1986). Sometimes the point is expressed in a more convoluted way. See, e.g., Anwar v. 
Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). And the rule has 
been invoked to hold a victim to a mandatory arbitration term. Am. Patriot, 364 F.3d  
at 890. 
 72. See, e.g., Young v. Tri-Etch, Inc., 790 N.E.2d 456, 459 (Ind. 2003) (“Since Young 
was not a party to the contract, and thus never consented to the terms of the contract, the 
contract simply does not impose any obligations or limitations on him.”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1998) 
(acknowledging the power of a seller to disclaim liability for property harm, adding “[o]f 
course, such contractual limitations would be effective only between the parties 
themselves”); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 840 (2005) (“Even if a products 
liability defendant effectively avoids negligence responsibility toward the user who signed 
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 The two rules typically are stated as being self-evident. Indeed, 
the rules seem self-evident. The rule a third-party beneficiary has no 
greater rights than a contract creates seems self-evidently correct 
when the harm-doer’s duty to the victim has no basis other than the 
harm-doer’s contract.73 Conversely, the rule a contract cannot destroy 
a right of a nonparty seems self-evidently correct because “rights” 
bring to mind rights we have that are good against the world, such as 
the right to decide who may touch your body in a way that is poten-
tially harmful or offensive, or who may use your property. You can 
give others the right to use your property. You can even relinquish 
certain aspects of control over your body. But, if you are a competent 
adult, no one else has the power to do these things. Only you do.74 
 An immediate and obviously unfortunate consequence of this state 
of affairs is that it makes an exculpatory term’s effect turn on wheth-
er the victim’s claim against the harm-doer is classified as a third-
party beneficiary contract claim or as a tort claim. This is indefensi-
ble as the classification of a claim is often arbitrary.75 Often a claim’s 
classification is a product of the relative pace at which negligence law 
and third-party beneficiary law have developed in a jurisdiction. The 
foreign experience is instructive. Courts that were late in embracing 
                                                                                                                  
the contractual disclaimer, such a provision will not bar a negligence action brought by an 
injured third party against the manufacturer or other seller.”).  
 73. The qualifications to the rule in contract law are minor. The most pertinent 
qualification is the constraint on the general power of parties to a contract to cut back on 
the rights of a third-party beneficiary who relies on performance. This “power terminates 
when the beneficiary . . . materially changes his position in justifiable reliance on the 
promise.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 74. The question-begging character of the rule becomes apparent if you think instead 
of rights as derived from other people, as most impersonal rights are. For example, most 
rights in tangible property derive from other people by acquisition. When property is ac-
quired, the acquirer’s rights in the property are limited by the terms of prior conveyances. 
A contract can thus delimit the rights of a nonparty. But we do not think of this as a prior 
conveyance “destroying” a right, because we think of a limitation in a prior conveyance as 
preventing a right from coming into being. 
 75. For example, in some states the claim by a purchaser of a home against an 
inspector hired by the owner is treated as a tort claim. See, e.g., Hardy v. Carmichael, 24 
Cal. Rptr. 475, 480-81 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Alternatively, other states treat the claim 
as a third-party beneficiary claim. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Ga. Boy Pest Control Co., 287 
S.E.2d 752, 754 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Davis v. New England Pest Control Co., 576 A.2d 
1240, 1242 (R.I. 1990). For additional cases, see Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, 
Liability of Termite or Other Pest Control or Inspection Contractor for Work or 
Representations, 32 A.L.R. 4th 682 (1984). The claim of a disappointed heir harmed by an 
estate planner’s negligence has been classified both as a negligence claim and as a third-
party beneficiary claim. For authority which straddles the two theories, holding the 
beneficiary has a tort claim for malpractice as a third-party beneficiary of the estate 
planner’s contract with the client, see Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987). While 
classification often is arbitrary, it need not be. A claim might be classified as a third-party 
beneficiary claim when the parties to the contract have a general power to disclaim a duty 
to a nonparty under the analysis in Sections VIII.A.2 and VIII.B.2, infra.  
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a robust law of third-party beneficiary tend to handle claims in tort, 
which has the unintended consequence of making an exculpatory 
term ineffective. This is roughly the position of English law today, 
where third-party beneficiary claims were not recognized until 
1999.76 German law, on the other hand, long ago recognized third- 
party claims. Thus, third-party claims against a lawyer for a mistake 
in drafting a will or against an appraiser are handled in Germany as 
contract claims. It has been argued that “[t]he advantage of such an 
approach—as indeed all contractually-flavoured solutions—is that 
the plaintiffs take the claim subject to equities so that the sub-
contractor can set up all defences against the owner that would have 
been available to him in a suit brought by the main contractor.”77 
This position potentially suffers from the opposite weakness of the 
English position, because it may make the term effective against the 
owner regardless of non-contractual considerations. Apparently this 
has not been a problem in German law because the interests of the 
third party victim can be considered under the doctrine of “contract 
protecting the interests of a third party.”78  
B.   The Premise the Rules Share with the Old Privity Doctrine  
 The two rules are a product of the rejection of the old privity doc-
trine, but ironically they share the same mistaken basic premise as 
the old doctrine. This premise is that contract is either conclusive or 
irrelevant to the issue of the availability of a tort claim. The connec-
tion and the shared premise is near the surface of a passage from an 
article published in 1905 by Francis Bohlen, a leading torts scholar of 
the first third of the twentieth century. Bohlen wrote: “While it is 
true that no one’s rights can be enlarged by a contract to which he is 
                                                                                                                  
 76. I say roughly because English courts seem to have done a pretty decent job taking 
account of the contractual nexus of a negligence claim making particularized duty 
determinations. Thus in Leigh & Sillavan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co., Lord Goff held 
that a plaintiff-buyer’s tort claim against a ship owner when goods were damaged in 
transit was subject to a customary exculpatory term in the contract of carriage between the 
ship owner and the seller. Leigh & Sillavan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co., [1986] AC 785 
(HL) (Eng.). 
 77. BASIL S. MARKESINIS ET AL., THE GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE 
TREATISE 209 (2d ed. 2006). 
 78. Hein Kötz, The Doctrine of Privity of Contract in the Context of Contracts 
Protecting the Interests of Third Parties, 10 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 195, 195 (1990). In 
German law, the greater flexibility of the contract rule has enabled courts to overcome a 
defect in an inflexible tort rule. Professor Kötz reports that the flexibility of the doctrine 
enabled German courts to allow a cleaning woman injured when a defectively repaired 
water heater exploded to recover from the repairman’s employer on a contract claim when 
recovery in tort was barred by “the unfortunate provision of Section 831 of the Civil Code, 
which permits an employer to escape tort liability if he proves that the servant has been 
carefully selected and supervised.” Id. at 196. 
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no party, it is equally true that they cannot be restricted or destroyed 
thereby.”79 There are two propositions here. The first—“no one’s 
rights can be enlarged by a contract to which he is not a party”—
captures one premise of the old privity doctrine that has since been 
rejected. Bohlen may be forgiven for accepting this premise, as the 
point he was making did not depend on its accuracy, and he was a 
torts scholar who simply accepted conventional wisdom about  
contract law.  
 Bohlen’s first proposition was tendentious even in 1905, at the 
heyday of classical theories of contract. Though classical contract law 
treated it as true as an axiomatic matter, the axiom never jibed with 
actual contract law. Prior to the rise of classical theories of contract 
in the late twentieth century, courts in England and the U.S. regular-
ly recognized third-party beneficiary contract claims. In 1905, the 
axiom did fairly accurately describe the law in places like England 
and Massachusetts, where the logic of classical theory overcame 
common sense for a while (in England, this was for a long while).80 
But the axiom did not reflect the law in places like New York, where 
third-party claims remained available in limited categories of cases.81 
Today, the error in Bohlen’s first proposition is universally acknowl-
edged.82 U.S. courts now regularly enforce third-party beneficiary 
claims in a wide range of situations. The old premise has been re-
placed by the modern rule: a third-party beneficiary has no greater 
rights than a contract creates. 
 Bohlen’s second proposition, that one’s rights cannot be restricted 
or destroyed by a contract to which he is not party, is his attempt at 
correcting another premise of the old privity doctrine that also is no 
longer accepted. This is the premise that a contract cuts off any duty 
of care in tort that one owes a nonparty. Bohlen was right to chal-
lenge this premise, and his second proposition is today’s conventional 
wisdom. The proposition is embodied in the rule a contract cannot 
destroy a right of a nonparty. But the second proposition is a clumsy 
way of expressing the correct point, and the clumsiness of the propo-
sition involves the mistaken basic premise that modern law shares 
                                                                                                                  
 79. Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligation in the Law of Tort, 53 AM. 
L. REG. 273, 284 (1905). 
 80. Third-party beneficiary claims have been available in England since the 
enactment of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act of 1999. See Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act, 1999, c. 31 (Eng.). 
 81. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1360-71. 
 82. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1359, 1373-74 (describing development of modern 
law of third-party beneficiary out of classical contract law). 
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with the old privity doctrine. This premise is that contract is either 
conclusive or irrelevant to the issue of the availability of a tort claim. 
Some context helps explain why Bohlen made this mistake. 
 The quoted passage appears in Bohlen’s discussion of the “general-
ly misunderstood case of Winterbottom v. Wright.”83 Bohlen’s aim was 
to challenge conventional wisdom of the day about tort law: that a 
contract cut off any possible duty of care to a nonparty. In Winterbot-
tom, an injured carriage driver sued a supplier for breach of a con-
tract to supply a safe carriage. The driver pled only a contract claim 
because he could establish nonfeasance, but not misfeasance, on the 
supplier’s part.84 Bohlen argued the absence of privity between the 
two parties bore only on the claim that was actually pled—breach of 
contract. According to Bohlen, the absence of privity should not have 
barred a claim by the driver that the supplier was negligent in sup-
plying a defective carriage, if the driver could have established an act 
of misfeasance by the supplier.85  
 Bohlen’s underlying point was that a contract should not absolve a 
party of a duty of care it owes under tort law to a nonparty, inde-
pendent of the contract. The contrary view seems an obvious error, 
and hardly worth correcting. Correction was needed because U.S. and 
U.K. courts committed this obvious error in handling defective prod-
ucts claims for much of the nineteenth century and the early years of 
the twentieth century. Bohlen’s second proposition, that a contract 
cannot “restrict or destroy” the rights of a non-party, corrects the ob-
vious error. However, the second proposition goes farther than is 
necessary to correct the error. The overreach lies in the difference 
between saying that a contract is always irrelevant to the duty owed 
a nonparty under tort law (this is how Bohlen’s second proposition is 
stated and commonly understood) and that a contract cannot conclu-
sively negate such a duty if non-contract considerations justify im-
posing one (this is the correct point). 
 Bohlen was not alone in thinking that, in a given case, a contract 
must be either conclusive or irrelevant to the existence of a legal du-
ty. Indeed, this way of thinking persists in the modern rules that 
make the effect of an exculpatory term depend on the classification of 
a claim as third-party beneficiary or tort. For Bohlen at least, this 
                                                                                                                  
 83. Bohlen, supra note 79, at 281 (citing Winterbottom v. Wright, [1842] 10 M. & W. 
109 (Eng.)).  
 84. A negligence claim was not available for nonfeasance at the time. 
 85. Bohlen, supra note 71, at 283-84. Frederick Pollock makes a similar point in his 
torts treatise. FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 
OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW 349 (1st ed., Philadelphia, 
Blackstone Publishing Co. 1887). The agreement of Bohlen and Pollock suggests this point 
may have been well understood by more sophisticated legal theorists. 
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way of thinking can be explained by how contract and tort law were 
viewed in his day: contract was thought of as the realm of privately 
determined obligation or “private legislation,” and tort was viewed as 
the realm of publicly imposed obligation.86 Judges were not thought 
to have much discretion in either realm. In classical contract law, the 
rules were designed to give parties who could afford good legal advice 
the ability to determine their contractual obligations with a high  
degree of confidence. If a contract ended up in litigation, a court 
would enforce the contract as written, using the established rules. 
Tort law inevitably gave courts somewhat greater discretionary pow-
er because duties are imposed by law and are not a product of mani-
fested intent, but great pains were taken to limit this power. Courts 
and legal theorists insisted these public obligations be derived  
from established legal rules or broadly accepted norms of custom or 
morality.  
 When we place a high value on legal certainty and predictability, 
or if we distrust judges to exercise discretion wisely, having judges 
and lawyers think about contract and tort in this way can be a posi-
tive. But this way of thinking about contract and tort—as perfectly 
distinct, minimally discretionary bodies of law—is an impediment to 
solving the immediate problem intelligently. It leads to the view that 
a contract must be either conclusive or irrelevant to the existence of a 
duty. This is a better view than the old premise that a contract cuts 
off a duty in tort, even if that duty is independent of the contract, but 
it similarly makes the analysis too mechanical. Treating an exculpa-
tory term in a relevant contract as conclusive gives too much weight 
to the term, while treating a term as irrelevant gives too little.  
But, like Bohlen, courts continue to find it difficult to strike a balance 
between the competing claims of tort and contract, and the competing 
claims for public ordering versus private ordering. 
C.   Changes in Negligence Law Make This Premise Untenable 
 Changes in negligence law make the premise of the two rules un-
tenable. The problems with the rule a contract cannot destroy the 
rights of a nonparty begin with terminology. Negligence law is not 
really about protecting rights any more. If rights are implicated in 
modern negligence law, then it is only in a thin sense. Whatever 
right a person has not to be inadvertently harmed is qualified, and it 
gives way if the harm-doer has an excuse because the harm could not 
                                                                                                                  
 86. Mark P. Gergen, Negligent Misrepresentation as Contract, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 
968-82, 995-96 (2013). 
28  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
 
 
reasonably have been avoided.87 In the U.S., negligence law generally 
is not thought of as implicating rights even in this thin sense. Negli-
gence law is thought of as a product of balancing the interests of risk-
creators in liberty of action and the interests of risk-bearers in secu-
rity from harm.88 
 If we think of negligence law as a matter of interest balancing, 
and we acknowledge that a contract can delimit the rights of a non-
party, then the rule a contract cannot destroy the rights of a nonparty 
is a colorful and strong way to express a per se rule of nullity when 
an exculpatory term is not in a contract to which the victim is a par-
ty. This rule could be placed alongside other rules that limit the ef-
fectiveness of exculpatory terms; for example, the per se rule against 
terms protecting a harm-doer from liability for bodily harm caused by 
his gross negligence. The question then becomes whether such a per 
se rule is justified. 
 A per se rule might be justified if the background rules of negli-
gence law are very likely to be in people’s interest. If we believe that 
is the case, we might allow individuals to relinquish the rules’ protec-
tion—to have their rights “destroyed”—only in ways that minimize 
the risk of mistaken or improvident waiver. We would want the 
background rules to be “sticky,” or hard to opt out of. This could be 
done by requiring a risk-creator to obtain a risk-bearer’s agreement 
to an exculpatory term in a way that satisfies the formal require-
ments for a contract, such as by bargaining for a release signed by 
the risk-bearer. 
 An influential example of this thinking is an argument made by 
William Prosser in Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer).89 He argued that the “tort theory” (strict liability) is pref-
erable to the “contract warranty theory” for handling a claim by a 
consumer who is physically injured by a defective product. Prosser 
briefly touched on the power of the seller to disclaim liability under 
the contract warranty theory. He observed that while “[t]he courts 
have done what they could to obviate the dangerous power which this 
places in the hands of the seller,”90 the possibility that a court might 
                                                                                                                  
 87. See ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS (2007), for an account of the law along 
these lines. Stevens strenuously opposes describing the field as negligence law. 
 88. See GEISTFELD, supra note 13.  
 89. William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). Prosser focuses on first-party claims, in which privity 
is not an issue. See id.  
 90. Id. at 1132. 
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err and enforce a disclaimer “remains as a very obvious and a very 
large hole in the warranty theory.”91 Prosser argued the tort theory is 
preferable because it reduces this risk.92  
 But this feature of tort law—its ability to preserve the background 
rules of liability by undercutting exculpatory terms—quickly became 
problematic. Though Prosser limited his argument to defective prod-
ucts that caused bodily harm to consumers,93 products liability law 
quickly expanded to also encompass claims by businesses.94 Busi-
nesses accordingly sought to use products liability claims as a mech-
anism for circumventing contractual terms that barred recovery for a 
loss resulting from a product defect. Courts responded to these claims 
by limiting the products liability action to claims involving physical 
harm and precluding claims for what has come to be described as 
“pure economic loss.”95 When a negligence claim involves pure eco-
                                                                                                                  
 91. Id. at 1133. 
 92. See id. at 1120. Driving Prosser’s argument is an assumption that it is an 
“unreasonable thing” for a manufacturer to disclaim liability for physical harm its defective 
product causes a consumer. Id. at 1133.  
 93. Prosser limited his argument to defective products causing bodily harm to 
consumers because he thought courts generally should respect exculpatory terms in 
contracts between businesses.  
 94. Privity is now never required for a products liability claim, though it remains an 
issue in defective product cases where the downstream party sues on a breach of warranty 
claim as a third-party beneficiary. See, e.g., Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 
947, 948 (Ind. 2005) (holding a downstream consumer has claim against a manufacturer 
for a manufacturing defect in an automobile based on the implied warranty of 
merchantability). U.C.C. section 2-318 provides three optional rules on privity for a breach 
of warranty. U.C.C. § 2-318 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2014). These rules are understood to speak only to the issue of horizontal 
privity (e.g., a claim by a passenger in an automobile against the seller) and not to the 
issue of vertical privity (e.g., a claim of a downstream purchaser). This leaves courts free to 
adopt a less restrictive rule than the legislatively approved rule when the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the buyer, who is in privity with the defendant, is vertical and 
not horizontal. In Goodin, this cut in the plaintiff’s favor because the Indiana legislature 
had adopted the most restrictive rule on privity in section 2-318. The Indiana Supreme 
Court adopted a less restrictive rule on privity to allow a downstream purchaser to bring a 
breach of warranty claim. Christopher C. Little claims Goodin represents a “trend,” citing 
other cases in which “courts have concluded that the vertical privity requirement is simply 
no longer viable given contemporary commercial practices.” Christopher C. Little, 
Comment, Suing Upstream: Commercial Reality and Recovery for Economic Loss in Breach 
of Warranty Actions by Non-Privity Consumers, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 831, 845 & n.83 
(2007). 
 95. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 901 (Fla. 
1987); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 453 (Ill. 1982). Today, in many 
states, the “economic loss rule” bars both negligence and strict liability claims involving 
pure economic loss by both businesses and individuals. These rules vary in scope. In some 
states, the bar is global and precludes a negligence claim involving pure economic loss 
unless a claim can be made under a cause of action that is an exception to the rule, such as 
the exception for the negligent misrepresentation action. In some states, the bar is more 
limited and applies only to cases in which the plaintiff reasonably may be expected to 
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nomic loss, courts often instinctively refuse to apply principles of neg-
ligence liability, instead deferring to contract and to the possibility of 
private ordering as the appropriate mechanisms to address the risk 
of carelessly caused harm.96 But typically courts defer to contract 
thoughtlessly without inquiring whether contractual principles actu-
ally justify denying the negligence claim. 
 Courts take a much different approach with negligence claims in-
volving bodily harm. They tend to ignore the contractual context of a 
claim entirely. Tanguay v. Marston illustrates.97 The plaintiff slipped 
and fell on a greasy patch in his employer’s parking lot. After recov-
ering medical expenses and lost wages from his employer through a 
worker’s compensation claim, he sued the employer’s landlord. The 
landlord asserted as a defense a term in the lease absolving it from 
any obligation to maintain the premises and placing that obligation 
on the employer as tenant. The court refused to give effect to the 
term, citing earlier cases holding that a landlord had a general non-
delegable duty of care to maintain safe premises,98 and explaining: 
“While exculpatory clauses in leases of commercial real estate are 
binding on the parties to the lease, they have no effect on non-
signers, such as the plaintiff.”99 The result is wrong: the employer 
undertook responsibility for maintaining the area. The employee’s 
                                                                                                                  
protect himself from the risk by contract. Section VII.B, infra, concerns this body of law. It 
focuses on the approaches that best implement the principles identified in Part II, infra. 
Something similar occurred in cases involving defects in used goods. Courts gave effect 
to an “as is” clause in an upstream sales agreement against a downstream buyer, who was 
a party to the agreement, by adopting a general rule precluding products liability claims 
for defects in used goods. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Hicks, 179 Cal. Rptr. 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); 
Sukljian v. Charles Ross & Son Co., 503 N.E.2d 1358, 1364 (N.Y. 1986) (finding no duty to 
serve as a basis for a negligence claim); Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1301 
(Or. 1979) (declining to reach the issue of what the effect of the as is term would be were a 
products claim available). Gaumer v. Rossville Truck & Tractor Co. takes the contrary 
position, holding a seller of used farm equipment is subject to strict liability, and it collects 
authority on both sides of the issue. 257 P.3d 292 (Kan. 2011). 
 96. Often is not always. Ossining Union Free School District v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 
91 (N.Y. 1989), shows how the “tort” label can blind judges to the contractual context of a 
claim even when a claim involves pure economic loss. Under New York law, a claim is 
available for negligent misrepresentation only if the victim and the harm-doer are in “near 
privity,” which literally means a near-contractual relationship. The New York Court of 
Appeals allowed a negligent misrepresentation claim in the case, finding that the parties 
were in near privity, without saying a word about the contractual context of the claim. It is 
bizarre to condition liability on the parties being in a near-contractual relationship and 
then to ignore the contractual context of a claim in deciding whether negligence liability is 
appropriate. Had the Court examined the contractual context, either it would have found a 
contract claim was available to the plaintiff, making the negligent claim redundant, or that 
a contract claim was barred by an exculpatory term in either or both of the two relevant 
contracts, making it difficult to justify the negligence claim. 
 97. 503 A.2d 834, 837-38 (N.H. 1986). 
 98. Id. at 837.  
 99. Id. at 838. 
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worker’s compensation claim against the employer provides compen-
sation and some deterrence. The landlord may have an implied right 
to indemnity from the employer, which would cast the loss back on 
the employer and undercut the worker’s compensation scheme. And, 
whatever the rule on implied indemnity, landlords are likely to de-
mand express indemnification in the future, with the same  
ultimate effect. 
 This tendency to disregard the contractual context of a negligence 
claim concerning bodily harm is understandable. The rules of modern 
negligence law were developed to address cases in which the plaintiff 
and defendant were strangers, and so the plaintiff could not be ex-
pected to protect himself from a risk by contract. Further, even in 
cases where the plaintiff and defendant are in privity of contract, or 
are connected through a chain of contracts, the general assumption is 
that the risk of carelessly caused bodily harm is best dealt with by 
negligence law, and not by contract. There are good reasons for this 
assumption. Often it is not in people’s interest to agree to waive the 
protection of tort law.  
 But the expansive rules of liability in modern negligence law test 
the assumption that negligence law strikes the correct balance be-
tween the interests of risk creators and the interests of risk bearers 
in all cases involving physical harm. The expansive rules of liability 
in modern negligence law can make a claim that is weak both as a 
matter of fairness and as a matter of policy seem legally colorable. 
Hampton v. Federal Express illustrates.100 This is the tragic case in 
which Fed Ex failed to deliver a blood sample shipped by a hospital, 
and as a result a potential marrow donor for a young boy with cancer 
was not identified. The contract between Fed Ex and the shipper, the 
hospital where the boy was being treated, limited the carrier’s liabil-
ity to $100. The court held Fed Ex was not liable for its negligence 
because the carrier owed no duty of care to the boy. To reach this re-
sult, the court invoked Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,101 reasoning 
that Fed Ex owed no duty to the boy because the carrier “did not 
know the package contained blood samples” and could not “reasona-
bly foresee any injury to [him], or the nature and extent of  
the injury.”102  
 The court reached the correct result in Hampton, but the legal 
ground the court gave for the result is unpersuasive under modern 
rules of tort law, as those rules are stated in the Third Restate-
                                                                                                                  
 100. 917 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Missouri law). 
 101. Id. at 1124. 
 102. Id. at 1124-25. 
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ment.103 Under the Third Restatement, the foreseeability of harm has 
no bearing on the issue of duty.104 Duty hinges on whether an actor’s 
conduct has created a risk of harm.105 Foreseeability of harm in gen-
eral bears on the issue of breach (whether the harm-doer acted un-
reasonably), and foreseeability of the specific harm that occurred 
bears on the issue of legal causation or scope of liability (whether the 
risk of the specific harm that occurred is among the risks that made 
the harm-doer’s conduct unreasonable). These are jury issues, if a 
reasonable juror can find for the plaintiff on the issues. That Fed Ex 
“did not know that the package contained blood samples” and could 
not “reasonably foresee any injury to [him]”106 is thus pertinent only 
to the issues of breach and scope of liability. 
 The familiar facts in Palsgraf can be used to illustrate these 
points.107 Palsgraf was injured while standing on a railroad platform 
when an explosion caused a top-heavy scale to fall on her. The explo-
sion was caused by a package of fireworks, which another passenger 
dropped when two railroad employees pushed and pulled him as he 
tried to jump aboard a departing train. Under the Third Restate-
ment, it is clear the railroad owes a duty of care to Palsgraf, a paying 
customer who was standing on the railroad’s platform waiting for one 
of its trains. It is also clear under the Third Restatement that the 
railroad employees’ conduct—trying to help someone carrying a 
package to jump aboard a moving train—was unreasonable enough in 
a general way to require submitting the issue of breach to a jury. The 
railroad’s best defense under the Third Restatement is that Palsgraf’s 
harm is not among the risks that made the conduct of the railroad’s 
employees negligent (i.e., the harm is not within the scope of liabil-
ity). If Palsgraf only offers proof that the railroad’s employees were 
negligent in allowing or assisting a passenger to leap aboard a de-
parting train, the court could take the case away from the jury. No 
reasonable person could think the harm to Palsgraf is among the 
harms that make shoving a passenger who is trying to board a mov-
ing train while carrying a package unreasonable.108 But the claim 
                                                                                                                  
 103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL  
HARM § 29 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010). 
 104. See id. at cmt. n.  
 105. See id. § 6. A court may still opt not to find a duty, even if it finds that the harm-
doer’s actions created a risk of harm. As mentioned in Section II.A, countervailing factors 
may warrant a finding of no duty or a modified duty in such cases. 
 106. Hampton, 917 F.2d at 1125. 
 107. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL  
HARM § 29, cmts. f, n (AM. LAW. INST. 2010). Illustration 9 is based on Palsgraf. Id. at illus. 
9. It characterizes the only unreasonable conduct as assisting a passenger who was 
carrying a package jump aboard a departing train. Id.  
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could not be taken from the jury if Palsgraf offers sufficient proof that 
the railroad acted unreasonably in allowing the platform to be over-
crowded, or in having a top-heavy scale on the platform. It is then for 
the jury to decide if the bizarre nature of the events leading up to the 
accident take the harm outside the scope of liability for the railroad 
allowing the platform to be unreasonably overcrowded, or in having 
an unreasonably top-heavy scale on the platform. 
 Returning to the facts in Hampton, the Third Restatement seems 
quite clear that foreseeability of harm to the boy was a scope of liabil-
ity issue, and so a matter for the jury.109 Failure to deliver a hospi-
tal’s package may foreseeably harm its patients in any number of 
ways. In Hampton, the court made the harm seem unforeseeable by 
defining the relevant risk narrowly. The court reasoned Fed Ex could 
not have foreseen the package contained blood samples, or the pur-
pose for which the samples were being shipped.110 Making a harm 
seem unforeseeable by defining the relevant risk narrowly is a famil-
iar casuistic device. Cardozo’s opinion is Palsgraf is a brilliant exam-
ple of the use of this device. But the Third Restatement tells courts 
not to use this casuistic device to take a claim from a jury. It warns 
that sometimes “there will be contending plausible characterizations 
[of the type of harm that occurred] that lead to different outcomes 
and require the drawing of an evaluative and somewhat arbitrary 
line. Those cases are left to the community judgment and common 
sense provided by the jury.”111 
 The Third Restatement allows a court to take a claim away from 
the jury, even if the plaintiff presents evidence on which a reasonable 
person could find the elements of a negligence claim satisfied (breach, 
cause-in-fact, scope of liability, and damages). A court can always 
take a claim away from the jury by creating a special no-duty rule.112 
                                                                                                                  
 109. Id. at cmt. q. 
 110. 917 F.2d at 1125. 
 111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL  
HARM § 29, cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[u]nderstanding and characterizing the risk of 
harm”). 
 112. Id. § 7(b) (“In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle or 
policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may 
decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires 
modification.”). A no-duty rule must be categorical in two respects. First, the rule must be 
framed in categorical terms to cover a “particular class of cases.” Id. Second, under U.S. 
negligence law, if a rule is to justify taking a case from the jury, then that result has to 
clearly follow from the rule. No factual or normative issue should be left in doubt. Under 
U.S. negligence law, if an issue of fact or a normative issue is fairly contested under the 
applicable rule, then either party has the right to have the issue resolved by a jury. Mark 
P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 409-10 (1999). 
 
34  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
 
 
This is what the Hampton court should have done. Section VII.A.2 
will propose a no-duty rule to cover cases like Hampton. The rule 
gives presumptive effect to an exculpatory term in the defendant’s 
contract in cases that are within the rule. Before I explain how and 
why tort law can be used to solve this problem, I need to go back and 
explain why contract law cannot, at least in the United States. Part 
V explains. When I return to Hampton, I will explain that the no-
duty rule in Hampton follows entirely from general principles of tort 
law and does not depend on contractual considerations. On the other 
hand, in negligence cases involving claims for pure economic loss, 
contractual considerations can play an important role by informing 
the no-duty analysis. 
V.   PRIVITY RULES IN CONTRACT LAW AND INFORMATION COSTS 
 This Part considers privity rules in contract law. The rules pre-
clude using contract law to implement the principles in Part II, when 
the victim is not a party to the contract with the exculpatory term. 
This does not preclude contract considerations from weighing on the 
availability of a nonparty’s tort claim. But it does mean that bodies of 
law other than contract must be used to account for such considera-
tions.113 This Part also explains the information cost rationale for the 
privity rules in contract law.   
A.   Privity Rules in Modern Contract Law 
 Privity remains an important concept and an important boundary 
in modern contract law. A family of rules maintains the boundary. 
The most important of these is the general rule that a contract can 
                                                                                                                  
A no-duty rule must exclude liability in a category of cases, and in categorical terms, 
which leave no factual or normative issue in doubt, if the rule is to serve the channeling 
and screening functions of no-duty rules in U.S. law. Duty rules identify the types of cases 
in which a negligence claim is available, and identify the facts and normative criteria 
relevant to resolving a claim. Conversely, no-duty rules enable courts to dismiss a 
negligence claim early in the process, generally on a motion for failure to state a claim or 
on a motion for summary judgment, based on facts that can be readily ascertained, and 
based on normative criteria that cannot be fairly contested, in the cases the rule is meant 
to exclude. 
These rules are generally called no-duty rules though some might better be called no-
liability rules. The difference between a no-duty and a no-liability rule is more than 
terminological. Duty rules are forward looking. They command action. Liability rules are 
backwards looking. 
 113. This relates to the proposal in Section VII.B.1, infra. One of the most intractable 
issues in the law of economic negligence is determining when a negligence claim should be 
unavailable because the plaintiff can protect himself from a risk by contract. See infra 
Section VII.B.2, for a proposal to treat this as a problem of contract interpretation and 
contract construction. Nominally, this inquiry would be part of duty analysis under negli-
gence law, so it would not violate the privity rules of contract law. 
2015]  PRIVITY’S SHADOW 35 
 
never bind a nonparty. The rule has been described as “elemen-
tary,”114 as “so fundamental that it rarely receives mention,”115 and as 
something that “goes without saying.”116 Also as a general rule, a 
nonparty has no right to enforce a contract unless it is a third-party 
beneficiary or it acquires the right by assignment.117 Because of these 
two general rules, contractual obligations generally run only between 
the parties to a contract. Sub rules in the law of third-party benefi-
ciary and the law of assignment ensure the contract defines the obli-
gation owed to the nonparty. Among these sub rules is the rule a 
third-party beneficiary cannot have greater rights than a contract 
creates.118  
 The privity rules in contract also serve the important function of 
defining when contract law will apply to determine people’s obliga-
tions to each other. While contract is a mechanism for private order-
ing, much of contract law exists to resolve mistakes in private order-
ing, such as misunderstandings and oversights. Contract rules used 
to resolve misunderstandings, and to address oversights, generally 
come into play only when the misunderstanding or oversight is con-
tractual, which requires privity of contract. Thus, the contractual du-
ty of good faith only comes into play once people are in privity  
of contract.119 
 Furthermore, rules of contract interpretation and contract con-
struction do not apply to establish privity between parties who are 
connected through a chain of contracts. Harding Co. v. Sendero Re-
sources, Inc. illustrates.120 The plaintiff acquired a corporate-owned 
                                                                                                                  
 114. Gambles v. Perdue, 572 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Mont. 1977) (“It is elementary law that a 
contract binds no one but the contracting parties.”). 
 115. FCM Grp., Inc. v. Miller, 17 A.3d 40, 54 (Conn. 2011) (“Before turning to those 
cases, however, we set forth a general principle so fundamental that it rarely receives 
mention in case law or commentary, namely, that only parties to contracts are liable for 
their breach.”). 
 116. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) (“It goes without saying that 
a contract cannot bind a nonparty.”). 
 117. Pike v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 121 A.3d 279, 282 (N.H. 2015) (“Generally, 
a non-party to a contract . . . lacks standing to enforce the contract . . . .”). 
 118. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
 119. Matana v. Merkin, 957 F. Supp. 2d 473, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“There being no 
contractual relationship, neither can there be any ‘covenant of good faith and fair dealing’ 
implied which itself is based on the existence of a legal contractual obligation.”). 
 120. See Harding Co. v. Sendero Res., Inc., 365 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012); 
see also B&H Nat’l Place, Inc. v. Beresford, 850 F. Supp. 2d 251, 259 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding 
no-compete clause in franchise agreement does not bind franchisor, nor stockholders and 
officers of franchisees, who did not sign the contract); Primary Invs. LLC v. Wee Tender 
Care III, Inc., 746 S.E.2d 823, 826-27 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (holding members of LLC are not 
bound to no-compete clause in purchase agreement made by LLC, where the clause covered 
“Seller” and “its agents”; one member signed in capacity as LLC’s representative, the other 
two did not sign). 
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business. The purchase agreement included a covenant not to com-
pete. The owner of the business signed the agreement in his capacity 
as owner and president of the corporation, and not in an individual 
capacity. Later the plaintiff sought to enforce the covenant against 
the owner, arguing the formal capacity in which the owner signed the 
agreement should be ignored under a general rule of contract con-
struction, which rejects an interpretation that renders a term mean-
ingless. In fact, the covenant was valueless if it did not bind the  
owner. The court concluded this rule did not apply because “[a] gen-
eral rule of contract construction cannot be used to bind a party to a 
contract it did not sign.”121 
 These rules should preclude using contract law to enforce an ex-
culpatory term in a contract against a nonparty victim even when the 
victim has notice of the term, and even when the victim’s conduct in 
placing itself in harm’s way can reasonably be interpreted as tacit 
assent to the term. Ossining Union Free School District v. Anderson 
LaRocca Anderson illustrates, if you allow me to fill in a few factual 
gaps to make the argument for finding tacit assent to the term as 
strong as possible.122 A school district hired an architect as a consult-
ant for a project, and the architect hired two engineers as subcon-
sultants. The district incurred an unnecessary expense as a result of 
a careless error by the engineers. The New York Court of Appeals 
held that the district had a cause of action against the engineers for 
negligent misrepresentation, finding the parties were in near privi-
ty.123 The opinion says nothing about the terms of the district’s con-
tract with the architect or the architect’s contracts with the engi-
neers. There is a passing mention of the fact that the engineers had 
worked directly with the district in the past (this is cited as further 
support for the conclusion the parties were in near privity), but the 
opinion says nothing about the terms of these prior contracts.  
 To make the argument that the school district tacitly agreed to 
waive the tort claim as strong as possible, let me fill in some of the 
holes in the reported facts with assumptions. Often architects and 
engineers use a form contract promulgated by the American Institute 
                                                                                                                  
The rule has been weakened to subject a nonsignatory to a forum selection clause when 
not doing so defeats the purpose of the clause. See Marra v. Papandreou, 59 F. Supp. 2d 65, 
77 (D.D.C. 1999) (applying the rule that a nonsignatory is bound by a contract term if it is 
closely related to dispute such that it becomes foreseeable that it will be bound). The rule 
also has been weakened to subject a nonsignatory to a merger clause when the non-
signatory attempts to establish a side/oral agreement. See Baroid Equip., Inc. v. Odeco 
Drilling, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). 
 121. Harding, 365 S.W.3d at 740. 
 122. Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91, 95-96 (N.Y. 1989). 
 123. See id. at 94-96.  
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of Architects (“AIA”), which has a term that provides for reciprocal 
waiver of consequential damages.124 Assume the district, the archi-
tect, and the engineers used the AIA form contract in all of their  
construction dealings, including the transactions giving rise to this 
claim. Also assume use of the AIA form is ubiquitous in New York’s 
construction trade. 
 If we put aside the absence of privity between the district and the 
engineers, then the assumed facts present a very strong argument for 
finding a tacit contractual waiver of liability. Multiple types of evi-
dence that are usually treated as indicative of contractual intent—
express terms, course of dealing, and trade practice125—indicate the 
district and the engineers intended there to be no liability for conse-
quential damages.126 
 There is another twist in the case: it is clear that the engineers 
and the district considered privity to be a formality. The engineers 
submitted their bills directly to the district, they were paid directly 
by the district, and they delivered their reports directly to the dis-
trict. If in fact the district and the engineers routinely used the AIA 
form contract in all of their construction dealings, then the engineers 
would have been surprised to find that the formality of contracting 
with the architect, and not the district directly, exposed them to a 
greater risk of liability—it exposed them to an unexpected tort 
                                                                                                                  
 124. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT B141-1997, STANDARD FORM OF 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT WITH STANDARD FORM OF ARCHITECT’S 
SERVICES § 1.3.6 (1997), http://wvhepcdoc.wvnet.edu/resources/pmanualforms/A&EServices/ 
AIAB141-97AgreementBetweenOwner&Architect.pdf (providing for limitation of liability). 
For the background and history of the term, see Gregory K. Morgan & Albert E. Phillips, 
Design Professional Contract Risk Allocation: The Impact of Waivers of Consequential 
Damages and Other Limitations of Liabilities on Traditional Owner Rights and Remedies, 
33 J.C. & U.L. 1, 7-9 (2006). 
 125. For a definition of these terms, see U.C.C. § 1-303(b)-(c) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014). 
 126. The point can be made even clearer if I tweak the facts in two more respects. 
Assume first that the district dealt directly with the engineers in the transaction that gave 
rise to the claim so that the engineers and the district were in privity of contract. But 
assume further that the district and the engineers dealt informally in this particular 
transaction, and the district’s representative never actually signed the standard contract. 
On these facts, a court should find the parties intended there to be a waiver of liability for 
consequential damages, and thus uphold the waiver. This result follows from course of 
dealing and trade practice, including the local construction trade’s assumed ubiquitous use 
of the AIA form and its waiver of liability. U.C.C. section 2-207, comment 5 is a clear 
authority for the possibility of tacit assent to a liability waiver based on custom. U.C.C. § 2-
207 cmt. 5 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014). 
It provides “[e]xamples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise and 
which therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection is 
seasonably given,” referring to section 2-207(2). Id. at cmt. 5. The concluding example in 
the sequence is “a clause limiting the right of rejection for defects which fall within the 
customary trade tolerances for acceptance ‘with adjustment’ or otherwise limiting remedy 
in a reasonable manner.” Id. (emphasis added).  
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claim127 while stripping them of the contractual waiver of liability.128 
But the rule applied by the court in Harding makes it impossible to 
overlook the formality to use contract law to subject the engineers to 
a liability waiver in the contract between the district and the architect.  
 The rule applied by the court in Harding may seem incongruous 
alongside other rules in contract law. While the signature formality 
remains strong when the issue is who is a party to a contract,129 the 
signature formality has been diluted to almost nothing in the law of 
consumer form contracts. The results in the “shrinkwrap” and “click-
wrap” agreement cases are two important steps in this direction. In 
the shrinkwrap agreement cases, a consumer purchases a good in a 
box that includes a form with terms. The form tells the consumer he 
has the right to return the good if he does not assent to the terms in 
                                                                                                                  
 127. The decision allowing the claim came out of the blue; it could not have been 
predicted based on prior New York cases. The claim’s novelty is evident from the brief 
opinion of the Appellate Division, which asserts “a long-standing general rule, that 
recovery will not be granted to a third person for pecuniary loss arising from the negligent 
representations of a professional with whom he or she has no contractual relationship.” 
Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson, 521 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
The sole exception to this rule is accountants. Id. at 750. Widett v. U.S.  
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. comes to the same conclusion and cites further New York 
authority. 815 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1987). In Viscardi v. Lerner, the court relied on the 
same rule to hold a disappointed heir could not sue an attorney for malpractice in 
preparing a will, which is harder to justify. 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). 
This rule was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals while carving out an exception to 
allow the estate to sue. Estate of Schneider v. Finmann, 933 N.E.2d 718, 720 (N.Y. 2010). 
 128. Hopefully the facts are not as I have assumed and the engineers were 
contractually liable for the district’s loss under their contract with the architects. The 
holding that a negligence claim is available is still wrong as a matter of policy, as Section 
VI.B.2, infra, will explain, but the New York Court of Appeals is guilty only of the lesser 
sin of allowing a redundant tort claim. 
 129. See, e.g., Alliance Data Sys. Corp. v. Blackstone Capital Partners V L.P., 963 A.2d 
746, 760 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[T]he ordinary rule is that only the formal parties to a contract 
are bound by its terms.”). There are several legal theories available to bind a nonsignatory 
to a contract. They include the agency theory, the alter ego theory, and the adoption 
theory. Under the agency theory, a nonsignatory is bound if someone signed as his or her 
agent. Interbras Cayman Co. v. Orient Victory Shipping Co., 663 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1981). 
The alter ego theory may apply when the nonsignatory is a corporation and a corporate 
parent or subsidiary is a signatory. MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Bank of Can., 706 F. Supp. 2d 
380, 396-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The adoption theory was applied in A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S v. 
Comercializadora de Calidad S.A., 429 F. App’x 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying New York 
law). A nonsignatory to a bill of lading was held to have agreed to submit to a forum 
selection clause in the bill of lading when it brought an action based on the bill of lading 
and when it agreed to waive a term in the bill of lading in return for cash security. See also 
Flying Phx. Corp. v. Creative Packaging Mach., Inc., 681 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 
2012) (applying Wyoming law). For an account of these and a few other theories and the 
point that a nonsignatory can be bound to an agreement to arbitrate only on these theories, 
see Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 416-17 
(4th Cir. 2000). First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan holds a decision by an arbitrator 
that a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement had implicitly submitted to arbitration is 
subject to independent review by the courts. 514 U.S. 938, 942-47 (1995). 
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the form. Under U.S. law, the consumer’s act of keeping the good is 
treated as the legal equivalent of signing the form.130 In the clickwrap 
agreement cases, a business requires a consumer who engages in an 
electronic transaction with the business to click a box saying “I 
agree” to linked terms and conditions before completing the transac-
tion. Under U.S. law, the consumer’s act of clicking the box is treated 
as the legal equivalent of signing a form containing the linked terms 
and conditions. This is so even though it is common knowledge that 
virtually no consumers actually read the terms and conditions and 
even in circumstances where it is impossible for the consumer to read 
the terms and conditions before clicking “I agree.”131 
 But there is no real incongruity here. Privity is not an issue in the 
shrinkwrap and clickwrap cases. This is important; for the consumer 
knows he is engaging in a contractual transaction with the seller. If 
the consumer worried about his legal position in the transaction, 
then he would know to consult contract law, and the contract docu-
ments presented to him, to determine his legal position. Shrinkwrap 
and clickwrap agreements are troublesome because consumers al-
most never bother to investigate the contract documents presented to 
them.132 Because privity is not an issue, these are handled as misun-
derstanding cases within contract law. For example, if the dispute is 
over a consumer’s assent to an arbitration term in a form, then the 
consumer’s argument is that he did not understand that by keeping 
the good (or clicking “I agree”) he agreed to arbitrate any disputes 
with the seller. Meanwhile the seller will argue that it intended to 
hold the consumer to its boilerplate, including the arbitration term. 
For good or ill, the law of consumer form contracts generally resolves 
these misunderstandings against consumers.133 When there is privity 
of contract, then the rules of contract interpretation and contract 
construction apply to resolve a misunderstanding. But these rules do 
not come into play when parties are not in privity of contract. 
                                                                                                                  
 130. The leading cases are Hill v. Gateway and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg. Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 
(7th Cir. 1996). For a recent case adopting the theory, see DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 
1061, 1071 (R.I. 2009). The theory has received a mixed reception. See John E. Murray, Jr., 
The Dubious Status of the Rolling Contract Formation Theory, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 35 (2012). 
 131. Hancock v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. is clear authority for all of these 
points, including the last point. 701 F.3d 1248, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2012). The opinion 
collects other cases enforcing clickwrap agreements. See id. at 1256-58. 
 132. The information cost rationale for the privity rules assumes people make an effort 
to ascertain their legal position before choosing to engage in a transaction that has legal 
consequences to them.  
 133. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 130-31. 
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B.   The Information Cost Rationale 
 Should the privity rules in contract law be changed? What might 
justify the rules? It is well known that the privity rules in contract 
law reduce nonparty information costs. Nonparty information costs 
refer to the costs nonparties would incur to acquire information about 
contract terms to avoid inadvertently running afoul of a term. The 
scholarly literature on the point focuses on contract terms that poten-
tially affect numerous nonparties who are remote in time from the 
making of a contract and who are likely to find it costly to investigate 
a contract term. Merrill and Smith’s The Property/Contract Interface 
is a leading article.134 Merrill and Smith observe several features that 
distinguish property and contract as legal mechanisms for private 
ordering. Among the differences they observe are that property rights 
are exigible (good against the world), while contract rights are good 
only against a party to the contract.135 Another difference they ob-
serve is that there are limited forms property rights can take, while 
contract rights can take virtually any form.136 Merrill and Smith ex-
plain these differences are related. The exigible nature of property 
rights creates a concern for information costs imposed on nonparties. 
Rules that restrict the forms property rights can take, and that re-
quire property rights generally take visible forms with clear bounda-
ries, reduce these nonparty information costs.  
 This explanation of the privity rules in contract law cannot explain 
their application in a case like Harding Co. v. Sendero Resources, 
Inc., where the parties are in near privity. In Harding, the nonparty 
knows of the term and he is the only person who might inadvertently 
run afoul of the term.137 But the concern for information costs still 
justifies the rules. In “near privity” cases, the privity rules reduce in-
formation costs by reducing the need for a nonparty to monitor con-
tract documents, contract performance, and interactions between the 
parties to the contract to avoid inadvertently subjecting herself to an 
obligation. When the rules of contract interpretation and contract 
construction apply, a party can find herself subject to an obligation 
she did not intend to undertake, if the other party reasonably under-
stood she did undertake the obligation. Indeed, a party to a contract 
may find herself subject to an obligation she clearly did not intend to 
                                                                                                                  
 134. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001). 
 135. See id. at 780.  
 136. Id. at 776-77. 
 137. See Harding Co. v. Sendero Res., Inc., 365 S.W.3d 732, 745 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012). A 
nonparty may be liable for intentional interference with contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 766 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
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undertake. The court may imply an obligation after concluding the 
issue was not material when the contract was made and after predict-
ing the parties would have agreed to the obligation had the question 
of its existence been presented to them before the problem arose.  
 As a consequence of these rules, a party to a contract has an in-
centive to monitor contract documents, contract performance, and 
interactions with the other party to ensure she does not inadvertent-
ly undertake a contractual obligation. But these rules come into play 
only between parties who are in privity of contract. A nonparty, who 
is not in privity of contract, is not subject to these rules. Thus, when 
a transaction or project involves the performance of three or more 
parties, and it is possible to partition the performances into two or 
more contracts, the privity rules reduce information costs by reducing 
the need for a party to closely monitor parts of the transaction or pro-
ject to guard against an unintended obligation. Each party need wor-
ry about inadvertently undertaking a contractual obligation by 
transmitting or receiving a communication from another party, re-
ceiving a benefit from another party (or rendering a benefit to anoth-
er party), or otherwise interacting with another party only if the two 
parties are in privity of contract, or their interactions are such that a 
court could find manifest assent to contract.  
 Consider a project involving three parties—A, B, and C—who par-
tition the project into two binary contracts (the AB and BC con-
tracts). Each contract is reduced to a written contract document. Un-
der the privity rules, A can focus her attention on the contents of the 
AB contract document, the performances under the AB contract, and 
her interactions with B. Apart from an assignment, nothing that may 
appear in the BC contract document, nothing that may occur in the 
performances by B and C of the BC contract, and nothing that may 
occur in the interactions between B and C may put A under a per-
formance obligation to C. Thus, if A pays B for work done by C that is 
delivered through B, then A need not monitor whether B pays C. A 
cannot be made to pay twice for work regardless of what happens be-
tween B and C.138 A simple way to grasp the magnitude of the saved 
                                                                                                                  
 138. For a limited exception to cover the case in which A has not paid B for work 
requested by A and done by C, and C is unable to collect from B because B is insolvent, see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). C may also be protected by a lien on A’s property under state law. See generally 
Doug Rendleman, Quantum Meruit for the Subcontractor: Has Restitution Jumped off 
Dawson’s Dock?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2055 (2001) (discussing the history of the restitution 
claim). This is an exception to a general rule in the law of restitution that “[a] person who 
has conferred a benefit upon another as the performance of a contract with a third person 
is not entitled to restitution from the other merely because of the failure of performance by 
the third person.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 110 (AM. LAW INST. 1937). 
Thimjon Farms Partnership v. First International Bank & Trust illustrates the application 
of this fundamental rule. 837 N.W.2d 327, 336-37 (N.D. 2013). The plaintiffs were 
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information costs is to consider how much more effort A would  
expend—to monitor the BC contract documents, the performances of 
B and C under that contract, and the interactions between B and C—
if B were acting as A’s agent. The reduction in information costs  
increases as the number of parties involved in a transaction or pro-
ject increases,139 but the savings can be significant even in a transac-
tion or project involving only three parties and two contracts.  
 To be clear, the contents of the BC contract documents, and the 
performances by B and C under the BC contract, may affect the ex-
tent of A’s liability for damages for breach of A’s performance obliga-
tion under the AB contract.140 For example, if A’s breach of the AB 
                                                                                                                  
customers of Northern Grain who had made down payments to Northern Grain for work 
that was never done. Northern Grain used some of the down payments to reduce its line of 
credit with First International Bank & Trust. The bank then withdrew the line of credit, 
putting Northern Grain out of business. The plaintiffs sued the bank on a theory of unjust 
enrichment, seeking to recover the amount of their down payments used to pay down the 
letter of credit. The court conceded that the bank may have profited as a result of the 
transactions but held there was no claim for unjust enrichment. 
 139. Call the savings to A from not having to closely monitor the B-C part of the project 
a single unit of contract monitoring. In the example, the total savings are two units of 
contract monitoring because C also does not have to closely monitor the A-B part of the 
project. Assuming binary contracts, in a four-party project the total savings are six units of 
contract monitoring. In a five-party project the total savings are twelve units of contract 
monitoring. 
More generally, if n is the number of participants in a project, then the unit savings 
equals (n-1)*(n-2). Thus, in a six party project the total savings are twenty units of contract 
monitoring. This is easiest to see if you imagine a hub and spoke configuration, with the 
participant at the hub contracting with the spoke participants. Only spoke participants 
realize savings (n-1), and each realizes savings equal to the number of other spoke 
participants (n-2). The savings are the same if the participants are arranged in a chain. 
The two participants at the ends of the chain save (n-2) while all other participants save 
(n-3). Shawn Bayern supplies the general derivation. E-mail from Shawn Bayern, 
Professor, Florida State University College of Law, to Mark P. Gergen, Professor, Berkeley 
Law School (Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with author). With n contracting parties there are n*(n-
1) total relationships and (n-1) contracts so long as each contract has two parties. Thus the 
savings equal n*(n-1) – 2*(n-1), or (n-1)*(n-2). 
 140. Fabrizio Cafaggi describes several mechanisms parties use when they want to 
work around the privity rule to link obligations across two or more contracts. Cafaggi, 
supra note 60, at 66, 77-84. For example, the AB and BC contracts may impose mutual 
obligations on A and C to coordinate their performance, making each a third-party 
beneficiary to the term in the other’s contract. Or, the AB and BC contracts may impose 
mutual exclusivity clauses to prevent each from the risk of the other defecting from the 
project. Each may be a third-party beneficiary to the term in the other’s contract. Or a term 
in the AB contract may require A to indemnify C for a loss caused by A. All of these 
mechanisms create an obligation to a nonparty by making them a third-party beneficiary. 
This was not possible under English law until recently. In the same monograph Simon 
Whittaker describes the contractual mechanisms developed by English lawyers and judges 
to create obligations to a nonparty. Simon Whittaker, Contract Networks, Freedom of 
Contract and the Restructuring of Privity of Contract, in CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS, INTER-
FIRM COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 60, at 179, 183-88. These seem 
quite crude. For example, one of the mechanisms was for A to make B its agent so that B 
could undertake an obligation to C that would bind A. Id. at 187-88.  
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contract predictably causes B to incur a loss under the terms of the 
BC contract, then B will be able to recover this loss from A. The loss 
may include consequential damages paid by B to C, which depend on 
C’s particular circumstances. But A’s exposure to losses involving the 
BC contract is mediated through the AB contract. This makes it pos-
sible for A to control his exposure by putting a liability waiver in the 
AB contract. The contents of the BC contract, and B and C’s perfor-
mances of it, may also create insecurity to A that B will be unable to 
perform the AB contract. And the contents of the BC contract, and B 
and C’s performance of it, may affect A’s ability to perform its con-
tract with B or otherwise create a risk of loss to A. But again these 
effects are mediated through the AB contract. Thus, A may insist on 
terms in the AB contract to minimize insecurity regarding the BC 
contract and to protect against the risk of loss. 
 Section V.C will argue that exculpatory terms are unlike many 
other types of contract terms because enforcing them against nonpar-
ties does not significantly implicate the concern for nonparty infor-
mation costs. There is no inconsistency between this claim and the 
claim just made about how the privity rules reduce information costs. 
The example assumed away the possibility of a negligence claim be-
tween A and C under the rules of tort law. If A has a possible negli-
gence claim against C in the event of a loss, then A has an incentive 
to investigate facts involving C that bear on the risk of loss and that 
bear on C’s ability to satisfy a claim. A also has an incentive to inves-
tigate tort law to determine the likelihood of recovery. A may discov-
er the exculpatory term in the BC contract in the course of these in-
vestigations, and once that knowledge is acquired, A has no incentive 
to further investigate the law or to monitor C’s ability to satisfy a 
claim. Meanwhile, if A secures protection against the risk in the AB 
contract, then A has less incentive to monitor C’s performance.141 
                                                                                                                  
 141. A corollary to this point is that allowing parties who are not in privity of contract 
to recover off the contract, on a negligence claim, imposes information costs. The point 
focuses on a risk-bearer (A in the example) because making a negligence claim available 
has an ambiguous effect on a risk-bearer’s information costs. The point made in text is 
modest, which is that conditioning a negligence claim on the absence of an exculpatory 
term in the harm-doer’s contract will not impose significant additional information costs on 
a risk-bearer and may actually reduce a risk-bearer’s information costs in some cases. The 
major effect of making a negligence claim available is the imposition of information costs 
on a risk creator (C in the example), who has an incentive to monitor the actions of a risk-
bearer (A) and an intermediary (B), to determine what precautions are worth taking and to 
gauge the liability risk. These information costs are a central concern of negligence law. 
They are addressed by the element of foreseeability, for example. 
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C.   Exculpatory Terms and Information Costs 
 Exculpatory terms do not implicate the concern for imposing in-
formation costs on nonparties. Why is best explained using a real 
world example: waiver of subrogation clauses in construction con-
tracts.142 In a typical construction project, the owner of the building 
will obtain insurance to cover the risk of property damage caused by 
the contractor. The construction contract will have a waiver of subro-
gation clause. In the absence of the clause, an insurer that pays for 
damages caused by a contractor could seek to recover its payment by 
bringing a contract or tort claim in subrogation.143 Typically, a waiver 
of subrogation clause also precludes a claim by the owner’s insurer 
against a subcontractor, employee, or agent of the contractor, as well 
as a claim against other persons hired by the owner, such as an ar-
chitect. Often the general contractor will include a waiver of subroga-
tion in the contract with a subcontractor. This prevents the subcon-
tractor’s insurer from recovering from the general contractor or from 
another subcontractor.144 If every participant in a construction project 
insures its own people and property against construction-related 
hazard, and there is universal waiver of subrogation, then the effect 
is to make the construction site a contractual pocket of no-fault  
liability. 
 Courts routinely enforce waiver of subrogation clauses.145 Some 
respects in which the clauses are enforced are strikingly unusual. 
Exculpatory terms are typically construed not to immunize a defend-
ant from liability for gross negligence.146 But a waiver of subrogation 
clause does exactly that.147 Further, although an insurer typically 
                                                                                                                  
 142. A mutual waiver of a subrogation term in a commercial lease raises similar issues. 
See Sidney G. Saltz, Allocation of Insurable Risks in Commercial Leases, 37 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 479, 482-85 (2002). 
 143. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201-2007, GENERAL CONDITIONS 
OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION § 11.3.7 (2014) (providing a standard form clause). 
See Gary E. Snodgrass, Waiver of Subrogation and Allocation of Risk in Construction 
Contracts, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 95 (1995), for a collection of cases enforcing the clause. 
Snodgrass reports that “[i]f an owner fails to obtain the necessary coverage, then it is 
estopped from proceeding against an architect, contractor, subcontractor or other 
consultant as a matter of law.” Id. at 98. 
 144. See David Arditi & Ranon Chotibhongs, Issues in Subcontracting Practice, 131 J. 
CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING & MGMT. 866, 872 (2005); Terrence L. Brennan, Construction 
Insurance: A General Perspective, 15 CONSTRUCTION L. 1, 46 (1995). 
 145. Snodgrass, supra note 143, at 95 (“There has been no hesitancy in upholding and 
enforcing the AIA’s and similar waiver provisions in both federal and state courts 
throughout the United States. The courts also have applied the waiver provisions to all 
parties identified in the clause.”). 
 146. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders Supply, 317 F. 
Supp. 2d 336, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 147. See id. at 341-42.  
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agrees to waive subrogation in its contract with the insured, this is 
not required to bind the insurer. Even when the insurance contract 
does not provide for waiver of subrogation, a term in the construction 
contract requiring the owner to secure a policy providing for waiver 
of subrogation eliminates an insurer’s right to subrogation. This is 
one of the rare instances in which it is acknowledged that a contract 
can have an adverse legal impact on a person who is not a party to 
the contract.148  
 Waiver of subrogation is unobjectionable because casualty insur-
ers should know the risk they bear, and should seek compensation 
accordingly. But this rationale raises the concern for information 
costs. Casualty insurers must determine whether a construction con-
tract waives subrogation in order to determine the risks they bear. 
Should we be concerned this imposes excessive information costs on 
insurers? The answer clearly is no. Some reasons are context specific. 
The ubiquity and standardization of waiver of subrogation clauses 
reduces information costs. An insurer who cares about waiver of sub-
rogation should know to look for a clause, where a clause is likely to 
be found in a construction contract, and what a clause means once it 
is found. 
 There are also other more generalizable reasons not to be con-
cerned that enforcing waiver of subrogation clauses will impose ex-
cessive information costs on insurers. A casualty insurer who cares 
about waiver of subrogation will care even more about other factors 
that affect its exposure to risks covered by a clause. These factors in-
clude the value of property exposed to construction-related hazard, 
the nature of the construction-related hazard, liability law, and the 
financial ability of a contractor to satisfy a claim. Often investigation 
of these other factors by an insurer will yield information about a 
waiver of subrogation clause at little additional cost. It is possible 
that waiver of subrogation actually reduces insurers’ total infor-
mation costs with respect to construction-related hazards. While 
waiver of subrogation makes an insurer marginally more sensitive to 
information bearing on the hazard it insures against, it makes an 
insurer indifferent to liability law, and it makes an insurer indiffer-
ent to the financial ability of a contractor to pay a liability. Need for 
this information, which bears on the likelihood of recovering from a 
negligent contractor, dissipates once a waiver of subrogation clause is 
discovered. 
                                                                                                                  
 148. See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Boraie, 672 A.2d 274, 278 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995). 
The technical justification for the result is that as a subrogee, the insurer stands in the 
same shoes as the insured subrogor. Sections VIII.A and VIII.B, infra, show this is not as 
rare as it is generally supposed.  
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 These reasons apply to exculpatory terms more generally. The 
universe of potentially affected persons, who have an incentive to in-
vestigate the possible existence of an exculpatory term, is generally 
limited to risk-bearers (potential victims) who have a potential legal 
claim against a risk-creator (a potential harm-doer) under the back-
ground liability rules, absent an exculpatory term. A risk-bearer who 
has a potential legal claim against a risk-creator has reason to inves-
tigate the situation independent of the possible existence of an excul-
patory term. The risk-bearer will have reason to gauge the magni-
tude of the risk and to gauge the financial ability of the risk-creator 
to satisfy a claim. Sometimes the risk-bearer will be able to obtain 
information about the exculpatory term at little additional cost. And 
similar to how the existence of waiver of subrogation clauses may 
benefit an insurer ex ante by reducing its total information costs, the 
existence of an exculpatory term may reduce the total information 
costs of a risk bearer by making him indifferent to liability law and 
the risk-creator’s ability to satisfy a liability. 
 Let me be clear about the limited point I am making. The infor-
mation costs to which I refer are not the sort of information costs 
usually of concern in negligence analysis. The usual concern is the 
cost to a risk-bearer and the cost to a risk-creator of acquiring infor-
mation about the risk itself, and not the cost to a risk-bearer of ac-
quiring information about a risk-creator’s liability for the risk under 
negligence law, or the cost of acquiring information about a risk-
creator’s ability to satisfy a liability. Sometimes negligence analysis 
is concerned with information costs borne by a risk-creator to ascer-
tain its potential liability under a liability rule. But negligence anal-
ysis is not concerned with information costs borne by a risk-bearer to 
ascertain the prospects for recovery under negligence law. This is as 
it should be. Potential negligence victims do not usually investigate 
their potential legal claims against potential harm-doers in advance. 
The possibility that potential negligence victims may investigate 
their potential legal claims against potential harm-doers typically is 
a product of the parties being engaged in a joint enterprise in which 
the potential victim is aware of the risk and the identity of the poten-
tial harm-doer.   
 The relative significance of my limited point is best explained with 
an example. Owner hires Contractor to construct a building, agreeing 
to absolve Contractor from liability for construction defects to get the 
job done quickly and cheaply. Worrying about his liability to later 
purchasers, Contractor has Owner record the liability waiver. We 
would call the recorded waiver an exigible grant of immunity if it 
precluded a negligence claim against Contractor by future owners 
and users of the building, when the future owners and users would 
otherwise have a claim against Contractor for harm caused by his 
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careless building mistakes under negligence law. The immunity 
granted would be good against the world and would not be limited  
to Owner. 
 An exigible grant of immunity may seem to raise two general con-
cerns that are raised by all servitudes.149 One is the concern that cre-
ators of the servitude will ignore the interests of future owners and 
users of property, and so create a servitude that is undesirable to fu-
ture owners and users (and may be socially undesirable).150 Call this 
the concern for externalities. The other is the concern for information 
costs that future prospective purchasers and users incur to identify 
undesirable servitudes.151 An exigible grant of immunity clearly rais-
es the concern for externalities. Returning to the example, Owner 
may be trying to profit at the expense of future owners of the proper-
ty when he grants Contractor immunity for slipshod work. Owner 
may anticipate that the problems from slipshod work will not mani-
fest for several years, long after Owner has sold the building to an 
unwitting purchaser.152 My limited point is that an exigible grant of 
immunity does not raise the concern for imposing information costs 
on future prospective purchasers and users. 
 The privity rules in contract are so well established that it is diffi-
cult to imagine courts creating an exception to the privity rules to 
cover exculpatory terms, even though the concern motivating the 
privity rules is not implicated when the issue is whether an exculpa-
tory may be enforced against a nonparty. Thus we must look outside 
of contract law for tools to give effect to an exculpatory term when 
the term is not in a contract to which the victim is a party. But we 
should not be surprised to find that contractual considerations may 
justify giving effect to an exculpatory term under these other bodies 
of law. Part VI considers the most obvious tool for this task: property 
law and the law of equity. 
                                                                                                                  
 149. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 893-905 
(2008) (describing these concerns as “notice and information costs,” “the problem of the 
future,” and negative externalities). Exigible immunities obviously do not raise concerns 
for fragmenting ownership of property, for an arrangement outliving its purposes, and for 
clouding the status of title. 
 150. See id. at 904. 
 151. See id. at 893-900.  
 152. Indeed, exigible grants of immunity have the potential to inflict greater costs on 
nonparties than easements and covenants on real property. The potential cost of an 
easement or covenant on real property generally is capped by the price paid for the 
burdened property or, more precisely, by what the value of the property would be without 
the servitude. On the other hand, a defect in property can have catastrophic consequences, 
and an exigible grant of immunity would deny the victim compensation for that loss. 
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D.   Contractual Workarounds to Obtain a Liability Shield 
 Before we leave contract law, one more point bears noting. Some-
times it is possible for a risk-creator who is not in privity of contract 
with a risk-bearer to work around the privity rules and to make an 
exculpatory term binding on the risk-bearer.153 But this requires 
some effort. Rosenstein v. Standard & Poor’s Corp. illustrates both 
the possibility and the effort that is required.154 An option trader on 
the Chicago Board of Exchange (“CBOE”) sued Standard & Poor’s 
(“S&P”), for an error in calculating the S&P index at the close of trad-
ing. The miscalculation resulted in a loss for the trader on options 
that closed on the day the error was made. The court concluded the 
plaintiff would have had an action against S&P under tort law, but 
the court held this claim to be precluded by an exculpatory term in 
the license agreement between S&P and CBOE. To achieve this out-
come, S&P required that CBOE include the exculpatory term in its 
rules and regulations, which were explicitly incorporated by refer-
ence in every option traded on the CBOE.155 This worked only be-
cause CBOE did what it promised. The exculpatory term would not 
have been enforceable against the option trader if CBOE had ne-
glected to include the term in its rules and regulations, or if CBOE 
                                                                                                                  
 153. The Pioneer Container illustrates another possibility when the risk-creator is a 
subcontractor who is engaged by a contractor with whom the risk-bearer is in privity. 
[1994] 2 AC 324 (PC) (appeal taken from Hong Kong). The case involves an accidental loss 
of bailed goods being carried by sea. Id. The initial carrier subcontracted the carriage to the 
defendants whose bill of lading provided that any dispute would be governed by Chinese 
law and resolved in Taipei. Id. at 332. The term in the defendants’ bill of lading was held to 
bind the plaintiffs because their contracts with the initial carriers had a clause providing 
“[t]he Carrier shall be entitled to sub-contract on any terms the whole or any part of the 
[carriage].” Id. at 333. For a discussion of the case, see Andrew Phang, Sub-Bailments and 
Consent, 58 MOD. L. REV. 422, 422 (1995). Phang considers the possibility the plaintiffs 
might have been bound to the sub-bailee’s term even if the contract with the initial carrier 
had not empowered it to sub-contract on any terms. Id. 
 154. 636 N.E.2d 665, 671-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). Assent to terms in an unsigned 
writing may also be manifested by a party’s conduct, but the cases where this has been 
found involve strong facts, such as conduct by the party unambiguously showing he 
understands the unsigned writing to be a source of both rights and duties. A.P. Moller-
Maersk A/S v. Comercializadora de Calidad S.A., 429 F. App’x 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(applying New York law), illustrates what constitutes strong facts to establish adoption of 
a writing. A nonsignatory to a bill of lading was held to have agreed to submit to a forum 
selection clause in the bill of lading when it brought an action based on the bill of lading 
and when it agreed to waive a term in the bill of lading in return for cash security.  
Id. at 28. 
 155. This satisfied the high standard for incorporating the terms of an unsigned 
writing into a signed writing by reference: there must be a “clear and unequivocal” 
reference to the incorporated writing in the signed writing, and the incorporated writing 
must be readily available to the party. Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 217 
P.3d 716, 721 (Utah 2009). 
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had neglected to incorporate the rules and regulations in its contracts 
with option traders. S&P would have been left with a breach of con-
tract claim against CBOE. 
 In cases where negligent performance of a contract involves a risk 
of physical harm to a nonparty, the usual contractual workaround to 
obtain a liability shield is an indemnity clause. The indemnity clause 
requires the other party to the contract to indemnify the protected 
party (the risk-creator) for defense and settlement costs on claims 
arising from the contract. For example, burglary and fire alarm con-
tracts often have both an exculpatory clause, which limits liability on 
first-party claims, and an indemnity clause, which requires the pur-
chaser of the service to indemnify the service provider for defense 
and settlement costs on all claims arising from the contract. While 
they are ubiquitous, indemnity clauses offer poor protection because 
the value of the indemnity right depends on the indemnitor being 
able to satisfy the indemnity obligation. 
VI.   EXCULPATORY SERVITUDES (EQUITABLE NOTICE) 
 The privity rules in contract law make it close to impossible to use 
contract as a mechanism for extended forms of private ordering when 
more than a handful of people want to establish collective govern-
ance,156 or when people want to establish a collective obligation (i.e., 
an obligation with multiple obligors and/or multiple obligees).157 
                                                                                                                  
 156. Contract is possible only when people are willing to work under a rule that 
requires unanimous consent of persons whose rights are impaired by a collective decision. 
 157. There have been occasional attempts to account for some simpler forms of 
collective private ordering using contract law, but contract law is usually found inadequate 
even to these simple tasks. Thus, classical contract theory had difficulty accounting for the 
partnership. Frederick Pollock wrote that the legal power of a partnership to admit new 
partners “may seem to involve the anomaly of a floating contract between all members of 
the partnership for the time being, who by the nature of the case are unascertained 
persons when we look to any future time.” FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT: 
A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS IN 
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 233-34 (7th ed. 1902). The anomaly was solved by treating the 
admission of a new partner by a partnership as a new contract, and not as a transfer of 
rights and obligations under an existing contract. 
Classical contract theory also had difficulty accounting for collective obligation more 
generally. For discussions of the problems, see WALTER HUSSEY GRIFFITH, A TREATISE ON 
JOINT RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES: INCLUDING THOSE WHICH ARE JOINT AND SEVERAL (1897); 
Samuel Williston, Releases and Covenants Not to Sue Joint, or Joint and Several Debtors, 
25 HARV. L. REV. 203 (1912). 
For much of the twentieth century, legal theorists struggled to find a basis in contract 
law for a worker to sue an employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. See 
David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. 
REV. 663, 663 & n.1 (1973). The possible theories are suggestive. They were “the custom or 
usage theory,” whereby an agreement is regarded as incorporated by reference; “the agency 
theory”; and “the third party beneficiary theory.” Id. at 663 n.1. Eventually these theorists 
gave up looking for a solution in contract law. They adopted a new paradigm that 
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Thus, owners of firms use the law of business organizations to de-
termine matters of firm governance and sharing of profits and losses. 
Debtors and creditors use the law of secured credit to determine the 
relative priority amongst creditors to the debtor’s assets. The law of 
agency determines when one person has the power to undertake a 
legal obligation for another. And so on.  
 This Section concerns one such mechanism for collective private 
ordering: the law of servitudes. It also concerns the equitable doc-
trine of notice, which is the original legal source of the law of servi-
tudes. Real estate developers often use servitudes as a mechanism for 
collective private ordering in a development, which allows for estab-
lishment and enforcement of collective obligations among owners of 
property in the development.158 The possibility of using the law of 
servitudes to enforce an exculpatory term covering a defect in land 
against downstream purchasers has not been lost on lawyers.159 A 
Washington Supreme Court case, 1515—1519 Lakeview Boulevard 
Condominium Ass’n v. Apartment Sales Corp., holds this to be a per-
missible use of servitudes.160 A city permitted the construction of 
housing in a landslide-prone area. Concerned for its potential liabil-
ity, the city conditioned the permits on the developer warning pur-
chasers of the risk and the developer granting and recording a cove-
nant waiving claims against the city resulting from soil movement. 
The Washington Supreme Court held this to be a valid servitude, ap-
plying the “touch or concern” test.161 
                                                                                                                  
analogizes a collective agreement to a government code. Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private 
Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1359 (1982). 
 158. It is taken as a given in these cases that the absence of privity between the party 
seeking to enforce the servitude and the party opposing its enforcement precludes enforce-
ment on the basis of contract law. See, e.g., Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 551 P.2d 
1213, 1217 (Cal. 1976) (in bank) (“Inasmuch as there is no privity of contract between de-
fendants and plaintiffs,[] [defendants’] right to enforce use restrictions against plaintiffs 
depends upon whether or not the restrictions sought to be enforced are comprehended with-
in mutually enforceable equitable servitudes for the benefit of the tract.”) (alterations in 
original). 
 159. See Bennett J. Hansen & Alexander S. Wylie, Options are Limited: Can the 
Defense Turn to Contract?, 50 FOR DEF. 47, 49-50 (2008) (proposing that builders 
incorporate exculpatory terms in the real estate deed to try to eliminate the liability to 
which they would otherwise be exposed); see also Newman v. Tualatin Dev. Co., 597 P.2d 
800 (Or. 1979) (holding that at least 125 nonprivity townhouse owners who purchased 
townhouses from someone other than builder could prevail against builder upon showing of 
builder’s negligence). 
 160. 43 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Wash. 2002) (en banc). 
 161. Id. at 1238-39. For a discussion of the case, see Susan F. French, Can Covenants 
Not to Sue, Covenants Against Competition and Spite Covenants Run with Land? 
Comparing Results Under the Touch or Concern Doctrine and the Restatement Third, 
Property (Servitudes), 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 267, 276-80 (2003). French also 
discusses two other cases that come out the opposite way, holding a covenant not to sue for 
damages on account of soil contamination does not touch or concern land. Id. at 279. 
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 Nothing is objectionable about using servitudes as a legal mecha-
nism to enforce exculpatory terms covering real property defects 
against purchasers of the property. In most states, downstream pur-
chasers of residential real property do not have a negligence claim 
against an upstream party in the first place. In these states there is 
no possibility of the claim that was precluded by the exculpatory 
term in 1515—1519 Lakeview Boulevard. In some states, a down-
stream purchaser may have a third-party beneficiary claim, typically 
on an implied warranty theory, but this claim is subject to an other-
wise valid exculpatory term in the upstream contract. Washington is 
one of a few states that allow a downstream purchaser to recover 
against an upstream party on a negligence claim absent bodily harm 
or physical harm to other property.162 The effect of allowing these 
claims is to create a background liability rule for upstream parties 
whose activities involving real property create a risk of pure econom-
ic harm to a downstream owner or user of property. People should be 
allowed to opt out of this background liability rule by creating an ex-
culpatory servitude, unless the court determines it is unreasonable 
for the defendant to absolve itself from liability for the act and harm 
in question. One way to think about the legal arrangement in Wash-
ington is that by allowing people to try to opt out of the background 
liability rule with an exculpatory servitude, the Washington Supreme 
Court gave courts an opportunity to rethink the need for the liability 
rule in cases in which people do try to opt out.  
 The law of servitudes gives courts more powerful tools to police 
unreasonable servitudes than would the law of contracts if the right 
of the downstream party to compensation for defective work were de-
termined by the law of third-party beneficiary. The Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Servitudes abolishes the old “touch and concern” 
test for a valid servitude.163 Under the Restatement, a properly creat-
ed servitude “is valid unless [the term] is illegal or unconstitutional 
or violates public policy.”164 The public policy test involves stricter 
                                                                                                                  
French, who was reporter for the Third Restatement, argues that the public policy test 
permits a more candid discussion of the relevant considerations, which is whether it is in 
the public interest to enforce such terms against downstream purchasers. See id. at 279-80. 
 162. Casa Clara Condominium Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So.2d 1244 
(Fla. 1993), is a leasing case denying the claim. See William K. Jones, Product Defects 
Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 
799-803 (1990) (concluding that an “overwhelming majority of courts deny recovery, in 
negligence and in strict liability”); see also Sean M. O’Brien, Caveat Venditor: A Case for 
Granting Subsequent Purchasers a Cause of Action Against Builder-Vendors for Latent 
Defects in the Home, 20 J. CORP. L. 525, 545-47 (1995) (collecting cases allowing the claim, 
while noting that a majority of states have rejected the claim). 
 163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 164. Id. § 3.1. 
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scrutiny of servitudes than a standard of unconscionability or the 
public policy rules that apply to exculpatory terms in a contractual 
setting. The comments in the Restatement explain that public policy 
determinations involve general interest balancing.165 Thus, a court 
could invalidate an exculpatory servitude if the reasons for negli-
gence liability seemed particularly strong, even if the term was not so 
egregious as to be unconscionable or to violate public policy under 
those bodies of law.166 
 There are possibilities beyond real servitudes for enforcing an ex-
culpatory term in the absence of privity of contract between a plain-
tiff and defendant based on the plaintiff having notice of the term 
before he stepped in harm’s way. The law of servitudes originates in 
the equitable doctrine of notice, which is a venerable exception to the 
rule that limits the legal effect of a contract to parties to the con-
tract.167 Application of the doctrine does not depend on the availabil-
ity of formal channels for providing a nonparty notice, like land rec-
ords. The equitable doctrine of notice was used in Tulk v. Moxhay to 
enforce a covenant restricting the use of land against a purchaser of 
the land who had actual notice of the covenant, but who may not 
have understood the covenant to bind him.168 The case long predates 
the recording system for land transfers. The equitable doctrine of no-
tice is used for purposes other than enforcing servitudes in land. It 
has been used to subject a purchaser of an asset to a third party’s 
claim to the asset when the purchaser acquires the asset with notice 
of the claim. For example, if a purchaser knows the seller acquired an 
asset fraudulently, then the purchaser takes the asset subject to the 
equitable claim of the defrauded prior owner.169 And a purchaser  
                                                                                                                  
 165. See id. at cmt. i (resolving public policy claims requires balancing interests).  
 166. Some cases suggest courts should generally defer to private ordering through a 
servitude when assent to the servitude is of reasonably high quality because the servitude 
is clear, it is properly recorded, and other property owners rely on the existence of the 
servitude. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994) (in 
bank). Nahrstedt adopts a rule of deference according presumptive validity to clear use 
restrictions in a common interest community when the use restrictions are contained in the 
community’s originating documents, which are recorded, emphasizing that some 
purchasers may have relied on the restrictions. Id. at 1290-92. The decision suggests that 
restrictions that are later imposed by majority vote or by a rulemaking power should be 
tested under a more demanding reasonableness requirement. See id. 
 167. The doctrine should not be confused with equitable estoppel, which requires a 
representation by an estopped party and reliance by a party claiming estoppel. In cases 
involving equitable notice, the party invoking the doctrine has not relied on any act or 
representation by the party against whom the doctrine is being invoked. 
 168. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144. 
 169. For chattels, the rule is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code and gives 
someone who wrongfully acquires title to a chattel in a consensual transaction (such as by 
fraud) “voidable title” and the “power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for 
value.” U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
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of land who knows the sale to him violates a previously made pur-
chase agreement takes the land subject to an equitable claim of the 
aggrieved purchaser.170 
 In a few cases, contractual restrictions on the use of chattels have 
been enforced against downstream purchasers of the chattel.171 These 
cases raise the possibility of using chattel servitudes (or the equitable 
doctrine of notice) to subject a purchaser or user of a chattel to a rea-
sonable exculpatory term covering a defect in the chattel when the 
person knows or has reason to know of the term when he acquires or 
uses the chattel. For example, a volunteer organization refurbishes 
beat-up old bikes, paints them yellow, and then leaves the bikes in 
public places for anyone to use.172 The organization prominently em-
blazons a disclaimer of liability on the bikes, informing a user of the 
bike that he or she bears the risk of a defect in the bike. The princi-
ples identified in Part II support enforcing the term, unless a bike 
was clearly unsafe to use when the organization placed the bike 
on the street. Riders are best situated to monitor the condition of the 
bikes they use. Contract law offers a possible legal basis for enforcing 
the exculpatory term in this case, but the contract theory requires 
classifying the relationship between the yellow bike organization and 
a bike user as contractual. The law of chattel servitudes (or the equi-
table doctrine of notice) offers an alternative legal theory for enforc-
ing the term that does not depend on the classification of the rela-
tionship as contractual. 
                                                                                                                  
STATE LAWS 2014). A downstream purchaser of the chattel who has notice that it was 
wrongfully acquired takes the chattel subject to the victim’s equitable claim. For intangible 
rights (e.g., “choses in action”) the rule is embodied in the doctrine of latent equities. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 343 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981); JOHN D.  
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 18-20 (2d ed. 1977). Under this 
doctrine, an assignee who acquires an intangible asset such as an insurance policy for 
value without notice of an equitable claim of a third party takes the asset free of the claim.  
 170. See, e.g., Greenfield Country Estates Tenants Ass’n v. Deep, 666 N.E.2d 988, 994 
(Mass. 1996) (“A holder is entitled to injunctive protection against sale to a bona fide 
purchaser, and may enforce the right in an action of specific performance against a third 
party who purchased with notice of the option. The third-party purchaser holds legal title, 
subject to the equitable obligation to convey the property to the holder of the right on 
receipt of payment of the required purchase price.”); George v. Oakhurst Realty Inc., 414 
A.2d 471, 474 (R.I. 1980). 
 171. See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 
(2004). Robinson highlights Pratte v. Balatsos. 113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955) (enforcing rental 
agreement for juke box against purchaser of business). The case elicited wry critique. See 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and 
Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1250-53 (1956) (arguing that servitudes in chattels should 
not be recognized generally because they mostly are used for illegitimate ends and serve 
few legitimate ends); see also Robinson, supra, at 1455-60 (describing four other relatively 
recent cases enforcing a servitude in a chattel). 
 172. See, e.g., AUSTIN’S YELLOW BIKE PROJECT, http://austinyellowbike.org (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016). 
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 Possible objections to using the equitable doctrine of notice to en-
force the exculpatory term in the yellow bike hypothetical include the 
doctrine’s obscurity and the fact the doctrine has never been used for 
a purpose such as this. Apart from the law of servitudes, the doctrine 
fills an obscure niche in property law. The doctrine almost always 
operates to preserve an upstream owner’s proprietary interest in an 
asset against a downstream purchaser, who acquires the asset with 
notice of the upstream owner’s proprietary interest.173 
 But there is no obvious reason why the application of the doctrine 
should be limited to the preservation of proprietary interests in as-
sets. Indeed, there is no longer any obvious reason to limit the doc-
trine to asset-based legal claims.174 Previously, the old form of the 
privity doctrine limited the potential use of the doctrine to claims of 
proprietary interests in assets. To see the connection,  consider the 
case of an asset that is passed down through a stream of hands. 
Handlers include successive owners of the asset, non-owners who 
handle the asset in servicing it, and non-owners who handle the asset 
in using it. Under the privity doctrine, a downstream handler could 
never have a claim against an upstream handler for carelessness in 
handling the asset, even if the carelessness predictably harmed the 
downstream party. Non-contractual claims only went one way—
downstream. And the only possible non-contractual claim was a pro-
prietary claim by an upstream owner against a downstream party in 
possession of the asset, asserting an interest in the asset superior to 
                                                                                                                  
 173. Technically, an equitable interest in an asset is a non-possessory, proprietary 
interest that does not involve legal title. Traditionally, the doctrine operated negatively 
and was not a basis for imposing an affirmative obligation on a party. Thus, traditionally, 
only negative servitudes (land use restrictions) were recognized, and these were 
enforceable only by injunction. Damages were not available for violation of an equitable 
servitude. In addition, an owner of an asset subject to an equitable interest does not 
commit a wrong against the interest holder by selling the asset to a bona fide purchaser, 
even though the sale destroys the equitable interest. This feature distinguishes the 
doctrine from the tort of interference with contract. 
 174. The doctrine has been applied to vindicate interests that are not associated with a 
particular thing. In a pair of 1994 English cases, the Law Lords used the doctrine to 
prevent a creditor from enforcing a guarantee of a debt, when the guarantee was obtained 
by the debtor from a loved one using undue influence, misrepresentation, or some other 
equitable wrong, if the creditor had reason to suspect the wrong-doing. Barclays Bank PLC 
v. O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); C.I.B.C. Mortgs. PLC v. Pitt 
[1994] 1 AC 200 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). James Edelman explains this application 
of the doctrine is “an anomaly largely prompted by public policy considerations.” SNELL’S 
EQUITY para. 8-028, at 237 (John McGhee ed., 32d ed. 2010). 
Going back some time, it seems the doctrine may have been used in the law of merchant 
shipping in the nineteenth century to hold a shipper who consigns goods to a vessel for 
shipping to the terms of a charter agreement even though the shipper had nothing to do 
with the agreement. See JAMES T. FOARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MERCHANT SHIPPING 
AND FREIGHT 294-95 (1880). I have not pursued this lead because proof of the point would 
add little to the case for using the doctrine today. 
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the downstream party, or a right to control use of the asset. The law 
generally cuts off an upstream owner’s proprietary claim to protect a 
bona fide purchaser and successors in interest. The equitable doc-
trine of notice prevents the claim from being cut off when the down-
stream purchaser had notice of the claim. The doctrine applied in the 
only situation where, because of the privity doctrine, a downstream 
handler’s notice of an upstream handler’s legal position in relation to 
the asset could matter.  
 The fall of the old form of the privity doctrine exposes an upstream 
handler of an asset, who is responsible for a defect in the asset, to a 
liability claim by a downstream handler of the asset, who is harmed 
by the defect. Sometimes the law will allow the upstream handler to 
absolve himself from liability for the defect to a purchaser of the asset 
by including an exculpatory term in the sales contract. There is no a 
priori reason why this exculpatory term should not also exclude a 
claim by a downstream handler, who has actual or constructive notice 
of the term. Further, there is no a priori reason why the doctrine 
should be limited to exculpatory terms covering defects in tangible 
assets. Returning to Ossining Union Free School District, if the Dis-
trict knew or had reason to know that the contract between the Ar-
chitect and the Engineers had a waiver of consequential damages, 
and in the circumstances the District reasonably should have under-
stood this term applied to any claim it might bring against the Engi-
neers, then the court could hold the District is subject to the term 
based on the equitable doctrine of notice. That said, it is unlikely that 
lawyers and judges will think of using the equitable doctrine of notice 
to give effect to an exculpatory term, other than in cases in which the 
term is in the form of a real servitude. Lawyers and judges are likely 
to look to tort law, to which I now turn. 
VII.   TORT LAW 
 This Part concerns approaches in tort law that courts may use to 
implement the principles identified in Part II.175 Tort law generally 
                                                                                                                  
 175. The doctrine of assumption of risk is not considered. In the U.S., the doctrine of 
implied assumption of risk has been pared back so that an unreasonable decision by a 
plaintiff to engage in an unreasonable activity is treated as contributory negligence. What 
remains of the doctrine of implied assumption of risk covers cases in which a plaintiff 
makes a reasonable decision to engage in an activity with others that involves a risk of 
physical harm, such as playing a sport. The doctrine shields other participants in the activ-
ity from negligence liability for conduct that is commonly associated with the activity. The 
application of the doctrine by a court to find no duty can involve question-begging deter-
minations of the reasonableness of an activity, the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
decision to engage in the activity, and whether the defendant’s conduct was appropriate 
to the activity. All of these issues are near the surface in the leading California case. See 
Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992) (holding that a woman of slight build as-
sumed the risk of rough bodily contact by a much larger male participant in an impromp-
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will determine the effect of an exculpatory term in cases where  
the victim is not a party to the contract with the exculpatory term.  
The way tort law handles these cases depends in part on whether the  
relevant harm is physical or purely economic. Section VII.A concerns 
cases involving physical harm, typically in the nature of bodily  
harm to the plaintiff. Usually in these cases the victim cannot be  
expected to protect herself from the risk by contract, often because 
the victim is not connected to the harm-doer through a chain of  
contracts. Section VII.A considers the limited ways in which tort law 
still makes the terms of an actor’s contract relevant to the actor’s  
duty to a nonparty. 
 Section VII.B concerns cases involving pure economic loss. In 
these cases, it is widely agreed that tort law sometimes should give 
way when the victim and the harm-doer are connected through a 
chain of contracts, and it is possible for the victim to protect herself 
from the risk by contract. There is no agreement on when precisely 
tort law should give way, or on what is it precisely about a claim’s 
contractual context that might justify dismissing a claim when there 
are strong reasons for liability under the usual negligence factors. 
Section VII.B.1 shows the problem is best approached as one of con-
tract interpretation or contract construction. A court should try to 
predict whether the parties would have disavowed the possibility of a 
negligence claim if the issue had been brought to their attention be-
fore the problem arose. This approach makes duty a matter of pre-
dicted intent. Section VII.B.2 concerns rules in the law of economic 
negligence that give parties to a contract the power to disclaim a duty 
to a nonparty victim, without regard to the nonparty victim’s assent, 
either actual or predicted. Section VII.C considers the tort action for 
negligent misrepresentation separately. It returns to the concern for 
information costs and argues this concern does not justify the New 
York rule requiring “near privity” or the California rule requiring 
“intended reliance.” 
A.   Negligence Involving Physical Harm  
 Under modern rules of tort law, an actor is likely to have a duty of 
care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm to an-
other. As a consequence, when the performance of a contract involves 
a risk of physical harm to a nonparty, one or both of the contracting 
                                                                                                                  
tu co-ed touch football game because the contact was appropriate to the game). The con-
sensus among U.S. scholars is that we would be better off without the doctrine because 
any useful work done with it can be better done using other doctrines. See, e.g., Stephen 
D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833 (1997). For a contrary view, see 
Avihay Dorfman, Assumption of Risk, After All, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 293 (2014). 
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parties is likely to have a duty of care to the nonparty. But tort law 
gives the parties some power to determine who among them has this 
duty of care. The first Section concerns these rules. The second Sec-
tion concerns the power that the parties to a contract may have to 
disclaim any duty to a nonparty by including an exculpatory term in 
a contract. An absence of duty under both sets of rules does not gen-
erally depend on contractual considerations involving the plaintiff’s 
assent to an exculpatory term, either actual or predicted. 
 1.   The Power to Determine Who Has a Duty to a Nonparty  
 Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, “An actor ordinarily has a 
duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a 
risk of physical harm.”176 Under this general duty rule, when the per-
formance of a contract involves a risk of physical harm to a nonparty, 
one or both of the parties to the contract is likely to have a duty to 
the nonparty. However, the parties have some power to determine 
who among them bears the duty: they have flexibility in defining the 
legal relationship between themselves, and they can use their con-
tract to allocate performance obligations. This power is a product of 
interaction between negligence law and rules outside of negligence 
law. These other rules come from areas such as contract law, the law 
of business organizations, agency law, and the law of vicarious liabil-
ity. The rules on independent contractors illustrate how this works. 
 Owner wants to cut down a tree on his property, which involves a 
risk of physical harm to Neighbor. If Owner cuts down the tree him-
self, then he will have a duty of care to Neighbor. But Owner can lim-
it his duty to Neighbor, and partly shield himself from possible negli-
gence liability, by hiring Tree Service to do the work as an independ-
ent contractor. Hiring an independent contractor is not a perfect 
shield against a negligence claim by Neighbor against Owner, should 
Neighbor be injured when the tree is cut down. The shield is not 
available if the task is considered a non-delegable duty.177 Further, a 
hirer has a duty of care in selecting an independent contractor and in 
giving instructions to an independent contractor.178 But these caveats 
aside, Owner will be shielded from liability for the independent con-
tractor’s carelessness in performing the contract. A hirer generally 
has no duty to monitor an independent contractor’s performance. And 
                                                                                                                  
 176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL  
HARM § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 177. 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 432 (2d ed. 2011). 
 178. Id. at 815 (first citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (AM. LAW INST. 
1965) (negligent selection); then citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (negligent 
instructions); and then citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (negligent exercise 
of retained control)). 
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in most states a hirer does not have a duty to investigate an inde-
pendent contractor’s finances or insurance coverage to ensure the 
contractor can satisfy any claims that arise from negligence in doing 
the work.179 
 Under the old privity rule, Tree Service would not have been liable 
to neighbor.180 Today tort law starts from the opposite premise: a con-
tract cannot absolve an actor from a duty of care the actor would owe 
to a nonparty in the absence of a contract. Instead, a contract can on-
ly be an additional source of a duty. This is expressed by two rules in 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm section 
43. The rule in section 43(a) applies if an action of Tree Service in 
performing the contract creates a risk of harm to Neighbor. The rule 
in section 43(b) applies if Tree Service undertakes to perform a duty 
owed by Owner to Neighbor. The contract is the source of Tree Ser-
vice’s duty under the rule in section 43(b), and so the terms of con-
tract between Tree Service and Owner may be relevant to the exist-
ence of a duty. The terms of the contract are generally irrelevant to 
the existence of a duty under the rule in section 43(a).  
 Under the rule in section 43(a), an actor ordinarily has a duty of 
care to a nonparty in performing a contract, or in performing any 
other undertaking, if an action increases the risk of physical harm to 
the nonparty “beyond that which existed without the undertaking.”181 
The action can be in the performance of the undertaking, or it can be 
the engagement in the undertaking. Duty arises under this rule be-
cause an action creates a risk of harm. The terms of the actor’s con-
tract generally have no bearing on his duty.182 For example, Electri-
cian is hired by Shopkeeper to repair an electrical line, and he care-
lessly loosens a light fixture, which falls on Customer.183 It is irrele-
                                                                                                                  
 179. Id. at 817-18. 
 180. As discussed in Part IV, infra, the old rule shielded an actor from liability to a 
nonparty—both in contract and in tort—for harm he caused in carelessly performing a 
contract. 
 181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL  
HARM § 43(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 2010). This rule does not reach cases of culpable 
nonfeasance, so section 43(b) and (c) provide two other bases for a duty: “the actor has 
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person” or reliance by a 
relevant person, which includes at least the plaintiff and the other party to the contract. 
Id. § 43(b)-(c). 
 182. An exception to this general rule is the rule that a contractor building in 
accordance with plans and relying on valid business permits is not liable to a third party 
even though the contractor creates an unreasonably dangerous condition by following the 
plans. The contractor is liable only if no competent contractor would follow the plans. Soave 
v. Nat’l Velour Corp., 863 A.2d 186, 191 (R.I. 2004). This is similar to the “contract 
specification defense” in the law of products liability. See OWEN, supra note 72, at 879-81 
(reporting this is the majority position and gaining adherents). 
 183. The example is from the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY 
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 43 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
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vant to Electrician’s duty under section 43(a) that he was not hired to 
ensure the fixture was secure. Electrician has a duty of care to Cus-
tomer because his conduct created the risk of harm. 
 The terms of the actor’s contract do have a bearing on duty under 
the rule in section 43(b). This rule provides that a duty of care to a 
nonparty can arise by contract (or other undertaking) when “the ac-
tor has undertaken to perform a duty owed by [a party] to the [non-
party].”184 In Electrician’s case, this rule comes into play if the loose 
light fixture is a pre-existing condition not of Electrician’s making. 
Electrician has a duty of care under the rule in section 43(b) if, in ad-
dition to repairing the electrical line, he actually undertakes to check 
the safety of the fixture. On the other hand, if checking the safety of 
the fixture is not part of Electrician’s undertaking—i.e., it is outside 
the scope of his contract—then Electrician has no duty with respect 
to the loose fixture when it is a pre-existing condition, which is not of 
his making.185 Of course, Shopkeeper will have a duty to correct the 
loose fixture as part of his general duty to Customer to maintain safe 
premises. 
 The distinction between the case in which Electrician loosens a 
light fixture, and the case in which Electrician fails to correct an al-
ready loose light fixture, is often expressed as the distinction between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance. The Restatement Third properly shifts 
the focus to the source of the risk of the harm the plaintiff suffers. If 
the risk is partly of an actor’s making, then the action that created or 
increased the risk can be the source of a duty, and there is no need to 
justify the actor’s duty by reference to his contract.186 On the other 
                                                                                                                  
 184. Id. § 43(b). 
 185. See, e.g., Doe v. Grosvenor Props. (Haw.) Ltd., 829 P.2d 512, 518-19 (Haw. 1992) 
(holding an elevator maintenance company was not liable for failing to connect the elevator 
stop button to the alarm bell when this was not within the scope of the company’s 
maintenance obligation); Cassell v. Collins, 472 S.E.2d 770, 772-73 (N.C. 1996) (holding a 
security service was not liable when a guard failed to intervene to protect a guest on the 
property from a violent assault when the contract provided for unarmed surveillance). 
 186. The misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy suggests a plaintiff must establish either 
an affirmative action by the defendant that was unreasonable (misfeasance) or a failure to 
fulfill a contractual undertaking (culpable nonfeasance). This is not required. It is enough 
for duty that the defendant’s action created or increased the risk of the harm that occurred. 
The action that created the risk need not be unreasonable in itself for a duty to arise, and 
the duty that arises because of the action may go beyond the scope of the contract. 
Anderson v. PPCT Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 145 P.3d 503 (Alaska 2006), illustrates the possibility. 
The plaintiff, an employee of the state Department of Corrections (“DOC”), was injured 
while being trained in “use-of-force techniques.” The defendant designed the training 
program, which involved techniques approved by the defendant. The defendant did not run 
the training sessions. These were run by DOC employees, who were trained and certified 
by the defendant. The plaintiff was injured in a session by a trainer who did not follow the 
defendant’s protocol in a live simulation. The conduct of the trainer could not be imputed to 
the defendant, for the trainer was not the defendant’s employee and was not in the 
defendant’s control. Id. at 507-11. The only theory left to the plaintiff was negligent 
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hand, if an actor had no hand in creating the risk, he is unlikely to 
have a duty of care unless his contract provides a basis for one. In 
such a case, the actor generally will be subject to negligence liability 
only if he had a contractual obligation to take the untaken  
precaution. 
 2.   The Power to Disclaim a Duty to a Nonparty (Physical Harm) 
 We have seen parties to a contract have some power to decide who 
among them owes a duty to a nonparty. This Section considers the 
limited situations in which parties to a contract are able to complete-
ly disclaim a duty to a nonparty when performance of a contract in-
volves a risk of physical harm to the nonparty. To begin, the parties 
may have this power if neither party to a contract has performed an 
act that creates or adds to the risk of the harm suffered by the plain-
tiff. To see how performance of a contract may involve a risk of physi-
cal harm to a nonparty though neither party had a hand in creating 
or adding to the risk, consider the facts of two cases, Stanley v. 
McCarver187 and Butler v. Advanced Drainage Systems, Inc.188 
 In Stanley v. McCarver, a hospital hired a radiologist to screen a 
prospective employee’s x-rays for tuberculosis. McCarver, the radiol-
ogist, told people at the hospital that shadows on the x-rays should be 
looked into. But McCarver did not follow up with Stanley, the pro-
spective employee, and no one at the hospital passed the information 
to her. The shadows were an early sign of lung cancer. By the time 
the cancer was detected, it was untreatable. Stanley did not claim 
she skipped a checkup, relying on the screening as a bill of health. 
Butler v. Advanced Drainage Systems, Inc. raises the same basic is-
sue in less tragic circumstances. A city hired contractors to design 
and build a drainage system for a lake to mitigate flooding. As a re-
sult of design and construction errors, the system worked poorly, and 
owners of lakeside property suffered flooding that would have been 
avoided if the contractors had done their jobs competently. But the 
                                                                                                                  
training. The trial court ruled this required the plaintiff to show the maneuver involved in 
her injury, that the defendant taught this maneuver to instructors, and that it was 
negligent for the defendant to train instructors to teach this maneuver to others. Id. at 511. 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff failed to 
produce such evidence. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant 
might be found negligent if the jury found the defendant “developed a program that, as a 
whole, produced instructor trainers and instructors who lacked the training they 
reasonably needed to protect their future students from harm.” Id. at 512. 
 187. 92 P.3d 849 (Ariz. 2004). 
 188. 717 N.W.2d 760 (Wis. 2006). 
2015]  PRIVITY’S SHADOW 61 
 
flooding was no worse than it would have been without the drainage 
system. The owners of lakeside property did not claim that they re-
lied on the system in any way. 
 In both cases, the defendant was hired to perform a task that, if 
done competently, would have diminished a pre-existing risk of harm 
to the plaintiff. The defendant did nothing to increase this risk, and 
so had no duty to the plaintiff. The person who hired the defendant 
(“the hirer”) also had no duty with respect to the risk. The hirer did 
not create or add to the risk and was not otherwise under a duty with 
respect to it. (In a moment we will look at the more common case in 
which the hirer has a duty of care with regards to a pre-existing con-
dition because of the hirer’s own contract with the plaintiff). Further, 
there is no claim by the plaintiff that she detrimentally relied on 
competent performance of the undertaking. 
 One might wonder whether there is any basis in tort law for im-
posing a duty on the defendants in these cases. The answer is no un-
der the rules in Restatement section 43,189 but the two cases are au-
thority that a duty may exist in these circumstances. In Stanley v. 
McCarver, the court held there was a duty but suggested its content 
may be affected by the terms of the physician’s contract, among other 
factors.190 A leading torts treatise applauds the decision and reports it 
reflects the trend in recent cases.191 In Butler v. Advanced Drainage 
Systems, Inc., the court did not allow the claim, but the majority 
skipped over the duty issue and instead found no liability under an 
unusual Wisconsin rule. This rule allows a court to make a no-
liability determination based on public policy.192 (A concurring opin-
ion applied the rules in the Restatement and held there was  
no duty.)193 
 As for the source of the defendant’s duty in each of these cases, the 
obvious source is the relevant contract between the defendant and 
the hirer. Abundant precedent shows that, even where Restatement 
                                                                                                                  
 189. There is no duty under the rule in section 43(a) because the defendant’s actions 
did not create or increase the risk of the harm that occurred. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 43(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 2009). 
There is no duty under the rule in section 43(b) because the hirer was under no duty to the 
plaintiff with respect to the risk. See id. § 43(b).  
 190. Stanley, 92 P.3d at 853-55. The court did not define the content of the duty, saying 
this “may depend upon factors such as whether there is a treating or referring physician 
involved in the transaction, whether the radiologist has means to identify and locate the 
patient, the scope of—including any contractual limitations on—the radiologist’s 
undertaking, and other factors that may be present in a particular case.” Id. at 854-55. 
 191. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 286, at 143-45 (2d ed. 2011). The 
authors directly challenge the rules in the Restatement. See id. § 412, at 687-88. 
 192. Butler, 717 N.W.2d at 767-69. 
 193. Id. at 774-75. 
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section 43 provides no basis for duty, a contract may still create a du-
ty in tort to a nonparty. A familiar example comes from the law of 
economic negligence: when a lawyer botches a bequest, many states 
allow the disappointed beneficiary to recover in tort on a malpractice 
claim. Some states treat this as a third-party beneficiary claim on the 
lawyer’s contract with the testator. I will refer to the tort form of the 
claim as a third party duty claim. 
 How does third party duty analysis differ from third-party benefi-
ciary analysis? An obvious but mostly superficial difference is that 
the “intent to benefit” test is used in third-party beneficiary analysis, 
whereas Stanley v. McCarver makes no mention of the parties’ intent 
to benefit the plaintiff. This is mostly a superficial difference: when 
the contract does not expressly identify the plaintiff as a third-party 
beneficiary, and a court must therefore predict the parties’ intent, the 
‘intent to benefit’ test does little work in the analysis. A more sub-
stantive difference is whose interests are considered. In third-party 
beneficiary analysis, only the interests of the contracting parties 
count. A court asks whether allowing a nonparty plaintiff to sue for 
breach of contract advances the interests of the parties in making the 
contract. The interests of the nonparty plaintiff are irrelevant. In 
third party duty analysis, some weight is given to the interests of the 
nonparty plaintiff, and to society’s interests. It is difficult to justify 
the result in Stanley v. McCarver if only the interests of the radiolo-
gist and the hospital count in the analysis. 
 One way to think about the difference between the two analyses is 
that, when reasonable care in performing a contract protects a non-
party from a risk of physical harm, a court will more readily imply a 
duty to use such care using tort law. This seems right to me. Howev-
er, it also seems right that the contracting parties’ interests remain 
paramount in duty analysis in tort law when neither party owes a 
duty of care to the plaintiff, independent of the contract, with respect 
to the risk of the harm suffered, because neither party had a hand in 
creating the risk. Stanley v. McCarver and Butler v. Advanced 
Drainage Systems, Inc. seem to recognize this point. In Stanley v. 
McCarver, the court justified the duty by arguing the law required 
the physician to do only what most physicians would do in the same 
situation.194 If this is correct, then the burden imposed by the duty 
was slight, and the “threatened flood of litigation might instead be a 
trickle.”195 The court also suggested the duty could be avoided by con-
                                                                                                                  
 194. See Stanley, 92 P.3d at 855 (“We suspect, based upon the ethical standards 
governing radiologists, that most radiologists do in fact communicate with some 
responsible party when a serious abnormality is discovered.”). 
 195. Id. 
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tract.196 In justifying the absence of liability in Butler v. Advanced 
Drainage Systems, Inc., the court emphasized the chilling effect lia-
bility might have on contractors bidding on municipal abatement pro-
jects.197 I expect that if the city and the contractors had specified in 
their contract that they did not intend to create any duty to the own-
ers of lakeside property, then that would have been the end of the 
matter, and the court would not have thought it necessary to give 
policy reasons to explain the absence of liability.  
 The argument I have made up to this point is fairly modest. Two 
parties who enter a contract to advance their own interests can dis-
claim a duty with respect to some risk of physical harm to a nonpar-
ty, even if reasonable care in performing the contract would decrease 
that risk. But the parties have this power only where the initial risk 
is not of either party’s making, and only if neither party otherwise 
owes a duty with respect to that risk to the nonparty. When I say the 
parties have the power to disclaim a duty, I mean that a court should 
give effect to the disclaimer even though the court thinks the dis-
claimer is unreasonable and not likely to be in the interest of the par-
ties, or society. The parties have the final say on the matter. Thus, if 
an employer hires a radiologist to screen the x-rays of a prospective 
employee, and the contract between the hospital and the radiologist 
disclaims any duty on the part of the radiologist to the employee, 
then the court should give effect to the disclaimer, even if the court 
thinks this arrangement is unreasonable. If you had to explain this 
in terms of the parties’ interests, then you might say the employer 
and the radiologist are assumed to have a benevolent interest in aid-
ing the employee, so long as benevolence does not impose much of a 
burden on them, and so long as they do not disclaim any benevolent 
interest in aiding the employee. 
 Cases in which this claim is put to the test hopefully will be rare. 
It would be depressing to learn that radiologists responded to Stanley 
v. McCarver by adding a term in their standard contracts disclaiming 
the duty. Hampton v. Federal Express raises a related issue, which is 
of much greater practical significance.198 In one respect, the case is 
similar to Stanley v. McCarver. The boy died as a result of a pre-
existing condition. Nothing the hospital or Fed Ex did created or in-
                                                                                                                  
 196. Id. (“Finally, we note that doctors may deal with this issue as a matter of contract. 
They may, for example, require x-ray subjects to consent to having the results reported 
only to the employers.”). The court did not explain how radiologists are to obtain a subject’s 
consent when they do not deal directly with the subject. 
 197. Butler, 717 N.W.2d at 769. The court also reasoned liability was unnecessary, 
because the city had sued the contractors for breach of contract, and the suit was settled to 
the city’s satisfaction. See id. at 769 n.8. 
 198. 917 F.2d 1119, 1119 (8th Cir. 1990).  
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creased the boy’s risk of dying of cancer. In another respect, Hampton 
is unlike Stanley: the hospital undertook a duty to treat the boy’s 
condition. This may make a great deal of difference legally, for Fed 
Ex might owe a duty of care to the boy under the rule in Restatement 
section 43(b).199 The carrier’s duty to the boy would be derivative of 
the hospital’s duty. 
 The major difference between the two cases is in the strength of 
the reasons for negligence liability. While the legal basis for finding a 
duty is quite weak in Stanley, there are strong reasons for imposing 
negligence liability. McCarver, the radiologist, knew he had infor-
mation that should be passed on to Stanley. The court thought the 
burden it was imposing on future radiologists was slight, and that 
any unfairness to McCarver in holding him liable for a risk that was 
not of his making was mitigated by the fact that he was being held 
liable only for failing to do what the court assumed most radiologists 
would have done as a matter of course. Conversely, in Hampton, the 
reasons for negligence liability are incredibly weak, despite the 
stronger legal basis for finding a duty. The court emphasized the fac-
tor of foreseeability—Fed Ex could not know the importance of the 
package it lost. Other factors support the result. The liability Fed Ex 
was asked to bear was disproportionate to its degree of fault. And the 
hospital bears primary responsibility—someone at the hospital 
should have followed up to ensure delivery of the package. 
 There are also strong policy reasons for the result in Hampton. 
Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., a case that raises issues similar to 
Hampton, speaks to these policy reasons.200 In Edwards, the widow of 
a firefighter sued the company that provided a fire alarm service for 
the house in which her husband died while fighting a fire. She al-
leged her husband died as a result of the company’s negligent delay 
in communicating the alarm. The court found the alarm service had 
no duty to the firefighter. The opinion is by Judge Posner, who focus-
es on the policy issue.201 The alarm service can do only so much to 
reduce the incidence of errors by its employees. Some errors are inev-
itable. Meanwhile, tragic losses from these inevitable errors, like the 
death of the fireman, are rare. Imposing liability for such unusual 
losses is unlikely “to evoke greater efforts at preventing accidents; it 
                                                                                                                  
 199. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 43(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 2010). 
 200. Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 201. Judge Posner also argues the alarm service is not the best loss avoider. See id. at 
491. People on the scene (the owner of the premises and people on the premises, like the 
fireman) can better assess fire risk and take precaution against it. See id. “The alarm 
service constitutes . . . not a first or second line of defense against fire but a third line of 
defense—and in this case possibly a fourth, fifth or … nth.” Id.  
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is likely merely to constitute the employer an insurer.”202 Judge Pos-
ner concludes: “All things considered, however, the creation of a duty 
of care running from the alarm service to Edwards is likely to make 
at best a marginal contribution to fire safety and one outweighed by 
the cost of administering such a duty.”203 These reasons apply with 
equal or greater force in Hampton v. Federal Express. 
 Hampton and Edwards have another fact in common: there was 
an exculpatory term in both contracts in the form of a liability cap.204 
The contract between the homeowner and the alarm service in Ed-
wards limited the company’s liability to $250. The presence of the 
exculpatory term is utterly unsurprising in both cases for many of 
the reasons Judge Posner identifies. In both cases, the defendants 
provide a standardized service. In both cases, the service does not in 
itself create a risk of harm, but an error in providing the service can 
interact with background risks that are not of the defendant’s mak-
ing. The congruence of an error by the defendant and background 
risk occasionally yields a large loss, including bodily harm. In both 
cases, the service provider cannot observe the level of background 
risk, nor can the service provider alter the error rate or the price 
based on the level of background risk. Not surprisingly, in both cases, 
firms in the defendants’ lines of business routinely cap their liability 
in the event of error. Not surprisingly, liability caps are routine in 
business-to-business contracts as well as in consumer form contracts. 
And not surprisingly, these caps are routinely upheld in the first par-
ty context (i.e., when the plaintiff is a party to the contract with  
the term).205 
 There is a modest take away point: the presence of an exculpatory 
term in a contract is relevant to duty analysis, even when the plain-
tiff is not a party to the contract with the term. An exculpatory term 
is at least some evidence of what one or both of the parties to a con-
                                                                                                                  
 202. Id. at 490.  
 203. Id. at 491.  
 204. Id. at 485; Hampton, 917 F.2d at 1121.  
 205. For a collection of relevant cases, see Shields, supra note 6, §§ 4-5. For example, it 
reported nineteen decisions holding a clause valid in a case involving fire, heat, or air 
quality damage, and one case holding a clause invalid. The pattern is the same in cases 
involving burglary and theft. See id. §§ 9-12. 
Alarm services have won a majority of the reported cases in which the plaintiff is not a 
party to the contract with the term, though nonparty plaintiffs have prevailed in a 
substantial number of cases. See id. §§ 21-22 (reporting seven cases involving third-party 
claims in which the clause was applied and five cases in which it was not). Typically, when 
the service prevails, it is because the court characterizes the plaintiff’s claim as a third-
party beneficiary claim. See, e.g., Fretwell v. Prot. Alarm Co., 764 P.2d 149, 151 (Okla. 
1988). This begs the nettlesome issue why a negligence claim is not available. Edwards v. 
Honeywell grasps the nettlesome issue and finds no duty under negligence law. 50 F.3d at 
492. 
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tract considered to be an appropriate allocation of risk. When a term 
is customary in a trade, it is evidence of what people in the trade con-
sider to be an appropriate allocation of risk. The relevance to duty 
analysis of contract terms that allocate the risk in question is rarely 
acknowledged, but this modest point should be uncontroversial.206 I 
want to make a stronger claim. There is a category of cases in which 
an exculpatory term in the harm-doer’s contract should presumptive-
ly absolve the harm-doer of a duty to a nonparty. Hampton and Ed-
wards are specific instances of this larger category of cases. In cases 
in this category, the contractual allocation of risk is likely to be in the 
interest of the affected parties as well as society. The burden should 
be on the plaintiff to persuade the court otherwise. The presumption 
is a shortcut to the result the court should reach if the court engages 
in unfettered duty analysis. 
 How precisely to define this category of cases is a difficult ques-
tion, for we immediately run into the boundary-drawing problem. 
Hampton and Edwards are easy cases because of the combination of 
factors identified above: the defendant supplies a service that does 
not generally create a risk of bodily harm to users of the service; 
some level of error is inevitable in providing the service; the impact of 
an error depends on the user’s background risk; the defendant cannot 
readily observe the background risk, or readily adjust its error rate or 
price in response to changes in the background risk; exculpatory 
terms (liability caps) are common in the defendant’s trade; these 
terms are common in business-to-business contracts as well as in 
consumer form contracts; and the terms are upheld in the first party 
context (i.e., liability caps are held to not violate public policy). 
 In addition, imposing liability on the defendant cannot be justified 
in Hampton or Edwards as an indirect mechanism to deter the other 
party to the defendant’s contract from creating an unreasonable risk 
of harm to people like the plaintiff. Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. 
Y.B.H. Realty Corp. raises this concern.207 A fire sprinkler system in a 
commercial building malfunctioned over the weekend and flooded a 
tenant’s premises, causing over $1 million in property damage. The 
sprinkler system was quite old. The malfunction was due to the fail-
ure of a sprinkler head that was manufactured in 1915 and that 
should have been replaced years earlier. It appears the tenant could 
not recover this loss from the building owners because the owners 
defaulted.208 The tenant sued a company hired to inspect the sprin-
                                                                                                                  
 206. See Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 556 N.E.2d 1093, 1096-97 
(N.Y. 1990) (acknowledging the relevance of an exculpatory term to duty analysis). 
 207. Id. at 1094. 
 208. Id. at 1094 n.*. 
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kler system and the fire alarm service, which should have detected 
the sprinkler system was activated. The building owners hired both 
defendants, and there was a low liability cap in both contracts. 
 The claim against the inspection company raises the new concern. 
The company was hired to inspect the system and report specific ser-
vice needs. It was not hired to maintain the system, or to inform the 
owners the entire system needed upgrading. This might seem to 
make it an easy no-duty case under the rules discussed in the previ-
ous Section even without the liability cap. The inspection company 
did not create the risk of the harm that occurred, and the untaken 
precaution was clearly outside the scope of the company’s obligations 
under the contract. But the narrow scope of the company’s undertak-
ing facilitated the owners’ breach of their duty of care to the tenants, 
because it enabled the owners to put off a needed upgrade. If you do 
not see the concern yet, then imagine the inspection company repeat-
edly reports a specific service need, the owners take no action, and 
there is a catastrophic fire that could have been avoided had action 
been taken. In this situation, we might impose liability on an inspec-
tion company for a dangerous condition that is not of the company’s 
making, but of which the company is aware, as an indirect mecha-
nism to pressure the building owner to correct the dangerous  
condition.  
 In Eaves Brooks, the court held the inspection company and the 
alarm service had no duty of care to the tenant. This seems right to 
me. The only reason for imposing a duty on the inspection company is 
the reason just identified, and it is not a strong reason. The duty 
would raise the cost of inspection. Inspection companies would pres-
sure owners to correct some dangerous conditions that would other-
wise not be corrected, but the increased price of inspection would also 
cause some owners to forgo inspections, leaving some dangerous con-
ditions undetected (and uncorrected). Even if the net result were pos-
itive, the good would have to be offset against the additional costs of 
processing claims against inspection companies.209 The calculus 
might be otherwise if the law required building owners to have safety 
systems regularly inspected. The calculus probably should be other-
wise if an inspector is required to visibly certify the system, and the 
public is invited to rely upon the visible certification. Then the in-
spection company would be in a position similar to an auditor who is 
hired to certify a company’s public financial statements. 
                                                                                                                  
 209. Important to this calculus is the fact that inspection does not in itself create a risk 
of bodily harm. No direct benefit in risk reduction comes from reducing the level  
of inspection. 
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 This Section identified a category of cases in which a rule giving 
presumptive effect to an exculpatory term in a defendant’s contract is 
a justified shortcut to the result that should be reached through un-
fettered duty analysis. There is useful work to be done in fleshing out 
the boundaries of this category. I will not do this work here, for it is 
best done case-by-case, using the common law method to identify and 
weigh relevant factors and values. Hampton, Edwards, and Eaves 
Brooks are good starting points. It is no coincidence that in all  
of these cases the defendant did nothing to create the risk of harm 
that occurred. For cases within this category, the parties have the 
presumptive power to disclaim a duty of care to a nonparty who is 
bodily harmed as a result of carelessness in performing a contract. 
Moreover, the absence of a duty does not depend on the plaintiff’s  
acquiescence to the term. If the quality of assent justifies the absence 
of a duty in these cases, it is social or aggregated assent reflected in 
the pervasiveness of the exculpatory term. 
B.   Negligence Involving Pure Economic Loss 
 This Section considers negligence claims involving pure economic 
loss.210 Section VII.B.1 considers one of the more intractable problems 
                                                                                                                  
 210. This Section focuses on business-to-business claims where both the victim and the 
harm-doer are fairly sophisticated. The principles identified in Part II support tailored, 
categorical no-duty rules involving other types of claims. An example is the rule 
immunizing an employee for claims involving pure economic loss for torts committed in the 
scope of employment. This immunity rule mirrors the liability rule of respondeat superior, 
which holds an employer strictly liable for torts committed by an employee while working 
within the scope of his or employment. Under the immunity rule, if an employee carelessly 
harms a victim while working within the scope of his or her employment, and causes a 
pure economic loss, then the victim has no claim against the employee and must look solely 
to the employer for compensation. Greg Allen Constr. Co. v. Estelle, 798 N.E.2d 171, 173 
(Ind. 2003); Kennett v. Marquis, 798 A.2d 416, 418 (R.I. 2002) (holding seller’s broker as 
seller’s agent was not liable to buyer for negligent misstatement regarding property); 
Krawczyk v. Bank of Sun Prairie, 553 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding a 
bank trust officer was not individually liable for negligence resulting in solely pecuniary 
harm). This is also the position of Canadian and English law. See Edgeworth Constr. Ltd. 
v. N. D. Lea & Assocs. Ltd., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 206 (Can.); Williams v. Nat. Life Health Foods 
Ltd. [1998] UKHL 17, [1998] 1 WLR 830 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). But see Hart v. 
Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 247 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying Mississippi law and holding 
employee officer is individually liable if he was involved in negligent misstatement). For a 
review of California law on the point, see Richard Malamud, Employee Liability for 
Economic Losses of the Employer’s Customers: A California-Based Examination of the 
Question of Duty, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 195 (1994). Unless an employer is a shell company, or 
an employer is shielded from liability by its contract with the victim, the employer liability 
provides compensation and deterrence, diminishing the reasons for employee liability. If an 
employer is shielded from liability by its contract with a victim, then the immunity rule 
preserves the agreed allocation of risks. 
The rule appears to be otherwise when the harm is physical. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 348-357 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). An agent is individually liable if the 
agent is complicit in fraud and duress, id. § 348, trespass, id. § 348A, conversion, id. § 349, 
but that an agent is not individually liable for solely pecuniary harm if the agent neglects 
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in the law of economic negligence. The issue involves determining 
when contract should displace negligence law as a mechanism for 
dealing with the problem of carelessly caused harm. The draft of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm speaks to 
this issue when the plaintiff and defendant are in privity of contract 
or when the negligence occurs in the negotiation of a contract. It 
adopts a rule that generally precludes a negligence claim for pure 
economic loss.211 But the draft says little about cases in which the 
plaintiff and defendant are not in privity yet are connected through a 
chain of contracts.212 Section VII.B.1 addresses these cases. It propos-
es that, if there would be a negligence claim under general principles 
of tort law were it not for the contractual context, then courts should 
initially approach the duty issue as a problem of contract interpreta-
tion or contract construction.213 A court should try to predict whether 
the parties would have disavowed the possibility of a negligence 
claim, had the question of the claim’s availability been brought to the 
parties’ attention before the problem arose. Section VII.B.2 considers 
cases in which the parties to a contract have the power to disclaim a 
duty to a nonparty without regard to the assent of the nonparty,  
either actual or predicted. These cases involve considerations similar 
to the cases discussed in Section VII.A.2. 
 1.   Duty and Predicted Intent  
 Often negligence claims involving pure economic loss arise in set-
tings in which the plaintiff and defendant are connected through a 
                                                                                                                  
to perform its duties to its principal, see, e.g., id. §§ 352, 357. The rule also appears to be 
otherwise when the employee is a professional, such as a lawyer. See, e.g., Moransais v. 
Heathman, 744 So.2d 973 (Fla. 1999). These rules can be explained by the general policies 
against liability shields for carelessly caused physical harm and professional malpractice.  
 211. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 3 (AM. LAW 
INST. Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012). The claim for professional malpractice is recognized as 
an exception. Id. § 4. The claim for negligent misrepresentation is not recognized as an 
exception. See id. § 5(5) cmt. m.  
 212. See id. § 3 cmt. f (explaining that the rule in section 3 does not apply when parties 
are “indirectly linked by contract”). Comment f goes on to state that “missed opportunities” 
to seek protection by contract in such cases explain the absence of a duty “outside the well-
recognized categories stated in this Chapter.” Id. at cmt. f, illus. 8. Section 6 (“Negligent 
Performance of Services”) Comments b and c address some of the problems discussed in 
Section VII.B.1, infra. See id. § 6 cmt. b-c.  
 213. This will generally be true when it is fairly clear the defendant acted 
unreasonably; the plaintiff suffered a loss that almost certainly would have been avoided 
had the defendant used reasonable care; the risk of the loss suffered by the plaintiff is 
among the risks that made the defendant’s conduct unreasonable; the loss did not involve 
the plaintiff’s own unreasonable conduct, or the wrongful conduct of another person; the 
loss can be measured in dollars with a reasonable degree of certainty; and liability for the 
loss does not expose the defendant to indeterminate liability, or to liability that is 
disproportionate to the degree of fault. 
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chain of contracts that might address the risk in question. J’Aire 
Corp. v. Gregory is a notorious example.214 The plaintiff was a tenant 
who operated a restaurant at a county airport. The defendant was a 
contractor who was hired by the county to renovate the heating and 
air conditioning system in the tenant’s restaurant. There were egre-
gious construction delays, shutting down the restaurant and causing 
a substantial loss of income to the tenant. The tenant brought both a 
negligence claim and a third-party beneficiary claim against the con-
tractor. It dropped the third-party beneficiary claim on appeal. The 
case is notorious because of the principles invoked by the California 
Supreme Court to justify allowing the claim. The court applied the 
Biakanja balancing test and established “foreseeability as the key 
component necessary to establish liability.”215 The court also rejected 
“overly rigid common law formulations of duty” and the view that 
“economic interests” are less deserving of the law’s protection than 
physical.216 Meanwhile the court said nothing about the contractual 
context of the claim, suggesting its irrelevance to the negligence  
issue. 
 There is widespread agreement that J’Aire Corp. was a mistake. 
Most states have rejected foreseeability as the relevant criterion of 
negligence in cases involving pure economic loss.217 Drafts of the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts explicitly reject the result in the case.218 If 
the case arose in California today, the result would almost certainly 
be different under later decisions of the California Supreme Court, 
which continue to apply the Biakanja balancing test but in a very 
different spirit.219 However, while there is widespread agreement 
                                                                                                                  
 214. 598 P.2d 60, 60 (Cal. 1979) (holding Contractor was obligated to complete its work 
in a manner which did not cause injury to Tenant’s business, where such injury is 
foreseeable).  
 215. Id. at 64. 
 216. Id.  
 217. Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for 
Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 791 (2006) (“The bulk of economic-loss case law 
repudiates People Express and J’Aire.”). The claim is clearly precluded in states like 
Florida, Illinois, and Texas, which have rules that generally preclude negligence claims 
involving pure economic loss, unless the claim is within one of the established pockets of 
liability, such as for professional malpractice and negligent misrepresentation. The claim 
would also be precluded in states that have adopted a categorical no-duty rule for third-
party claims in the construction context. The claim would also be precluded in states, like 
Oregon, that predicate a duty on a special relationship. 
 218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 1 cmt. e, illus. 
3 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012).  
 219. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. holds that an auditor is subject to liability only to 
persons with whom the auditor is in privity plus intended beneficiaries of the audit and 
only on the specific ground of negligent misrepresentation, not the general ground of 
negligence. 834 P.2d 745, 747 (Cal. 1992) (in bank). The court reasoned negligence liability 
should not be imposed when parties are able to determine their rights and obligations by 
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J’Aire Corp. was a mistake, there is no agreement on when negli-
gence law should give way because of the contractual context of  
a claim. 
 J’Aire Corp. has many of the factors that make the problem diffi-
cult. The contractor clearly owes a duty of care to the tenant if gen-
eral principles of negligence law apply. The contractor knew con-
struction would harm the tenant. Indeed the delay harmed only the 
tenant, for the project was fully contained within the restaurant. 
There was little or nothing the tenant could do to protect himself 
from the harm, unless the tenant had the foresight to secure protec-
tion from the loss in its contract with the county. Further, no other 
actor’s wrongful conduct was involved; there was no difficulty in de-
termining causation or damages; and the claim did not raise the con-
cern for imposing indeterminate liability, or for imposing liability 
that is disproportionate to the degree of fault. Viewed solely as a neg-
ligence problem, the claim should be allowed. 
 Part of the difficulty of the problem is that many of these factors 
are also reasons to think the tenant, county, and contractor might 
have used their contracts to address the issue of the contractor’s lia-
bility to the tenant in the event of a construction delay.220 But here 
we run into the privity rule in contract law. The tenant and the con-
tractor are not in privity of contract, and so it would seem that the 
terms of the parties’ contracts, and contract law, have no bearing on 
the availability of a negligence claim. But this point is not as self-
evident as it may seem. In principle, if a claim might be available 
under general principles of negligence law, and the argument is that 
the claim should give way because of the contractual context, then it 
seems natural to look to general principles of contract law for a rea-
son why the claim should be denied. Once one looks to general prin-
ciples of contract law, the initial question is: what did the parties in-
                                                                                                                  
contract, because of a preference for “private ordering.” Id. at 761. J’Aire would not stand 
under this view. Aas v. Superior Court rejects negligence and other tort claims brought by 
homebuyers against developers and contractors for defective construction seeking as 
damages repair cost or the diminution in market value of the property. 12 P.3d 1125, 1128 
(Cal. 2000). The majority opinion, which had five votes, postulates the centrality of 
physical harm to the negligence action. See id. at 1138-39. Biakanja and J’Aire elide this 
distinction. A three-justice concurrence disagreed but only at the margin of the new 
position, arguing that a negligence claim should be allowed for defects that if uncorrected 
would pose a risk of physical harm. Id. at 1143. The court has used the balancing test to 
reject negligence claims for pure economic loss in other cases. Summit Fin. Holdings, Ltd. 
v. Cont’l Lawyers Title Co., 41 P.3d 548, 554 (Cal. 2002); Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title 
Guar. Co., 960 P.2d 513, 532 (Cal. 1998). 
 220. The Dobbs treatise puts the point gently, speaking of J’Aire Corp.: “This result is 
out of line with the settled principle that greater protection, not lesser, is to be afforded to 
contracts than to uncontracted-for opportunities.” DOBBS ET AL., supra note 191, § 655, at 
611 n.3. 
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tend? Intent usually determines the legal effect of a contract. Thus, if 
general principles of contract law justify denying the negligence 
claim in J’Aire Corp., then it probably is because to allow the claim 
would violate the parties’ intent. Perhaps courts have been slow to 
grasp that the parties’ intent has to be the linchpin when arguing 
why principles of negligence law should give way to principles of con-
tract law, as in J’Aire Corp, because courts are not used to asking 
about intent when the relevant intent is that of three or more parties, 
who are connected through two or more contracts. 
 Once we ask “What did the parties intend?” we run into another 
difficulty. The contracts in J’Aire Corp. did not speak directly to the 
issue of the contractor’s liability to the tenant.221 But in contract law 
courts do not give up on trying to determine intent simply because 
the contract does not clearly reveal intent. Courts do their best to as-
certain or to predict the parties’ likely intent. I propose courts do just 
this to determine whether a claim’s contractual context justifies 
denying the claim, even if the rules of negligence law would other-
wise allow it. The court should try to predict what the parties would 
say regarding the availability of the negligence claim, if the issue had 
been brought to the parties’ attention before the problem arose.  
 Once the issue is put in these terms, some cases turn out to be 
quite easy. Sometimes we can predict with a fair degree of confidence 
that the parties would disavow a possible negligence claim, had they 
been asked before the problem arose. For example, in J’Aire Corp., it 
is likely that the tenant, county, and contractor would have agreed 
they did not want the restaurant to have a possible negligence claim 
against the contractor, had they been asked about the availability of 
the claim before the problem arose. Gary Schwartz fills in the con-
tractual context, as reported to him by the plaintiff’s lawyer in a 
phone conversation. He was told the restaurant could have recovered 
its losses through a contract claim against the county, and the county 
could have passed this loss on to the contractor through a contract 
claim against the contractor. The restaurant chose not to pursue its 
                                                                                                                  
 221. This is often the case when the plaintiff and defendant are not in privity of 
contract. People typically do not focus on liability issues in a contract until a problem 
arises. People are especially unlikely to focus on liability issues involving a nonparty, 
including their liability to a nonparty and a nonparty’s liability to them. Such inattention 
is not just a matter of nonparty liability issues’ not being salient. There is no clear and 
immediate payoff to addressing nonparty liability issues in a contract, unless the desired 
result is to make the nonparty a third-party beneficiary (i.e., either to create a duty to a 
nonparty or to disclaim a duty owed by a nonparty). The privity rule in contract law makes 
it impossible to disclaim a duty to a nonparty or to impose a duty on a nonparty by 
contract. There is another reason the parties may not have addressed the nonparty liability 
issue in J’Aire Corp: the negligence claim was novel. The parties had no reason to address 
a negligence claim for which there was no precedent. 
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contract claim because “the tenant did not wish to upset its friendly 
relations with the building owner and thereby jeopardize the contin-
uation of the lease arrangement.” 222 
 The contract claims protected the tenant from the risk of construc-
tion delays and passed the loss on to the contractor, providing both 
compensation and deterrence. The tenant could have minimized the 
threat and cost of litigation to the county by offering to suspend its 
claim against the county in return for an assignment of the county’s 
claim against the contractor, and agreeing to release the county once 
a judgment was obtained against the contractor.223 Allowing the ten-
ant to “short circuit[]” the contracts224 by bringing a negligence claim 
directly against the contractor adds little in the way of compensation 
and deterrence, but it complicates resolution of a dispute, if a dispute 
arises. Contracts tend to have clear performance metrics to deter-
mine when compensation is due, whereas negligence has a vague 
standard. A negligence claim may involve issues of contributory neg-
ligence, so the negligence of the county may become an issue. A neg-
ligence claim short circuits contractual terms included in the contract 
to simplify dispute resolution, such as a liquidated damage clause or 
a mandatory arbitration term. Settlement becomes more complicated 
if a negligence claim is available because the contractor has to get the 
assent of both the county and the tenant. The tenant could play the 
county and the contractor against each other, because the tenant can 
settle with one while proceeding against the other. 225 I could go on, 
but you get the point. If reasonably sophisticated parties have gone 
through the trouble to establish contractual mechanisms to provide 
for compensation and deterrence, then they would also likely disavow 
an additional negligence claim if presented with it as a possibility 
before a problem arises. 
 It is important to be clear about the character of this inquiry into 
intent, for intent has several meanings in contract law. In J’Aire 
Corp., the parties did not intend to disavow the negligence claim in 
the sense that this is among the “terms that the parties . . . probably 
had in mind but did not trouble to express.”226 We can be confident no 
                                                                                                                  
 222. Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J’Aire 
and of Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37, 41 (1986). Schwartz also reports that 
the repair work was done entirely inside the plaintiff’s restaurant. Id. at 40 & n.19. 
 223. This is a good deal for the county, for it is off the hook if the contractor cannot 
satisfy the judgment. 
 224. Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) 195 (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
 225. Chambco v. Urban Masonry Corp., 647 A.2d 1284 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) 
(holding that a subcontractor harmed by another sub’s mistakes who settled its claim 
against the general for the loss has no claim against the other sub).  
 226. Glanville L. Williams, Language and the Law—IV, 61 L.Q. REV. 384, 401 (1945). 
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one considered the possibility of a negligence claim until the problem 
arose. The claim was unprecedented. The parties may have intended 
to disavow the negligence claim in the sense that this is among the 
“terms that the parties, whether or not they actually had them in 
mind, would probably have expressed if the question had been 
brought to their attention.”227 Given the novelty of the negligence 
claim, we can imagine the tenant, county, and contractor would have 
agreed to disavow a possible negligence claim, if the issue had been 
brought to their attention before the problem arose. This would be 
particularly likely if they had consulted a lawyer, who would have 
told them there was no legal precedent for the claim. 
 Of course, we cannot be certain the tenant would have agreed to 
disavow the negligence claim, had the issue been brought to the 
parties’ attention before the problem arose, because having the 
additional claim is generally to the tenant’s advantage. But it is still 
possible to say the parties intended to disavow the claim, for intent 
can be defined objectively. The concept of objective intent in contract 
law is capacious enough to encompass terms that “are implied by the 
Court because of the Court’s views of fairness or policy.”228 In this 
scenario, we predict the parties would have disagreed about the 
availability of a negligence claim, had the issue been brought to their 
attention before the problem arose. Presumably the parties are 
predicted to disagree because we think they have different views on 
what is fair, or on what is in their interest. This is a case of latent 
misunderstanding: the misunderstanding is not revealed until the 
problem arises. In J’Aire Corp., the contractor’s view prevails in this 
scenario because it is the more reasonable view, for the reasons just 
explained. A term is “intended” even though only one party intended 
the term, if the other party’s intent is unreasonable. The absence of a 
negligence claim is objectively intended. 
 If intent regarding the availability of a negligence claim turns out 
to depend on what the court considers reasonable, then it may seem 
we are back to where we started, for a standard of reasonableness is 
also at the heart of negligence law. But the contract and negligence 
inquiries are different. An important difference is the focal point in 
time. Under the contract inquiry, the court generally focuses on a 
point in time before the problem arose—typically this is the point in 
time when the contracts were made. Under the negligence inquiry, 
the court generally focuses on the point in time the harm was 
carelessly caused. Another important difference is in whose interests 
and values count. The contract inquiry takes only the interests and 
                                                                                                                  
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
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values of the parties as relevant. The negligence inquiry considers 
social interests and values more generally. The contract inquiry also 
places greater weight on the interest in self-governance and on the 
value of planning.  
 There is some overlap between the contract and negligence inquir-
ies. In particular, the plaintiff’s vulnerability to the relevant risk is 
an important factor under both inquiries, as is the strength of the 
reasons for negligence liability more generally. J’Aire Corp. is an 
easy case because the contract claims provided compensation and 
deterrence. But sometimes we can predict the parties would disavow 
a negligence claim with a fair degree of confidence in the prediction, 
even though the absence of the negligence claim leaves the plaintiff 
vulnerable to carelessly caused harm.229 Lutz Engineering Co. v.  
Industrial Louvers, Inc. illustrates.230 A subcontractor incurred a 
                                                                                                                  
 229. The discussion of Ossining Union Free School District v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91 
(N.Y. 1989), makes the related point that parties may rely on the exculpatory terms when 
the term is ubiquitous in a trade. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text. More 
generally, when participants in a multi-party project legitimately choose to eliminate first-
party claims, then generally it makes little sense to allow third-party claims. The 
defendant is unlikely to expect a third-party claim, and so little or nothing is achieved in 
the way of deterrence. Whatever compensation is achieved is capricious. Recovery depends 
on the plaintiff being able to assign responsibility for the harm to a participant in the 
project with whom the plaintiff is not in privity, and who has the resources to satisfy the 
claim. Claims-resolution costs are also likely to be high because of the need to establish 
negligence, causation, and the absence of responsibility on the part of other participants in 
the project. 
The handling of exculpatory terms when there is a first-party claim in the construction 
context reinforces this conclusion. Exculpatory terms in construction contracts are enforced 
when a claim involves pure economic loss. See, e.g., Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., Inc. 44 
F.3d 195, 201-04 (3rd Cir. 1995) (applying Pennsylvania law and enforcing term limiting 
engineer’s liability to $50,000 or total fee for services). This deference is warranted. The 
AIA standard construction documents have been described as a classic example of “private 
legislation.” Justin Sweet, The American Institute of Architects: Dominant Actor in the 
Construction Documents Market, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 317, 317 (1991); Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a Transactional 
System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463, 485 (1998) (“For the construction industry the standard 
form contract—particularly the AIA Standard Document set—has in several respects 
served as a surrogate for a commercial code.”). Admittedly, the AIA’s process for creating 
these documents is imperfect. Standard waivers of consequential damages have been 
criticized as favoring architects over other participants in the industry. See Mark R. 
Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and Contract 
Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 353 (2010). Other criticisms include the under-
representation of some participants in the industry (particularly owners and lenders), and 
sometimes failing to strike the right balance between achieving simplicity, clarity, 
completeness, and flexibility. But there are plausible reasons to think the AIA got it right. 
See Carl J. Circo, Contract Theory and Contract Practice: Allocating Design Responsibility 
in the Construction Industry, 58 FLA. L. REV. 561, 619-22 (2006) (arguing private risk 
allocation through business contracts is sensible because it is much cheaper and as 
effective to handle unforeseen problems within a project informally by negotiation rather 
than through high stakes litigation). 
 230. 585 A.2d 631 (R.I. 1991). 
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large loss on a manufacturing project as a result of an engineer’s 
failure to catch nonconformities between shop drawings submitted by 
the subcontractor and contract specifications. The general contractor 
hired the engineer. We can be reasonably certain that the parties 
would have disavowed the negligence claim had they been asked be-
fore a problem arose. Explicit terms in both contracts made it clear 
that the subcontractor was intended to bear the risk in question. A 
term in the subcontract provided the subcontractor bore sole respon-
sibility to ensure its drawings complied with the specifications, and a 
term in the engineer’s contract provided its review of drawings was 
solely to protect the general contractor.231 In the case, the Rhode  
Island Supreme Court held the engineer had no duty to the subcon-
tractor. Unfortunately, the court did not explain the result by refer-
ence to the parties’ actual or predicted intent. The stated reason for 
the result is incoherent.232 
                                                                                                                  
 231. Woolcock St Invs Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd, a leading Australian case, might be 
explained on the same basis. (2004) 216 CLR 515 (Austl.).  
 232. The Rhode Island Supreme Court said this in Lutz to distinguish its earlier case, 
Forte: 
Forte was in a position wherein it had to rely on the architect’s record keeping 
regarding the removal of rock and boulders because Forte would be compen-
sated for rock removal only in the amounts the architect-engineer reported had 
been removed. The architect-engineer therefore had a direct reponsibility [sic] 
to Forte, the contractor, whose payment was dependent on the architect-
engineer’s records. Our holding in Forte, therefore, has no application to this 
case.  
585 A.2d at 636.  
The word “direct” cannot bear the weight being placed on it. In Forte, the engineer’s “di-
rect responsibility” was to the owner, the principal he undertook to serve as an agent. Per-
haps the court was getting at something else. The word “direct” often has a causal connota-
tion: a harm is considered to be “indirect” when other human conduct is involved in the 
pathway between the actor’s conduct and the harm. In tort law, when the involvement of 
other human conduct justifies absolving a harm-doer from liability for carelessly caused 
harm, the other conduct is often labeled a “superseding cause.” What is or is not a super-
seding cause is a normative determination, which requires explanation. In Forte, for exam-
ple, the loss would not have occurred if the owner had waived the contract term to rectify 
the engineer’s mistake. Why is this not a superseding cause, changing the result in the 
case? A likely candidate for a superseding cause in Lutz is the subcontractor’s mistake in 
submitting shop diagrams that did not match contract specifications. But, what justifies 
treating this as a superseding cause, justifying the result in the case? 
A later Rhode Island case, Volpe v. Fleet National Bank, further confuses matters. 710 
A.2d 661 (R.I. 1998). The case holds that a bank owes no duty of care to a noncustomer 
when the bank is presented with a check made out to the noncustomer as payee. Id. at 655. 
The bank cashed the check on a forged endorsement. Id. at 661. The result is clearly cor-
rect under the principles identified in Part II. A negligence claim is unnecessary to protect 
the payee because the law of conversion provides a remedy. Also, on the facts of the specific 
case, the plaintiff was compensated for the loss by the state bar. Id. at 662 n.3. Her lawyer 
negotiated a settlement without her knowledge, and then cashed the settlement check, 
forging her signature. Id. at 662. What is troublesome about the case is the rationale, 
which is the privity doctrine: “This rule is based on the legal principle that there is no priv-
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 Sometimes the parties’ intent regarding the availability of a negli-
gence claim will be unpredictable, particularly when the absence of a 
negligence claim leaves the plaintiff vulnerable to the harm in ques-
tion. An earlier Rhode Island case, Forte Brothers, Inc. v. National 
Amusements, Inc. illustrates.233 A contractor (Forte) was hired to re-
move rocks and boulders. Forte was paid based on the volume of ma-
terial he removed, as reported by a supervising engineer, who was 
hired by the owner. Forte claimed he was underpaid as a result of  
the engineer’s negligence, but he apparently could not recover the 
underpayment from the owner. The Rhode Island Supreme Court  
allowed the contractor to bring a negligence claim against the engi-
neer to recover the underpayment. 
 A classic torts case, Glanzer v. Shepard, may raise a similar is-
sue.234 A buyer overpaid the seller for beans, allegedly as a result of a 
careless error by a bean weigher hired by the seller. A mystery in the 
case is why the buyer did not seek to recover the overpayment by 
bringing a restitution claim against the seller. Victor Goldberg infers 
there was a term in the contract between the buyer and seller mak-
ing the certified weight “final and binding.”235 The New York Court of 
Appeals allowed the negligence claim. Goldberg argues this may have 
been a mistake.236 
 An inquiry into the parties’ likely intent is inconclusive in Glanzer 
without more information. The purpose of a “final and binding” term 
is to eliminate potential litigation between the buyer and the seller.237 
Allowing a negligence claim against the bean weigher defeats this 
purpose. Goldberg concludes “[s]hifting the losses around in this way 
looks like a reasonably expensive proposition with little to show for it 
in the way of deterrence.”238 If the parties’ goal is efficiency and min-
imizing transaction costs, then I expect they would agree with Gold-
berg. But the parties may also care about fairness. Goldberg speaks 
to the fairness issue, noting that gains and losses from mistakes in 
weighing beans are likely to even out.239 But the buyer may not be 
consoled by this prospect. The buyer may also worry about potential 
bias on the part of the bean weigher, who is hired by the seller, and 
                                                                                                                  
ity between the parties and that therefore the bank owes a stranger no duty of vigilance.” 
Id. at 664. 
 233. 525 A.2d 1301 (R.I. 1987). 
 234. 135 N.E. 275 (1922). 
 235. GOLDBERG, supra note 52, at 249-50. For the original publication of this chapter, 
see Goldberg, supra note 3.  
 236. See GOLDBERG, supra note 52, at 270-71. 
 237. See id. at 253-54. 
 238. Id. at 271. 
 239. Id. at 270. 
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who may be subject to liability to the seller on a contract claim when 
an error results in an under-payment, which harms the seller. The 
buyer may think fairness in the particular case more important than 
efficiency in the long run.240   
 When intent is uncertain, courts fall back on rules of contract con-
struction. These are basically presumptions. One way of understand-
ing the Rhode Island cases is that principles of negligence law con-
trol, unless the court can be reasonably certain the parties would 
have disavowed the negligence claim had they been aware of the is-
sue before a problem arose. Some states come at the problem from 
the opposite direction, using the opposite presumption. These states 
adopt a categorical no-duty rule for cases in which a victim and a 
harm-doer are connected by a chain of contracts, and people in the 
victim’s position generally are sophisticated enough to be expected to 
protect themselves—through these contracts—from the risk of care-
lessly caused harm, when it is in their interest to do so. These cate-
gorical no-duty rules rely on private ordering to do the work of negli-
gence law in cases that are within the rules’ scope. In the parlance of 
contract law, these are rules of presumed intent or rules of contract 
construction, like the employment-at-will rule. 
 Berschauer/Phillips v. Seattle School District is a leading case 
that establishes such a general no-duty rule.241 A general contractor 
sued an architect and inspector seeking to recover cost overruns re-
sulting from the defendants’ alleged carelessness. The general con-
tractor, architect, and inspector all worked under separate contracts 
with the school district. The contractual context is similar to J’Aire 
Corp.: apparently, the general contractor was entitled to compensa-
                                                                                                                  
 240. Often the outcome in these close cases will depend on how the court weighs 
fairness in the particular case against efficiency in the long run. 
 241. Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 992-93 
(Wash. 1994) (en banc). The rule actually stated in the case is narrower and bars only a 
claim by a contractor against a design professional with whom the contractor is not in 
privity. Id. For a similar categorical rule and often the same rationale, see BRW, Inc. v. 
Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 68 (Colo. 2004). See also City Express, Inc. v. Express 
Partners, 959 P.2d 836, 839-40 (Haw. 1998); Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection 
Corp., 503 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1986); Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmty. Gen. 
Hosp. Ass’n, 560 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio 1990); Am. Towers Owners Ass’n v. CCI Mech., 
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190 (Utah 1996); Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Va. 
1987); Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Sheridan Area Water Supply Joint Powers Bd., 929 P.2d 
1228, 1234-35 (Wyo. 1996). 
Berschauer/Phillips names the rule “the economic loss rule.” 881 P.2d at 989. Later 
Washington cases rename the rule “the independent duty doctrine.” Eastwood v. Horse 
Harbor Found., Inc., 241 P.3d 1256, 1268 (Wash. 2010); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK 
Consulting Servs., Inc., 243 P.3d 521, 526 (Wash. 2010) (en banc). Affiliated FM Insurance 
Co. allowed a negligence claim against an engineer when the alleged negligence created a 
dangerous condition involving a significant risk of bodily harm and physical harm to other 
property. Id. at 523.  
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tion for the overruns from the district under its contract with the dis-
trict, and the district had a right to pass through this loss to the ar-
chitect and inspector under its contracts with them.242 The dismissal 
of the negligence claim left the general contractor with an assigned 
contract claim.243 But importantly, the outcome was not made to de-
pend on the facts of the case. The Washington Supreme Court estab-
lished a categorical no-duty rule for claims involving pure economic 
loss where the plaintiff and defendant are participants in a construc-
tion project who are not in privity with each other.244 The rule does 
not require investigation of the facts of a case, including the details of 
the relevant contracts. Under the rule, participants in a construction 
project are expected to protect themselves from the risk of inadvert-
ently caused pure economic loss by contract, when it is in their inter-
est to do so.245 Several reasons justify this expectation: it is assumed 
that most participants in construction projects are sophisticated; con-
tracts generally are routinized; and participants in a construction 
project generally should be aware of the risks they face from other 
participants to whom they are connected through a web of contracts 
but are not in privity with. Some courts have adopted similar cate-
gorical no-duty rules for claims involving pure economic loss that re-
sult from a defect in commercial, real, or personal property when the 
plaintiff and the defendant are not in privity of contract.246 
 The Washington rule is clearly better than some current alterna-
tives. It is clearly better than the approach taken in J’Aire Corp., 
which ignores the contractual context of a negligence claim entirely. 
And it is clearly better than the more extreme versions of the  
economic loss rule, which preclude negligence claims involving pure 
                                                                                                                  
 242. Both facts may be inferred from the fact that the district assigned its contract 
claims against the architect and inspector to the contractor in satisfaction of the 
contractor’s contract claim against it.  
 243. The Washington Supreme court held the claim to be assignable in another part of 
the decision. Berschauer/Phillips, 881 P.2d at 993-94. 
 244. Id. at 993. 
 245. Id. at 992-93 (“We . . . maintain the fundamental boundaries of tort and contract 
law by limiting the recovery of economic loss due to construction delays to the remedies 
provided by contract. We so hold to ensure that the allocation of risk and the determination 
of potential future liability is based on what the parties bargained for in the contract. . . . A 
bright line distinction between the remedies offered in contract and tort with respect to 
economic damages also encourages parties to negotiate toward the risk distribution that is 
desired or customary. We preserve the incentive to adequately self-protect during the 
bargaining process. If we held to the contrary, a party could bring a cause of action in tort 
to recover benefits they were unable to obtain in contractual negotiations.”)  
(citation omitted). 
 246. Bos. Inv. Prop. No. 1 State v. E.W. Burman, Inc., 658 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I. 1995); 
Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 850 (Wis. 1998).  
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economic loss more generally, and without regard for the plaintiff’s 
ability to protect itself from the risk of carelessly caused harm by  
contract.247   
 The comparison between the Washington rule and what I infer to 
be the Rhode Island approach is a bit closer. Under the Rhode Island 
approach, principles of negligence law control unless a court can be 
reasonably certain the parties would have disavowed negligence lia-
bility, if the issue had been brought to the parties’ attention before a 
problem arose. The Rhode Island approach involves greater claims 
processing costs than the Washington rule in these cases, though the 
two often yield the same result. The Rhode Island approach also in-
volves greater legal uncertainty because of factual uncertainty, nor-
mative uncertainty, and random error. The Washington rule yields a 
certain but debatable result in a case like Forte Brothers. The result 
is uncertain under the Rhode Island approach. A judge who thought 
efficiency in the long run to be more important than fairness in the 
immediate case might reject the claim. 
 These are the familiar trade-offs between a rule and a standard. 
The advantage of a standard is that sometimes a rule will be over-
broad, meaning the rule yields a result that is inconsistent with  
the reasons for the rule. Consider Squish La Fish, Inc. v. Thomco 
Specialty Products, Inc.248 The plaintiff (Squish La Fish) invented an 
                                                                                                                  
 247. An example is the rule established by the Florida Supreme Court in AFM Corp. v. 
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. that “without some conduct resulting in personal 
injury or property damage, there can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual 
breach which would justify a tort claim solely for economic losses.” 515 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 
1987). This reinstates the old privity rule for cases in which negligence in the performance 
of a contract results in a pure economic loss to a nonparty. It also eliminates the well-
established first-party tort claims for legal and accounting malpractice. 
The Florida Supreme Court abandoned this rule when some of these consequences 
became apparent. In Moransais v. Heathman, the court narrowed the scope of the economic 
loss rule “to those contexts or situations where the policy considerations are substantially 
identical to those underlying the product liability-type analysis.” 744 So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 
1999). Ironically, this was to allow a negligence claim that probably should have been 
denied. The plaintiffs hired an engineering company to inspect a home they were 
considering purchasing. Id. at 974. Their contract with the company had a liability 
limitation. Moransais v. Heathman, 702 So. 2d 601, 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The 
negligence claim was against two employees of the company. Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 975. 
The court relied on rules that allow direct claims by clients against lawyers and health-
care professionals who render services through a professional corporation. Id. at 975-78. 
Liability waivers by lawyers and health care professionals are void as against public policy. 
See id. at 978-79, 83. These rules prevent lawyers and health care professionals from 
immunizing themselves from liability indirectly by providing services through a 
professional corporation. Id. Individual liability of the engineers in the case should have 
been conditioned on a determination that a liability waiver in a home inspection contract is 
void as against public policy.  
 248. 149 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying Georgia law). The court held Georgia’s 
version of the economic loss rule did not preclude the claim for the technical reason that 
the claim was a negligent misrepresentation claim, and not a negligence claim. Id. at 1291. 
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inexpensive device to squeeze fluid from a tuna can. It contracted 
with ProPack to design and supply retail packaging for the device. 
ProPack purchased the glue from a 3M distributor, relying on the 
distributor’s expertise in selecting the glue. The glue chosen by the 
distributor was not easily washed off the squeezer, which made the 
squeezer unmarketable and caused the plaintiff to lose a multimil-
lion-unit contract it had in hand. The court allowed the plaintiff to 
bring a tort claim against the distributor. In some states, the claim 
would have been precluded by a categorical no-duty rule like the 
Washington rule, which applies in the products setting. 
 We can be fairly confident that, had the issue of the negligence 
claim’s availability been brought to the parties’ attention before the 
problem arose, the parties would have agreed the claim was availa-
ble. As previously noted, this is because courts handle predicted in-
tent as a matter of reasonableness. Even if we predict the 3M dis-
tributor would have dissented on this point, its position is unreason-
able on the facts of the case. ProPack relied on the distributor to pro-
vide water-soluble glue, and this reliance was made clear to the dis-
tributor. The distributor had reason to know of the plaintiff’s poten-
tial loss if the glue did not work, and it seems the distributor did not 
disclaim liability for consequential damages in its contract with 
ProPack.249 The strongest argument against allowing the negligence 
claim is that redress may have been available under contract law. 
But the plaintiff’s decision to pursue the tort claim against the dis-
tributor is excusable. The plaintiff’s strongest contract claim was 
against ProPack under UCC section 2-315 for breach of the implied 
warranty of fitness. But recovery on the claim was uncertain because 
of unusual facts in the case.250 
 A categorical no-duty rule may also yield the wrong result when 
established mechanisms for dealing with a risk fail in unusual  
circumstances. Plata American Trading, Inc. v. Lancashire illus-
trates.251 A scoundrel, Marco, devised a scheme to divert tallow that 
was being loaded into a carrier’s vessel so that 501 tons were record-
ed while only 375 tons were loaded. The plaintiffs were buyers of the 
tallow who paid for 501 tons. The buyers had two contractual mecha-
                                                                                                                  
 249. Neither the opinion nor the appellate briefs discuss the contracts between plaintiff 
and ProPack and between ProPack and the distributor. See id.; Brief of Appellant, Squish 
La Fish, Inc., 149 F.3d 1288 (No. 97-8595); Brief of Appellee, Squish La Fish, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1288 (No. 97-8595). 
 250. The plaintiff may have thought it did not have a claim for breach of the implied 
warranty of fitness against ProPack because ProPack disclosed it had no expertise in the 
type of packaging plaintiff wanted. While ProPack would have had a claim under the 
implied warranty against the distributor, this claim would cover the plaintiff’s lost profits 
only if they were recovered by the plaintiff in a contract claim against ProPack. 
 251. 214 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957). 
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nisms protecting them against the unexpected shortfall: an insurance 
policy covering the goods while they were in transit and a recital in 
the carrier’s bill of lading that it had received 501 tons. The court 
held this risk was uninsured because the 501 tons were never loaded 
into the vessel. And it held the carrier was not liable under the bill of 
lading with regard to the shipper (the first buyer), and that on the 
facts of the case, the second buyer stood in the same shoes as the first 
buyer. The court held the buyers could recover from the cargo inspec-
tor, Martin, explaining that “Martin negligently,—grossly so,—lent 
himself to the scheme. He merely measured the amount of tallow 
that left Marco’s tanks without troubling himself to find out where it 
actually went.”252 The result is clearly correct under the Rhode Island 
approach. Martin’s carelessness left the buyers completely vulnerable 
to the risk of being defrauded by the seller. The buyers went to great 
lengths to protect themselves from the risk of a shortfall on delivery, 
but these mechanisms did not cover the possibility that tallow would 
be diverted between the seller’s tank and the vessel. 
 It is possible to reduce the incidence of wrong results under a cat-
egorical no-duty rule by treating the rule as a strong interpretive 
presumption. The presumption would be that participants in a multi-
person project intend to disavow possible negligence claims for pure 
economic loss between participants who are not in privity of contract, 
when it is possible to create contractual mechanisms to protect 
against the risk. The interpretive presumption could be overcome if 
the plaintiff persuaded the court that the contracts were not intended 
to cover the risk of the relevant harm, and that the parties would 
have agreed to allow a negligence claim if the issue had been brought 
to their attention before the problem arose. Conversely, it is possible 
to reduce claims processing costs, uncertainty, and error under a 
more flexible approach by establishing rules of thumb, such as the 
rule a negligence claim is not available when contract claims provide 
compensation and deterrence, and the rule a negligence claim is not 
available when the contracts preclude first-party claims for the harm 
in question. The important point is that courts should use contractu-
al techniques of interpretation and construction to inform no-duty 
analysis by asking whether the parties would have agreed to disavow 
the negligence claim had they addressed the question when the con-
tract was made. 
                                                                                                                  
 252. Id. at 49. 
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 2.   The Power to Disclaim a Duty to a Nonparty (Pure Economic 
Loss)  
 Under the approach proposed in the last Section, the parties to a 
contract do not have the power to disclaim a duty in tort to a nonpar-
ty by including an exculpatory term in a contract. The presence of an 
exculpatory term is only a factor to be considered by a court in de-
termining whether the contractual context of a claim justifies a no-
duty determination. This Section briefly considers cases in which 
parties to a contract do have the power to disclaim a duty in tort to a 
nonparty. 
 Two examples illustrate the general circumstances in which this 
power should exist: 
 Testator agrees to absolve Draftsman from negligence liability 
in return for Draftsman preparing Testator’s will for a lower price. 
Intended Beneficiary loses a bequest as a result of Draftsman’s 
carelessness. The contract clearly shields Draftsman from a mal-
practice claim by Intended Beneficiary. 
 Employer hires Testing Company to drug test prospective em-
ployees. The contract provides the tests are done solely for Em-
ployer’s benefit, and that Company is not subject to liability to an 
employee in the event of a false positive. The contract clearly 
shields Testing Company from a negligence claim by an employee 
in the event of a false positive. 
 The reasons why parties should have the power to disclaim a duty 
in these cases are similar to the reasons why parties should have the 
power to disclaim a duty to a nonparty in a case involving physical 
harm, when neither party created the risk of the physical harm that 
occurred or was otherwise under a duty of care with respect to the 
physical harm.253 Testator has the right to not make a bequest to 
Beneficiary. Employer has the right to not hire a prospective employ-
ee. In both cases, the defendant’s negligence results in the plaintiff 
being denied a benefit that the hiring party (Testator and Employer) 
had the right to withhold. The hirer should have the power to absolve 
the defendant from possible liability to the plaintiff if the hirer de-
cides this arrangement to be in her interest. 
 To have an absence of a duty in the physical harm cases, it is im-
portant that the plaintiff did not rely on the defendant. For example, 
in Stanley v. McCarver254 the radiologist would have owed a duty of 
care to the plaintiff under general principles of tort law if the plain-
tiff relied on the clean bill of health to forego a checkup that would 
                                                                                                                  
 253. See supra Section VI.A.2. 
 254. 92 P.3d 849 (Ariz. 2004).  
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have detected the cancer. The radiologist’s action in giving a clean 
bill of health would create a risk of harm through the plaintiff’s reli-
ance. Similarly, if Intended Beneficiary changes his position in reli-
ance on receiving the bequest, then Draftsman may owe a duty of 
care to Intended Beneficiary because of the reliance. 
 When negligence results in physical harm through a plaintiff’s 
reliance, the reliance need only be foreseeable for the defendant to be 
subject to negligence liability. More is generally necessary for a de-
fendant to be under a duty of care when the plaintiff’s reliance in-
volves a pure economic loss. For there to be a duty, the defendant (or 
the person who hired the defendant) must have reasonably appeared 
to invite the plaintiff’s reliance. So, for example, if Lender hires En-
gineer to inspect property to protect Lender’s security on a purchase 
money loan, it is generally held that neither Lender nor Engineer has 
a duty of care to the Purchaser unless Lender (or Engineer) tells the 
Purchaser they intend for the Purchaser to be able to rely on the in-
spection. That the parties could foresee Purchaser would rely on the 
inspection is not sufficient to rise to a duty of care.255 This raises the 
question whether Lender and Engineer have the power to disclaim a 
duty of care to Purchaser by including an exculpatory term in their 
contract, while inviting Purchaser’s reliance. The next Section ad-
dresses this question in the context of a negligent misrepresentation 
claim. 
C.   Negligent Misrepresentation, Invited Reliance,  
and Information Costs 
 The possibility that a party to a contract may be subject to liabil-
ity to a nonparty for negligent misrepresentation raises the concern 
for nonparty search costs, which justifies the privity rules in contract 
law.256 This Section considers whether this concern might justify re-
lated restrictions some states have placed on the tort, including a re-
quirement that the parties be in “near privity” and a requirement 
that the defendant have subjectively intended to invite the plaintiff’s 
reliance. It concludes these restrictions are too crude and that there 
are better ways to balance the interests of information suppliers and 
information recipients using an invited reliance duty rule. 
 A pair of illustrations in the current draft of the Restatement 
(Third) Torts: Liability for Economic Harm257 raises the general con-
cern. In both illustrations, Borrower hires Accountant to prepare a 
                                                                                                                  
 255. See Gergen, supra note 16, at 754-56.  
 256. See supra Section V.B. 
 257. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 5 cmt. g, illus. 
10, 11 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012). 
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report Borrower intends to use to get a $5 million line of credit from 
Lender. As a result of a negligent oversight by Accountant, the report 
erroneously states Borrower is in good financial shape. Lender de-
clines to extend the line of credit. Borrower then gives the report to 
“Second Choice Bank,” which relies on the report, extends the line of 
credit, and eventually suffers a loss. The Restatement draft takes the 
position Accountant has no duty to Second Choice Bank if there is an 
express understanding between Accountant and Borrower “that [the 
report] is for transmission to Lender only.”258 But under the Restate-
ment draft, Accountant has a duty if “Borrower merely informs Ac-
countant that he expects to negotiate a loan . . . and has Lender  
in mind.”259 
 The illustrations assume the terms of the engagement between 
Accountant and Borrower are common knowledge. But what if they 
are not? What if Second Choice Bank believes the report was pre-
pared for its use when it was not, because the understanding be-
tween Accountant and Borrower is not communicated to Second 
Choice Bank. This is a classic case of misunderstanding: Second 
Choice Bank thinks its reliance is invited; Accountant thinks other-
wise. Generally a misunderstanding is resolved against the party 
who is more at fault. This is Second Choice Bank, if the report clearly 
indicates that it is prepared for Lender’s use only. But Accountant 
may be more at fault if the report merely states the report is for Bor-
rower to use in obtaining a $5 million line of credit, with no indica-
tion the report is for Lender’s use only. The comments in the Re-
statement adopt essentially this analysis, explaining that what mat-
ters in such a case is Accountant’s objective or apparent intent, and 
not Accountant’s actual intent.260 
 I have argued elsewhere that this inquiry into Accountant’s objec-
tive intent is best understood as an inquiry into the presence or ab-
sence of invited reliance, which is essentially a contractual ques-
                                                                                                                  
 258. Id. at cmt. g, illus. 10. 
 259. Id. at cmt. g, illus. 11. 
 260. Comment g(2) observes that:  
Courts sensibly interpret what a defendant “knew” to encompass as well what 
the defendant should have known—in other words, what the defendant 
reasonably should have expected the client’s use of the information to be. 
Otherwise a defendant’s negligent assessment of that use would serve to reduce 
its own duty of care. 
Id. at cmt. g(2). The relevant point can be put a bit more precisely: Accountant’s liability to 
Second Choice Bank does not turn on whether Accountant knows or has reason to know 
Borrower might give the report to Second Choice Bank. It turns on whether Accountant 
knows or has reason to know that Second Choice Bank might understand that one of 
Accountant’s purposes in supplying the report was that Second Choice Bank might be able 
to rely on it.  
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tion.261 The act of inviting reliance is similar to the act of making a 
promise. Both are speech acts. Both involve a shared understanding 
of the purpose of the act. For reliance on information to be invited, A 
supplies information to B with an intent that B be able to rely on the 
information, B understands this is A’s intent in supplying the infor-
mation, A understands this is B’s understanding, and so on. A prom-
ise involves a specific type of invited reliance. When A promises x to 
B, A is inviting B to rely on A to perform x in the future (or to be re-
sponsible if x does not occur). As speech acts, promising and inviting 
reliance are largely a matter of manifested intent. Manifested intent 
to undertake an obligation is more important than the reasonable-
ness of the obligation that is undertaken. Thus, if an information 
supplier disseminates information to the world while stating, “We 
invite the world to rely on this information,” then there is invited re-
liance, and the information supplier may have a duty of care to the 
world to ensure the accuracy of the information, even though inviting 
the world to rely on information is an unreasonable thing.262 Con-
versely, an information supplier can avoid undertaking a duty of care 
in supplying information to a recipient by clearly manifesting his in 
tent not to invite the recipient’s reliance, even though the likely qual-
ity of the information may make it reasonable to invite the recipient’s 
reliance.   
 To be clear, the presence of invited reliance is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for duty under the tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation. In particular, sometimes the contractual context of a claim 
negates duty even though reliance is invited.263 Ossining Union Free 
                                                                                                                  
 261. See Gergen, supra note 86. Reliance is invited when an actor “supplies information 
with an apparent purpose that the recipient be able to rely on the information.” Id. at 959 
(emphasis omitted). Reliance is explicitly invited when an information supplier effectively 
says to the recipient, “I want you to be able to rely on this [information].” Id. Both the user 
and the use must be invited. It is not necessary that the invitation be to a specific user and 
a specific use. The invitation may be to a class of users and for a category of uses.  
 262. See Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d 656, 658 (Ill. 1969) (noting that a plat of survey 
had a legend stating, “This plat of survey carries our absolute guarantee for accuracy” and 
holding that the surveyor had a duty to the downstream purchaser of land who was given 
the plat by the seller). 
 263. See Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1963] UKHL 4, [1964] AC 465 
(Appeal taken from Eng.). A bank gave a positive credit reference regarding a customer 
with the disclaimer “without responsibility on the part of this Bank or its officials.” The 
court established the availability of an action for negligent misstatement under English 
law but then went on to hold the bank was under no duty in giving a credit reference 
because of the disclaimer. In later English cases, courts reason the bank undertook a duty 
of care in answering the inquiry, but hold the exculpatory term absolved the bank from 
liability for breach of the duty on an essentially contractual ground. See Smith v. Eric S. 
Bush [1990] UKHL 1, [1990] 1 AC 831 (appeal taken from N. Ir.). I have argued elsewhere 
that the latter explanation is preferable on technical doctrinal grounds, if the information 
supplier simultaneously invites reliance on information and disclaims legal liability should 
the information turn out to be inaccurate, because there is a duty of care under the 
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School District v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson illustrates.264 This is 
the case in which two engineers were hired to evaluate the safety of a 
building owned by a school district. The engineers mistakenly report-
ed the building was unsafe, causing the district to incur a substan-
tial, unnecessary expense. The engineers worked as subconsultants 
for an architect, who was hired by the district. Invited reliance exists, 
but because the parties likely would have disavowed the negligence 
claim if the issue were previously brought to their attention, the en-
gineers probably have no duty. The parties would be likely to disavow 
the negligence claim if contracts claims were available to provide 
compensation and deterrence. And the parties would be likely to dis-
avow the negligence claim if both contracts had liability caps or 
waivers that precluded a first-party claim. 
 In the case, the New York Court of Appeals allowed the claim for 
negligent misrepresentation, based on a finding that the parties were 
in near privity,265 and without saying a word about the terms of the 
district’s contract with the architect and the architect’s contracts 
with the engineers. This is crazy. The fact the parties are in “near 
privity” cuts against finding a duty in Ossining Union because it in-
creases the likelihood that the risk is addressed directly or indirectly 
in the parties’ contracts. And this can be determined only by examin-
ing the contracts.  
 The mistake of the New York Court of Appeals is to assume “near 
privity” is sufficient to establish duty under the tort. The usual effect 
of the “near privity” test is to impose a heightened requirement for 
duty. The test requires direct communications between the plaintiff 
and defendant.266 Other states impose various heightened standards 
for duty, also requiring something more than invited reliance. Cali-
fornia law seems to require that the defendant have actually intend-
ed that the plaintiff be able to rely on the information.267 Louisiana 
                                                                                                                  
relevant duty rule. Mark P. Gergen, Contracting Out of Liability for Deceit, Inadvertent 
Misrepresentation and Negligent Misstatement, in EXPLORING CONTRACT LAW (Jason W. 
Neyers et al. eds., 2009). 
 264. 539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989). 
 265. See id. at 94-96. 
 266. See Credit All. Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 120 (N.Y. 1985) 
(holding that repeated contact between the auditor and the lender involving discussions of 
the lender’s interest in the borrower’s financial condition is sufficient to find that the 
plaintiff and defendant were in near privity); see also Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, 
P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d 582, 608-09 (Md. 2000) (adopting the New York rule while restating 
the requirement of direct contact in a way that suggests the real concern is that the 
accountant be able to estimate the size of the user’s consequential damages.). 
 267. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 773-74 (Cal. 1992). 
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seems to require the defendant’s actual knowledge.268 These rules ba-
sically resolve a misunderstanding about whether the defendant in-
tended to invite the plaintiff’s reliance against the plaintiff. 
 Does the concern for information costs justify any of these height-
ened requirements for duty under the tort of negligent misrepresen-
tation? As Section V.B explained, the privity rules in contract law 
make it possible to reduce information costs by partitioning a project 
that involves three or more participants into two or more contracts. 
Because of the privity rules, a participant who wants to ensure he 
does not inadvertently undertake an obligation needs to monitor 
closely only the contract to which he is a party, performances under 
that contract, and his interactions with the other party to that con-
tract. These rules do not apply when the claim is for negligent  
misrepresentation.  
 A test of “invited reliance” provides an information supplier some 
protection from inadvertently undertaking an obligation to a recipi-
ent of the information, because duty requires a court to find that the 
information supplier reasonably appeared to intend to invite the re-
cipient’s reliance. But an information supplier may worry about his 
intent being misunderstood, and a court concluding he is more at 
fault in the misunderstanding. The risk of misunderstanding can be 
great when the intended users and uses of information are ambigu-
ous. In addition, often an intermediary who transmits information 
has an interest in leading the recipient to believe the information 
supplier intended to invite the recipient’s reliance. In the example in 
the Third Restatement draft, Borrower has an interest in having 
Second Choice Bank believe Accountant prepared the report for the 
bank’s use in the transaction. Accountant may worry Borrower will 
miscommunicate its intent in this regard, and that a court will con-
clude Accountant bears more responsibility for the miscommunica-
tion than does Second Choice Bank. The risk of misunderstanding, 
and the risk of miscommunication by an intermediary, gives an in-
formation supplier an incentive to investigate potential users and 
uses of information when the information is supplied. The risk of 
miscommunication provides an incentive to monitor to whom the in-
formation is later transmitted, and on what terms. 
 A test of “near privity” and a test of “actual intent” reduce the risk 
of an information supplier inadvertently undertaking an obligation to 
a recipient as a result of a misunderstanding, or as a result of a mis-
communication by an intermediary. A test of “actual intent” does this 
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by resolving a misunderstanding about an intended user and use in 
the favor of the information supplier. A test of “near privity” does this 
by limiting the universe of recipients to whom an information suppli-
er may have a duty to persons with whom the information supplier is 
in direct communication. These direct communications also provide 
the information supplier with inexpensive opportunities to clarify its 
intent, or to otherwise disclaim a duty or limit its liability. 
 There would be nothing objectionable about these tests if people 
generally understood that an information supplier has no duty of 
care regarding the accuracy of information, even if it is predictable 
someone will attach substantial weight to the information, and even 
if the information is presented in ways that make it seem reliable. 
My impression is that many people do not understand this, particu-
larly when the information comes from a source, like a certified ac-
countant or a rating agency, that holds itself out as a reliable source 
of information. The “near privity” test creates bad incentives, for it 
allows an information supplier to aggressively invite reliance, with 
no fear of liability if the information is inaccurate, so long as they 
avoid direct communications with potential victims. The “actual in-
tent” test is better in this regard. But the test creates similar bad in-
centives if the test requires an information supplier to have a specific 
user and use in mind. This form of the “actual intent” test allows an 
information supplier to aggressively invite reliance so long as the in-
formation is not targeted at a specific user and use. 
 There are better ways to protect an information supplier from the 
risk of inadvertently undertaking a duty to a recipient with whom 
the supplier is not in privity of contract. The simplest solution is to 
create a safe harbor in the form of a rule that allows an information 
supplier to absolve itself from a duty to a recipient by including a 
clear and conspicuous disclaimer with the information. The disclaim-
er might state: “Rely on this information at your own risk. We are 
under no legal responsibility to make any effort to ensure its  
accuracy.” 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 It is possible to incorporate contractual considerations in negli-
gence analysis without upending negligence law. Sometimes the par-
ties to a contract have the power to disclaim a duty to a nonparty. 
But the principles that justify this power derive from negligence law, 
not contract law. For example, there is a power to disclaim a duty to 
a nonparty when carelessness by a party in performing a contract 
exposes the plaintiff to a pre-existing risk, which was not of the mak-
ing of either party to the contract. When a negligence claim involves 
pure economic loss, negligence principles do partly give way to con-
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tractual considerations when the plaintiff and defendant are con-
nected through a chain of contracts, and the parties may be expected 
to address the risk that occurred in these contracts. But negligence 
principles remain an important touchstone in these cases. Courts 
should take account of contractual considerations in approaching the 
duty question in negligence law by asking whether the parties proba-
bly would have disavowed the negligence claim, had the question of 
the availability of the claim been presented to them before the prob-
lem arose. Cases in which the answer to this question is clear present 
no real difficulty, once this is understood to be the question. The dif-
ficult cases are those in which the answer is not clear. I have sug-
gested courts deal with these cases by adopting a presumption either 
allowing or disallowing a negligence claim when the inquiry into pre-
dicted intent is not decisive. 
 Contract law should determine the effect of an exculpatory term 
only when the term is in a contract to which the victim is a party. 
The ultimate question in these cases is whether the harm-doer is an 
intended third-party beneficiary of the term. When the term is am-
biguous, the answer to the ultimate question is a matter of predicted 
intent, and the strength of the reasons for negligence liability is an 
important consideration in this analysis. One change in the law is 
warranted here. U.S. courts should not give literal effect to an excul-
patory term, to deny a negligence claim against a nonparty harm-
doer, when the denial of the claim does not advance the interests of 
the other party to the contract. Principles of contract law do not re-
quire literalism in this context because it does not serve the interests 
of the parties to the contract. 
 Property law and the equitable doctrine of notice may be used to 
create new channels for private ordering, to give effect to a waiver of 
liability, when a victim and a harm-doer are not in privity of con-
tract. But courts should be cautious in creating these channels. A 
new channel should be created for waiver of liability only when there 
is genuine possibility that the background rules of negligence law 
impose liability when it is not in the interest of the parties or society. 
On the other hand, when a court believes the existing background 
rules of negligence law may not reach as far as they should, a court 
might create a channel for waiver of liability while expanding the 
reach of negligence law. In particular, courts should consider elimi-
nating the restrictions on the scope of the tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation that immunize rating agencies and public auditors from 
negligence liability to the public. Immunity might be conditioned on 
rating agencies and public auditors presenting information in ways 
that make it clear to the public that users of the information rely at 
their own risk. 
 
